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Introduction
The concept of open discovery embodied in the 1938 Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the adversarial tradition of the Ameri-
can civil adjudication system have been in a state of ominous tension
since the inception of the federal rules. The existence of an irreconcil-
able conflict that would eventually require fundamental systematic
change was both epitomized and foretold by Hickman v. Taylor, in
which the Court endorsed liberal, open discovery by recognizing that
"[m]utual knowledge of all of the relevant facts gathered by both par-
ties is essential to proper litigation."1 At the same time, the Court
approved the adversarial principles reflected in Justice Jackson's fa-
mous concurring statement that "[d]iscovery was hardly intended to
enable a learned profession to perform its functions either without
wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary. ' '2 Recently, a seemingly
modest federal discovery rules reform proposal, which was spawned
by concerns about excessive litigation costs and requires mutual early
disclosure of basic information by both sides to a case, set off a furor
arguably unmatched in the history of the federal civil rules. Examina-
tion of the history of discovery and discovery abuse in the context of
the adversary system, the recent cacophony calling for litigation sys-
tem reform, and the likely operation and effect of the federal disclo-
sure proposal reveal that the proposal, while by itself unlikely to
significantly affect the costs and abuses associated with current discov-
ery practices, is far more revolutionary than its proponents seem to
1. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
2. Id. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring). While Justice Jackson's statement, which more
poignantly embodies partisanship principles than does the majority opinion, has been cited
with far greater frequency than the majority opinion, there is no question that the Court's
opinion embraces partisanship. See id. at 511-14 (stating that the files and mental notes of
lawyers should not be opened to the free scrutiny of their adversaries).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
acknowledge. Indeed, as its opponents consciously or subconsciously
sense, the proposal represents the first step on the difficult path away
from the laissez faire adversarial tradition in discovery that is per-
ceived by many as achieving too little justice at too great a cost.
The widespread public and professional perception of a "litiga-
tion explosion ' 3 accompanied by a serious breakdown in the Ameri-
can litigation system during the late 1970s and 1980s has given rise to
what might be called a procedural reform explosion in the 1990s. 4 All
three branches of the government, as well as much of the organized
bar and corporate America, have been involved in a frenzy of activity
in recent years that has generated numerous proposals for fundamen-
tal changes to the litigation mechanisms by which we resolve civil dis-
3. WALTER K. OLSON, THE LTIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN
AMERicA UNrLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991); see also Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41
AM. U. L. Rv. 559, 560 (1992) (increase in litigation). But see Robert C. Clark, Why So
Many Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad?, 61 FORDaAM L. Rnv. 275, 277-78, 301 (1992)
(suggesting that the increase in the number of lawyers and amount of litigation may not be
unhealthy); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. Rnv. 4 (1983) (acknowledging widespread claims and perceptions of "litigation
explosion" or "hyperlexis," but arguing that data does not support its existence) [hereinaf-
ter Galanter, Reading the Landscape]; Lauren K. Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the Federal
Courts, 7 Omo ST. J. ON DIsP. REsOL. 115, 137 (1991) (arguing crisis and need for reform
not substantiated); Jack B. Weinstein, ProceduralReform as a Surrogate for Substantive
Law Revision, 59 BROoic. L. Rnv. 827, 829-31 (1993) (arguing that claims about litigation
explosion have little objective basis and are not supported by federal court case filing
statistics).
4. See e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77
MiNN. L. REv. 375,377 (1992) [hereinafter Mullenix, Counter-Reformation]; Linda S. Mul-
lenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of Pow-
ers, 77 MnqN. L. REv. 1283, 1284-85 (1993) [hereinafter Mullenix, Separation of Powers];
George L. Priest, Lawyers, Liability, and Law Reform. Effects on American Economic
Growth and Trade Competitiveness, 71 DENV. U. L. REv. 115, 116-17 (1993); Thomas A.
Zlaket, Encouraging Litigators to Be Lawyers: Arizona's New Civil Rules, 25 ARIz. ST.
LJ. 1, 1-3 (1993). Professor Richard Marcus suggests that much of the recent "crisis rheto-
ric" appears to have been employed to spur radical, multidirectional change in the litiga-
tion system and concludes that "the feeling that there is some pressing urgency for change,
which is fueled by the litigation crisis notion, appears to have been debunked in profes-
sional, if not political, circles." Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Pros-
pects for Procedural Progress, 59 BRooK. L. REv. 761, 761-63 (1993) [hereinafter Marcus,
Prospects]. One aspect of the crisis noted by Marcus is the sense that there is a "crisis of
purpose"-that there is no general agreement as to what the ultimate aspiration of civil
litigation should be. Id. at 766-67. That there is a lack of consensus over purpose is argua-
bly reflected in debates over the relationship between the disclosure rule, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(a), and the adversarial system-the focal point here. See infra text
accompanying notes 300-400.
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putes in federal court.5 Few aspects of law, procedural or substantive,
relating to litigation in federal courts have escaped attention. Reform
efforts, largely spurred by concerns that litigation associated costs
have become so excessive that they threaten the very health of the
national economy,6 have included proposals to revise the longstanding
5. See, e.g., Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 101-105, 104
Stat. 5089-98 (1990) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. II 1990); Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1993, S. 585, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (bill sponsored by Senators Grassley and
DeConcini providing attorneys fees to winner in diversity cases, expanding offer of judg-
ment rule, limiting refiling notice to 30 days, limiting parties to one expert per party); Exec.
Order No. 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195 (1990) (implementing many of the Council on Com-
petitiveness recommendations for the Executive Branch); Agency Rulings: Government
Lawyers Instructed on Civil Litigation Reforms, 60 U.S.L.W. 2510-11 (Feb. 18, 1992) (De-
partment of Justice guidelines implementing Exec. Order 12,778); BROOKINGS INSTITU-
TION, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION (1989);
REPORT OF T=E FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 3 (Apr. 2, 1990); Mullenix,
Counter-Reformation, supra note 4, at 387-91 & n.33; Quayle, supra note 3, at 561-69; Carl
Tobias, Civil Justice Reform Roadmap, 142 F.R.D. 507 (1992); William K. Wells, Expedited
Cases: Efficiency Is Crucial to Success, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 1, 1993, at 31. For a brief review
of civil litigation reform activity, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science,
or Crumbling Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59
BROOK. L. REv. 659, 660-88 (1993).
Similar reform programs have been undertaken at the state court level. See, eg.,
Zlaket, supra note 4, at 1-9 (describing Arizona's civil litigation reform).
6. Probably the most notorious claims of adverse economic effects of litigation in the
United States were those of former Vice President Quayle at the 1991 American Bar Asso-
ciation Convention, where he stated that America had 70% of the world's lawyers and that
the increase in litigation was a drain on the economy. Vice President Dan Quayle, Address
before the American Bar Association (transcript available in Federal News Service, Aug.
13, 1991). For recent critical discussion of the claim that there is a litigation crisis, accom-
panied by excessive costs and too many lawyers, see David W. Barnes, The Litigation Cri-
sis: Competitiveness and Other Measures of Quality of Life, 71 DENV. U. L. REv. 71 (1993);
Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV. U. L.
REv. 77 (1993) [hereinafter Galanter, News from Nowhere). Galanter, who has been
deeply involved in the litigation crisis debate for many years, ultimately concludes that we
lack sufficient information to reach any conclusions about the economic effects of the civil
litigation system. "That baseless fictions about the number of lawyers, cursory surmises
about the costs of the civil justice system, unfounded notions about product liability litiga-
tion and fables about damaged competitiveness continue to be taken seriously testifies
both to Sthe paucity of information we do have and to the wide spread disinclination to
employ the information that we do have." Galanter, News from Nowhere, supra at 99.
Professor Marcus has offered several possible reasons for the crisis rhetoric and stri-
dency of debate on civil litigation reform, both as to the need for reform and the opposi-
tion to reform proposals such as mandatory disclosure in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a): (1) the innately conservative nature of the legal profession; (2) the politicization of
the civil rule-making process resulting in "the sky is falling" approach to gain attention for
interest groups' particular concerns; (3) recent experiences with previous reforms such as
the amendment of Rule 11 in 1983 and the adoption of the Civil Justice Reform Act
(CJRA), accompanied by the perception that there is a hidden agenda to these changes
that is intended to make particular groups either "winners or losers." Marcus, Prospects,
supra note 4, at 819-21.
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method by which costs are allocated in federal lawsuits; to limit dam-
ages; to limit expert witnesses;7 to increase yet again the level of judi-
cial management that is to be exercised by federal judges;8 to reduce
the number of lawyers being produced by law schools; to scale back
substantive law in torts, environmental, and other areas;9 and to
launch a massive five-year local delay and cost reduction experimental
program in federal courts, commonly referred to as the Civil Justice
Reform Act.10
Much of the outcry over the abuses and excesses in the litigation
system over the past two or three decades has centered on claims of
pervasive discovery abuse and misuse.1" While there are substantial
differences in perceptions as to what really constitutes discovery abuse
7. See S. 2180, 102d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1992); H.R. 4155, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992)
(Bush Administration reform proposals arising out of the work of then-Vice President
Quayle's Council on Competitiveness); Civil Justice Reform Act of 1993, S. 585, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), 139 CONG. REc. S2917-20 (1993) (reintroducing modified "English
Rule" for fees in diversity cases (Le., loser pays); modifying offer of judgment rule under
which plaintiff or defendant can offer judgment, which if declined by other side, may result
in costs and fees being awarded to offering side if judgment returned for less than offer;
limiting experts to one per side per issue; and requiring prior notice of intent to file civil
suit); 1995 Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 37, at D-16, D-17 (Feb. 24, 1995) (discuss-
ing H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), "A Bill to Reform the Civil Justice System,"
that includes shifting attorneys fees if an offer of judgment is rejected and the judgment
obtained is less than the offer, a presumption of inadmissibility of scientific evidence under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and restoration of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to its
pre-1993 version; and discussing H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), the "Common
Sense Legal Reforms Act," that contains similar provisions); ABA Says No to Litigation
"Reforms" in Republican Contract with America, 63 U.S.L.W. (BNA) 112, 2506 (Feb. 21,
1995) (discussing ABA opposition to reforms like those proposed in H.R. 988 and H.R.
10); Carl Tobias, The Clinton Administration and Civil Justice Reform, 144 F.R.D. 437, 443
(1993).
8. See Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 4, at 387-88; infra text accompany-
ing notes 78-79.
9. Priest, supra note 4, at 116-18.
10. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (Supp. 1992)). See generally Marcus, Prospects, supra note 4, at
800-05 (critically reviewing history of the CJRA and local Expense and Delay Reduction
Plans and concluding that based on the questionable empirical, political, theoretical, and
practical aspects of the CJRA process that "[t]he entire experience thus far has been most
troubling for those concerned with responsible innovation"); Mullenix, Counter-Reforma-
tion, supra note 4, at 392-96 (describing the requirements of the Act and the various pilot,
demonstration, and early implementation district plans); Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United":
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 54 LAW & CorNMw. PRons. 105 (1991). See also
Tobias, supra note 7, at 441-42 (describing CJRA generally).
11. The sheer volume of articles in the last two decades addressing the issues of de-
fects in the federal discovery system prohibits comprehensive enumeration here. For a
representative sampling, see DANIEL SEGAL, SuRvEY OF THE LITERATURE ON DiscovERY
FROM 1970 To Tm PRESEN. EXPRESSED DISSATISFACrIONS AND PROPOSED REFoRMS
(1978); see also infra text accompanying notes 55-93.
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or misuse and fundamental disagreement on the extent of the prob-
lem,12 there is little question that discovery abuse, however it is de-
fined, has been perceived as a major problem for many years despite
repeated corrective tinkering with the federal discovery rules.' 3 Not
surprisingly, therefore, virtually all quarters in the current procedural
revolution have devoted substantial attention to reforms to correct
what are seen as the most egregious, and most intractable, problems
with discovery. Perhaps the most prominent and controversial of the
current discovery reform proposals, which is a part of the Federal
Civil Rules Advisory Committee's seemingly modest recent offerings
on discovery reform and has been incorporated in various forms in
other reform proposals,14 is the concept of early mandatory disclosure
by both sides of basic information as a prelude to additional tradi-
tional discovery.' 5
Similar claims exist regarding discovery abuse in state court civil proceedings. See,
e.g., Honorable Robert D. Myers, MAD Track: An Experiment in Terror, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
11 (1993) (report of a state commission examining the direction of the state's courts indi-
cated that 'the most prominent way in which the conduct of lawyers has contributed to
inefficiencies, delay, and excessive cost in the resolution of civil disputes is in the conduct
of civil discovery' (quoting REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON =HE CouRTS § 5.6, at 55)).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 55-130. A survey of the literature on discovery
from 1969 until 1978 concluded that there was a growing sense that discovery abuse was
becoming a greater problem, particularly in complex litigation, but that the expressed dis-
satisfaction had come primarily from articles written by law students and academics rather
than practicing attorneys. SEGAL, supra note 11, at 66-67.
13. See, e.g., SEGAL, supra note 11, at 58, 66-68; Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery Abuse:
Some Specific Proposals to Amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 U.S.F. L. REV.
189, 189-99 (1992); Paul L. Friedman, Speeding Up Justice at the District Court, LEGAL
TIMs, Apr. 19, 1993, at 30, 31; Quayle, supra note 3, at 563.
14. See, e.g., Randall Samborn, Derailing the Rules, NAT'L L.J., May 24, 1993, at 1, 33
(noting that 22 of 38 Civil Justice Reform Act plans have variations on mandatory disclo-
sure and that Arizona has adopted a stringent mandatory disclosure rule); Carl Tobias,
Collision Course in Civil Procedure, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 19, 1992, at 43 (discussing disclo-
sure in Civil Justice Reform Act plans); Zlaket, supra note 4, at 5-7 (discussing Arizona
Rule 26.1, mandatory disclosure of relevant information known to the parties at the outset,
and placing presumptive limits on discovery); Tracey I. Levy, Note, Mandatory Disclosure:
A Methodology for Reducing the Burden of Pro Se Prisoner Litigation, 57 ALB. L. REv.
487, 497-501, 519-22 (1993) (discussing disclosure requirements in Civil Justice Reform Act
plans of 24 districts).
15. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)-(B). "[T]his subdivision imposes on parties a
duty to disclose, without awaiting formal discovery requests, certain basic information that
is needed in most cases to prepare for trial or make an informed decision about settle-
ment," including information about potential witnesses, documentary evidence, damages,
and insurance. Id. & advisory committee's notes, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 627, 627-28
(1993). The proposed rule on disclosure, along with other amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure approved by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the Stand-
ing Committee on Practice and Procedure, and the Judicial Conference of the United
States, were adopted by the Supreme Court and transmitted to Congress on April 22, 1993.
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Federal Rule 26(a) disclosure represents a variation on proposals
offered by several proceduralists in the late 1970s.16 The Advisory
Committee has described disclosure as the equivalent of the first wave
of standard interrogatories or the "functional equivalent of court-or-
dered interrogatories"; it is intended "to accelerate the exchange of
basic information about the case and to eliminate the paper work in-
volved in requesting such information."' 7 Despite these ostensibly
modest, benign aspirations,'8 the proposal set off such hairpulling and
handwringing in the legal community that one might assume that the
entire adversary system itself was being dismantled.' 9 Since prelimi-
The amendments became effective December 1, 1993, when Congress failed to take any
contrary action. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072; Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and Forms, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 402 (1993). For. additional discussion of the
text of the disclosure rule and the process by which the rule was adopted, see infra text
accompanying notes 148-179.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 128-168.
17. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a) advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 627, 627-
28 (1993). See also Letter from Sam C. Pointer, Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, to Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure (May 1, 1992), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 519, 527 (explaining objectives of disclosure
to reduce time and expense of discovery of basic information and assist parties in better
planning for needed discovery); see infra text accompanying notes 154-161.
18. See Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 263,
263, 271 (1992) (Committee Member and Federal Circuit Judge Winter describing the
amendments as "trivial or incremental," explaining that they "require disclosure of nothing
that is not mandatory under the present rules"); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience"
Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795, 798
(1991) [hereinafter Mullenix, Hope over Experience] (describing precursor version of dis-
closure rule as "innocent, neutral, bland and boring (-as all good procedural rules should
be)"); Samborn, supra note 14, at 33 (quoting former Advisory Committee Reporter Paul
Carrington that the Committee has not proposed anything "anywhere near as radical as
some think").
19. See e.g., Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms, re-
printed in 146 F.R.D. 507, 511 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling Rule 26 proposal "radi-
cal"); Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-Rush To Reform, 27 GA. L.
REv. 1, 3 (1992) (describing proposal as "most sweeping amendments" in 50 years); Ann
Pelham, Forcing Litigants to Share, LEGAL TImms, May 3, 1993, at 20 (calling proposal the
"most radical change ever in the rules for litigating civil cases"); Randall Samborn, U.S.
Civil Procedure Revisited, NAT'L L.i., May 4, 1992, at 1 (labeling the proposals the most
substantive alterations of the rules since their adoption). See also Marcus, Prospects, supra
note 4, at 808-12 (suggesting that "tumult" resulting from the plausible effort to address
discovery abuse cannot be explained by practical concerns about whether the rule will
work or cause more burdens, but instead that "many in the legal community fear that any
change comes with a malign hidden agenda" and lawyers look at any reform from the
parochial view of whether it will make them "winners or losers"); Mullenix, Hope over
Experience, supra note 18, at 830 (asserting that the overreaction to the proposed disclo-
sure rule suggests that what is going on is not strictly related to discovery reform, but
instead the politicization of the rule-making process for the purpose of furthering substan-
tive goals of interest groups); Stempel, supra note 5, at 661, 695-96, 705-37, 759 (discussing
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nary introduction of the disclosure concept in 1989, the pressure to
abandon the proposal has been intense. The thesis of this Article is
that there is also something far more fundamental causing the breadth
and intensity of reaction to the disclosure rule, even by those practi-
tioners who do not have a political, substantive, or parochial agenda.
This root cause relates to pervasiveness of a partisan tradition that is
not consistent with the formal rules and doctrines of discovery.20
Although there have been many instances over the past fifty years in
which amendments to the federal rules have generated substantial
resistance,21 organized resistance to the disclosure proposal appar-
ently is unequaled.22
thesis that litigation reform and disclosure controversy is part of a "shift" from the "open
access" civil litigation "paradigm" to one that focuses on cheaper and quicker dispute
resolution).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 179-400.
21. See, e.g., infra note 308. Reforms outside the area of federal procedural rules have
also set off widespread opposition. For example, the profession's negative reaction to the
development of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct by the Kutak Commission
between 1977 and 1983 appears to approach that encountered by the disclosure rule and
arguably may stem from common underlying dynamics. See Theodore Schneyer, Profes-
sionalism as Politics: The Making of a Modern Legal Ethics Code, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/
LAWYERS' PRAcncEs: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 95
(Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992). Among the most controversial provisions of the early
drafts of the Model Rules were those that increased lawyers' obligations to third parties
and to the courts in relationship to their clients, particularly with regard to client confi-
dences. These were seen as potentially destroying both the adversary system and tradi-
tional norms of confidentiality in lawyer-client relations. Id. at 113-17, 122-23, 127-30.
22. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Learning from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts
Need Real Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 295 (1994); Marcus, Prospects, supra note 4, at 808;
Jeffrey J. Mayer, Prescribing Cooperation: The Mandatory Pretrial Disclosure Requirement
of Proposed Rules 26 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 12 REv. LITIG. 77, 81
(1992); Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Dep't of Jus-
tice, Statement Concerning Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure before the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice, Committee on the
Judiciary, U.S. Senate, July 28, 1993, at 3 (quoting Honorable Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chief
Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama and Chairman of
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Statement before the Subcommittee on Intellec-
tual Property and Judicial Administration of the Committee of the Judiciary, U.S. House of
Representatives, June 16, 1993, at 13) (on file with Hastings Law Journal). Indeed, the
organized opposition to the proposal has extended beyond the public comment procedures
of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee to include lobbying against proposed Rule 26 to
the Standing Committee on Federal Rules, the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court,
and Congress. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 15, at
505 (1993) (statement of Justice White commenting upon letters received); Ann Pelham,
Forcing Litigants to Share; Judges Back Radical Discovery Rule, But Lawyers Want a Veto
from Hil LEGAL TIMEs, May 3, 1993, at 1, 20-23 (summarizing opposition and lobbying
efforts led by corporate defense and insurance company lawyers); Samborn, supra note 14,
at 33 (discussing lobbying efforts against disclosure rules led by corporate defense lawyers
and noting efforts to lobby the Supreme Court as well as Congress); Carl Tobias, Congress
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Opposition to the disclosure rule has come from all quarters-the
organized bar, individual practitioners, legal scholars, and some
judges 23-and has been motivated by politics, pragmatism, and funda-
mental theory. Many of the arguments against adoption of the rule
were directed at perceived defects in aspects of its structure, such as
supposedly unrealistic timing expectations or the fact that the disclo-
sure obligation is tied to a vague standard. Those opposed argue that
the language of the standard-"[r]elevant to facts alleged with partic-
ularity"-is even more problematic because of the liberal federal no-
tice pleading system24 and will result in the absence of meaningful
disclosure. Others object that the disclosure rule will cost more than it
is worth because .of increased satellite litigation over compliance with
vague and subjective disclosure standards or because the rule imposes
additional unnecessary burdens on the litigants.25 However, perhaps
the most significant criticisms center around a perception that the dis-
closure rule is inconsistent with fundamental principles of the adver-
sary system, particularly those which underlie the tradition of zealous
advocacy, the attorney-client privilege, and the work product immu-
nity doctrine.26 Thus, many opponents see the disclosure rule as fun-
damentally altering the balance between a lawyer's duty of zealous,
partisan representation of the client and the lawyer's duty to the legal
system as an officer of the court.27 According to these critics, disclo-
sure will undermine the cornerstone of the civil justice system-adver-
sarial preparation of cases.28
Although the controversy surrounding the disclosure rule is only
a small part of the larger debate over civil justice system reform that
and the Civil Rules Proposals, 148 F.R.D. 383, 384 (1993) (noting interest of Congress,
including hearings scheduled on proposals). See also infra notes 168-178.
23. See infra notes 168-205 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 201-205 and accompanying text. The disclosure obligation as to
persons with relevant knowledge and relevant documents is linked to the pleadings by the
Rule's standard: "relevant to facts alleged with particularity." FED. R. Cxv. P.
26(a)(1)(A)-(B).
25. See infra notes 201-204.
26. See infra notes 295-297 and accompanying text. See also Zlaket, supra note 4, at
5-7 (noting the prominence of these arguments in the opposition to Arizona's disclosure
rule).
27. See infra notes 295-297 and accompanying text.
28. Recently, in commenting on the opposition to Arizona's mandatory disclosure
rule, one commentator noted that the fallacious "parade of horribles" concerning the "as-
sault on the adversary system" is not unlike the outcry over the initial introduction of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See JoJene Mills, Practical Implications of the Zlaket
Rules from a Plaintiffs' Lawyer's Prospective, 25 Amz. ST. LJ. 149, 159 (1993). See also
infra notes 30-54 and accompanying text.
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has consumed the profession in recent years, it provides a unique focal
point for consideration of the nature and future direction of the civil
litigation system in the United States because it provides a point at
which the concerns of economy, justice, and formal and informal the-
ory meet head on. This Article will examine the disclosure rule in the
context of the recent debate over discovery abuse and the general out-
cry for corrective response to what are seen by many as runaway liti-
gation costs. The main focus is an analysis of why an apparently
modest rule, intended to reduce discovery costs associated with the
exchange of basic information that is supposed to be routinely shared
under traditional discovery rules, set off such vehement protest. This
analysis requires consideration of the background of discovery in the
federal civil litigation system, the process by which the federal disclo-
sure rule was developed and implemented, and the arguments con-
cerning both the practical and ethical problems with the disclosure
rule. Part I will briefly review the discovery doctrine and its history in
the American litigation system, focusing particularly on the inherent
tension between the principles of discovery and those of our adver-
sarial tradition of partisan representation. It will also examine the
sources of discovery abuse and the extent to which discovery abuse is
a continuing problem, focusing particularly on the available empirical
evidence. This examination suggests that discovery abuse may not be
as overwhelming a problem in terms of litigation cost and delay as it
has incessantly been portrayed. On the other hand, an apparently
constant, significant level of discovery abuse does exist in the tactical
use of discovery as an impositional weapon and in the evasion of dis-
covery,29 both of which are contrary to discovery's fundamental pur-
pose of informational exchange geared toward mutual knowledge. 30
Where discovery abuse does exist, it has remained largely unrespon-
sive to previous reform efforts perhaps because much of the abusive
discovery practice has become an accepted part of the informal zeal-
ous advocacy tradition.
Part II of the Article examines the history, purposes, doctrinal
basis, and intended practical operation of the recently amended Fed-
eral Rule 26(a) governing disclosure. Part III discusses whether the
response to disclosure is justified by serious practical or ethical flaws
in this rule or whether something else is responsible for the profes-
sion's adverse reaction to disclosure. A detailed analysis of the criti-
cisms of disclosure focuses particular attention on the relationship
29. See infra notes 82-127 and accompanying text.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 33-35.
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between disclosure of basic information under Rule 26(a) and adver-
sary-based doctrines, such as the attorney work product protection,
the attorney-client privilege, and the traditional ethic of zealous repre-
sentation, and finds that much of the criticism of disclosure is hyper-
bolic. Disclosure as envisioned by the Advisory Committee is likely
neither to create a panoply of practical problems nor to effect dra-
matic change in the current adversary-driven discovery system.31
The Article concludes that critics are probably correct that the
disclosure rule, by itself, is unlikely to significantly diminish discovery
abuse. The foundations for this type of abuse, characterized by un-
necessary discovery procedures and evasion of the duty to exchange
relevant information, still exist in the incentives and economies of the
adversary litigation system and attorneys' informal value systems. Al-
leviation of such abuse is not likely to occur without fundamental,
across-the-board changes in the legal system that address not only for-
mal rules and incentives, but also attitudes of the profession. Never-
theless, what is most significant and encouraging about the disclosure
rule-and what is most responsible for the massive resistance it has
spawned-is that by making an unambiguous statement about the
duty in discovery to disclose adverse information without a request
from an opponent, the rule takes a basic step toward a fundamental
change in litigation culture that gives more emphasis to values other
than winning at all costs and strikes a better balance between justice
and economy.
31. This is especially true with regard to claims that the minimal disclosure of basic
information required by Rule 26(a) will seriously damage the work product and attorney-
client doctrines or lawyers' legitimate representational duties to clients. Indeed, claims
that disclosure is inconsistent with these duties and doctrines appear to be based on wide-
spread misunderstanding about the scope of the doctrines as they formally exist. The oper-
ation of these doctrines will remain largely the same under Rule 26(a) as under traditional
discovery with one possible exception. That exception relates to the fact that attorneys, in
making a determination of what information is relevant for purposes of disclosure, will be
required to make determinations that are similar to evaluations protected as attorney opin-
ion under work product immunity and that under traditional discovery practice may not
have resulted in disclosure of information absent precise discovery requests from an oppos-
ing party. Lawyers' reactions to this difference, and the widespread perception that the
disclosure rule is inconsistent with the adversarial system, suggest the existence of a set of
informal lawyer rules regarding ethical discovery practice that are probably most responsi-
ble for the massive negative reaction to Rule 26(a)(1). These informal rules, largely
grounded in the primacy of the tradition of zealous advocacy, are not only inconsistent
with Rule 26(a) disclosure, but are also inconsistent with much of the Federal Civil Rules
system and its utilitarian goals. See infra Part m.C.
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I. A Brief History of Discovery Abuse
A. The Discovery Rules and the Adversary System
Meaningful discussion of the current discovery reform contro-
versy surrounding Rule 26(a)(1) must begin with a brief examination
of the theoretical and historical context of discovery in our adversarial
system and the problems that have arisen with discovery practices. 32
Commentary that accompanied the promulgation of the 1938 Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure indicates that the discovery provisions were
offered as an alternative to the existing antiquated procedural system
that was dominated by "the sporting theory of justice" 33-a system in
which lawyers were gladiators largely unrestrained in their efforts to
prevail through surprise at trial and the use of highly factual pleading
and technical motions practices. 34 At the time, the Federal Rules in
general, and the discovery provisions in particular, were viewed as
shifting the philosophy from all-out adversarial confrontation and
technical gamesmanship at all stages of litigation to economy, effi-
ciency, and justice. Through the cooperative exchange of information,
32. See Michael E. Wolfson, Addressing the Adversarial Dilemma of Civil Discovery,
36 CL~v. ST. L. REV. 17, 20 (1988) (also discusses pre-1938 history of discovery practices at
common law and in the states). There is an all too frequent tendency in much of the
procedural commentary to focus narrowly on current doctrine, facial flaws in that doctrine,
and future prognostications, without an adequate examination of history or theory. Histor-
ical context is especially important in the area of federal rules changes like those relating to
discovery where reforms have been repeatedly discussed and attempted over the past 30
years.
33. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729, 738-39 (1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 281 (1964). Mod-
em discovery was nonexistent at the time of Pound's address and many commentators later
saw the creation of modem discovery devices as the remedy for many of the defects in the
system. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYs-
Em 9-12 (1968); JuLruS BYRON LEVIE.~, DISCOVERY 79-85 (1982); Edson R. Sunderland,
Foreword to GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL iii, 251-59 (1932); Alex-
ander Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under Federal Rules of Procedure, 41 MICH. L.
REv. 205, 205 (1942); William H. Speck, The Use of Discovery in the United States Courts,
60 YALE L.J. 1132, 1132 (1951). Levine noted that the "sporting" instinct in litigation is
deeply ingrained in the English legal system and originally displaced in equity the ecclesi-
astical courts' provision of full pretrial disclosure with the "own case" rule, which essen-
tially limited discovery to information from an opponent that would tend to help the case
of the discovering party but did not include information that was helpful to the opponent.
LEVINE, supra at 75-76, 79-80. Interestingly, many of the criticisms of the adversarial sys-
tem made by Pound under the "sporting theory" rubric frequently have been applied by
later commentators to the systematic tendencies or practices in the discovery area. See
infra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
34. For a brief discussion of the procedural mechanisms available to obtain informa-
tion in the pretrial context prior to the 1938 Federal Rules of Procedure, see Mayer, supra
note 22, at 84-85.
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discovery was intended to narrow issues that remained in dispute,
equalize knowledge among the parties about the evidence, eliminate
trickery or surprise at trial, and, as a result, increase the likelihood
that justice would be efficiently achieved during both pretrial negotia-
tion and trial.3 5
Although it has been frequently stated that the philosophy of the
rules was "full disclosure, '36 the actual structure of the original rules
and the judicial construction of those rules during the first few de-
cades after their promulgation demonstrate that less than "full disclo-
sure" was actually contemplated and that the adversarial "sporting"
tendencies of the prior system still dominated a large part of the un-
derlying philosophy of the civil litigation system. Indeed, the discov-
ery system created by the 1938 Federal Rules was specifically
engineered to operate within the basic constructs of the adversary sys-
tem while simultaneously serving as a check on that system.37 How-
ever, the stated goals of discovery were at odds with the underlying
35. See; e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,500-01,507 (1947); Tellert v. Montgom-
ery Ward & Co., 27 F. Supp. 938, 941 (E.D. Pa. 1939); GLASER, supra note 33, at 9-11, 22,
30; LEvnE, supra note 33, at 2; James Gardner, Agency Problems in the Law of Attorney-
Client Privilege: Privilege and "Work Product" Under Open Discovery (Part 1), 42 DET. L.
Rnv. 105, 106-07 (1964) [hereinafter Gardner, Agency Problems]; Holtzoff, supra note 33,
at 205-06; Edson R. Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15
TENN. L. REv. 737-39 (1939) (explaining that the Federal Rules sought to facilitate the free
exchange of information at the pretrial stage); see generally James A. Pike & John W.
Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure: 1, 38 COLUM. L. REv. 1179,
1179-98 (1938) (discussing the less restrictive nature of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure); James A. Pike & John W. Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Pro-
cedure: II, 38 COLum. L. REv. 1436, 1436-59 (1938) (same).
Besides converting trials and pretrial negotiations into more orderly searches for
the truth, discovery was expected to reduce the number of trials and thus relieve
the burden on the courts. If the full truth would soon be revealed, fewer sham
suits would be filed. If the adversaries and the court knew the facts before trial,
the court could render more summary judgments. If both sides knew the full
truth and each other's strengths and weaknesses, they would settle the case and
avoid the costs and uncertainties of trial. If both sides knew all the facts, lawyers
and clients would be more satisfied with settlement terms and would carry out the
agreement willingly.
GLASER, supra note 33, at 11-12. As one influential early commentator summarized,
"Each party may in effect be called upon by his adversary or by the judge to lay all his
cards upon the table, the important consideration being who has the stronger hand, not
who can play the cleverer game." Sunderland, supra at 739.
36. See; e.g., 4 JAMSs WM. MooRE & Jo DnsHA LucAs, MooRE's FEDERAL PRAc-
TxcE 26.02[3] (1994); authorities cited supra note 35.
37. See GLASER, supra note 33, at 15. Moreover, critics often lose sight of the fact
that it is the adversary system itself that increases the need for a system of pretrial discov-
ery because of its reliance on party formulation and presentation of the case. Inquisitorial
systems like that in Germany lack extensive pretrial discovery by lawyers. Id at 26-27;
John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823,823-
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psychology and structure of the adversary system, giving rise to a fun-
damental tension that could cause discovery goals to be
compromised. 3
8
The fundamental attributes of the tr.aditional adversary system in-
clude: (1) litigants rather than the court carry the primary burden of
conducting the activities by which the dispute will be settled (e.g., set-
ting forth issues, uncovering facts, negotiating settlements, marshal-
ling and presenting evidence and arguments, attacking the opponent's
evidence); (2) in performing these functions, attorneys function as ad-
vocates who zealously advance the interests of their clients; and (3)
the court serves as a neutral umpire who ensures that the result will be
socially accepted because it is perceived as just.39 These characteris-
tics are supposed to lead to dispute resolutions that are more efficient
and just than would be rendered under an alternative system, such as
an inquisitorial system, in which the tribunal is far more active in di-
recting the course of proceedings.
The Federal Rules that were promulgated in 1938 to regulate dis-
covery were consistent with the traditional adversary system in three
fundamental respects. First, they were to be party-initiated and party-
driven. The expectation in the rules' enactment was that there would
be minimal involvement of the court in conducting discovery or
resolving discovery disputes.40 Also, as with other aspects of the case,
parties were financially responsible for putting together their own dis-
51 (1985) (describing the German legal system and its advantages for inquisitorial fact
gathering).
38. See, e.g., GLASER, supra note 33, at 15; Winter, supra note 18, at 264 (finding that
discovery can be used to impose costs on opponent that allow avoidance of merits); Wolf-
son, supra note 32, at 18-19 (stating that discovery "gives impetus and opportunity to the
baser litigational instincts of delay, deception, and unbridled confrontational advocacy").
One commentator recently noted that "[t]he sense of virtually all discovery reforms.., is
that the adversariness lawyers normally display is ill suited for pretrial exchange of infor-
mation" and that most reforms have tried to counter the adversarial tendency of litigating
attorneys. Mayer, supra note 22, at 80-81.
39. See GLASER, supra note 33, at 15; infra notes 301-307 and accompanying text.
What is "just" involves both considerations of substantive justice (i.e., the merits) and pro-
cedural justice (i.e., the outcome is consistent with the procedural rules by which the sys-
tem operates). See GLASER, supra note 33, at 15 n.1.
40. See PAUL R. CONNOLLY ET AL., JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE
PROCESS: DISCOVERY 9-27 (1978) (noting that the new discovery rules left discovery de-
vices mainly in the control of the parties at suit); Frank F. Flegal & Steven M. Umin,
Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: We're Not There Yet, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV.
597, 613; Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litiga-
tion: Enough Is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 579, 581 (discussing the premise that judges
are not needed for the practice of discovery). The expected minimal court involvement is
evidenced by the absence of significant court controls on discovery abuse in the early rules.
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covery cases. Furthermore, although attorneys would be the ones ac-
tually conducting discovery activities, the rules did not make attorneys
initially accountable for the activities of the clients with regard to dis-
covery.41 The new rules did not anticipate the extent to which parti-
san zealotry would hamper the discovery goal of truth seeking.42
In several respects, the initial discovery rules seemed to preserve
the opportunity for unfair surprise and failed to equalize knowledge
of the facts.43 Perhaps the earliest indication of a limited vision of
discovery, as well as the existence of tension between the objectives of
the new discovery system and the traditional adversary system's role
for the lawyer was found in Hickman v. Taylor.44 Despite the Court's
discussion of the preeminence of truth finding reflected in the Court's
statement that "[m]utual knowledge of all of the relevant facts gath-
ered by both parties is essential to proper litigation," the Court held
that the materials at issue-written witness statements taken by the
attorney for one of the parties-did not have to be disclosed to the
41. There were no attorney certification requirements like those later added to Rule
26(g) under which attorneys were required to certify that papers filed and discovery re-
quests or responses made were legally and factually supportable and not interposed for an
improper purpose. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(g).
42. This Article, as do most discussions of the civil justice system, assumes that the
primary goal of the system, including discovery, is the ascertainment of truth or substantive
accuracy. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal
Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 435-36, 444-45 (1994); Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery:
Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL SUD. 481, 498-99 (1994); Louis Kaplow, The
Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 307
(1994); Daniel Ortiz, Neoactuarialism: Comment on Kaplow (1), 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 403,
403 (1994). Essentially, discovery contributes to accuracy by increasing the quality and
quantity of information available to the parties and the court so that settlement and trial
outcomes have a strong relationship with the merits. See Hay, supra at 497-98. For an
extended discussion of the extent accuracy is or should be the primary value served by the
civil justice system, see the authorities cited above. See also Marcus, Prospects, supra note
4, at 768-69 (finding that procedural justice and accuracy are not synonymous; litigants
value other things such as opportunity to be heard and control of the process).
43. For example, narrow construction of the discovery rules resulted in many courts
concluding that interrogatories could not be used to inquire into an opponent's contentions
concerning the application of law to fact. See LEvNE, supra note 33, at 87. This in effect
allowed parties to shield their theory of a claim or defense until trial. Another example of
the short reach of the discovery rules was the fact that, as originally promulgated, Rule 34,
on production of documents, did not authorize one to obtain documents absent "good
cause." See GLASER, supra note 33, at 33. Yet another was the fact that as originally
promulgated the broad scope of discovery (Le., relevant to the subject matter of the suit)
was limited to depositions; even then courts initially construed the rules as not authorizing
questions that would produce inadmissible matter. Id. at 32.
44. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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other party because such disclosure would undermine the adversary
system.45
These examples suggest the existence of unresolved tension be-
tween the tenets underlying the adversarial litigation system and the
goals of the discovery rules. The examples also highlight the fact that
part of the legal profession may not have shared the philosophy of the
framers of the discovery rules in the primary objective of ascertaining
truth.
46
Nevertheless, the decades immediately following the promulga-
tion of the original Rules of Civil Procedure have been described gen-
erally as a period relatively free from the claims of abuse that became
common in recent years.47 Whether these "early days" truly represent
45. See id at 507, 511-12 (open access to work product such as witness statements
would result in "[ilnefficiency, unfairness, and sharp practices ... ,. and would poorly serve
the client's interest and the cause of justice); id. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[T]rial is
and always should be an adversary proceeding .... I can conceive of no practice more
demoralizing to the Bar than to require a lawyer to write out and deliver to his adversary
an account of what witnesses have told him."). Thus, the holding and the rationale of the
Court's opinion and Justice Jackson's concurrence undercut the suggestion by some com-
mentators that the Supreme Court "surely recognized that if the process was to work at all
discovery had to be a substantially nonadversarial endeavor." Wolfson, supra note 32, at
50.
46. See, e.g., GLASER, supra note 33, at 12 (noting ongoing criticism of discovery
based on fears that "it would diminish the advantages of the adversary system" and have
undesirable effects such as those stemming from its use as a tactical weapon); Gardner,
Agency Problems, supra note 35, at 164-65 & nn.222-23 (finding bench and bar adherence
"to surprise theory of justice" resulted in continually conservative or negative thinking
about discovery such that doubts were resolved against discovery in many circumstances);
Maurice Rosenberg, Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 479, 481, 484-
86 (1968) (discussing tension, reflected in Hickman, between "the Federal Rules' stated
objective of reaching the merits of the case by putting the cards face-up on the table, on the
one hand, and the need to preserve the lawyers' adversary function, on the other"); Wolf-
son, supra note 32, at 19-20 ("system that promotes adversarial resolution of disputes
through the efforts of dedicated legal representatives cannot be expected to easily accom-
modate a process that mandates disclosure of vital case-related information"). Indeed,
many of the problems that occur in discovery may stem from the fact that a lawyer operat-
ing under an adversarial philosophy is simply incapable of objectively responding to dis-
covery requests as long as there is any ambiguity or indeterminacy in the request that will
allow multiple interpretations-that a lawyer is virtually compelled to adopt an interpreta-
tion, no matter how marginal, that seemingly serves the client's immediate interest. See
Mayer, supra note 22, at 96-99. See also David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers', 104
HARV. L. Rnv. 468, 469-502 (1990) (discussing the relationship of indeterminacy and the
adversarial ethic); infra notes 360-404 and accompanying text.
47. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to
Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487,489-90 (1970); A.B.A. Sec. Jud. Admin., The Practical Operation
of Federal Discovery, 12 F.R.D. 131, 138 (1952) (noting that there were relatively few
abuses of the discovery process); Robert G. Bone, The Empirical Turn in Procedural
Rulemaking: Comment on Walker (1), 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 595, 604 n.30 (1994); Frank F.
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the halcyon days of civilized litigation is questionable. While the rela-
tive48 lack of critical outcry about problems with discovery may be
interpreted as the result of liberal discovery's wide acceptance, the
absence of significant complaints should probably be attributed to
other factors.
Because the early discovery rules were not as liberal or as de-
manding as later rules have become,49 they presented less potential
for conflict with the adversary system's ingrained partisan tendencies.
Furthermore, it may be that the first few years after the initial enact-
ment of the rules represented an adjustment period during which liti-
gators were adapting to discovery and realizing that rather than
inhibiting their adversarial gamesmanship, the discovery rules actually
provided new weapons for the game.5 0 Litigators may also have dis-
covered that the rules could be narrowly construed, ignored, or
flouted in many instances without fear of sanction by the court.5'
The relatively low level of dissatisfaction with the early discovery
practice also may have been related to conditions in the profession
and the field of litigation in the years immediately after the adoption
of the discovery rules that were different from conditions that devel-
oped later. First, the proclivity to transform the discovery rules into
adversarial tools to achieve unintended purposes may have been in-
tensified by a change in the legal profession itself. Some commenta-
Flegal, Discovery Abuse: Causes, Effects and Reforn, 3 REv. LmG. 1, 36 (1983); Wolfson,
supra note 32, at 38-39.
48. There were critics who raised complaints concerning discovery problems that were
quite similar to those raised later with greater volume and frequency. See, e.g., GLASER,
supra note 33, at 35-37 (reviewing complaints about discovery during 1950s, including use
of discovery to fish for facts giving rise to a case and use as tactical weapon against weaker,
poorer opponent, increased costs on parties and courts from discovery, and use of discov-
ery to avoid doing one's own work); William H. Speck, The Use of Discovery in the United
States District Courts, 60 YALE LJ. 1132-33 (1951) (same; citing critical commentary of the
late 1940s and early 1950s). Cf infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
49. See Gardner, Agency Problems, supra note 35, at 107, 164 & n.222 (describing the
transitory nature of discovery and its movement toward more open discovery as of 1964).
See also supra note 43.
50. See e.g., Winter, supra note 18, at 264 (describing use of discovery as "club" to
defeat a meritorious claim); Wolfson, supra note 32, at 42-43 (noting the ability of liti-
gators to use discovery for tactical purposes of delay increasing court costs); infra text
accompanying notes 62-68.
51. See GLASER, supra note 33, at 154-55; Gardner, Agency Problems, supra note 35,
at 165. For example, a 1962-63 Columbia University study of discovery problems revealed
that lawyers were "still motivated to conceal as much as possible, particularly evidence or
witnesses that will have a dramatic effect at trial." GLASER, supra note 33, at 234. This
suggests that at the time of the Columbia study, many lawyers were still steeped in the
"sporting theory" of adversarial justice. LEvInE, supra note 33, at 5.
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tors posit that as the legal profession became more competitive,
businesslike, and impersonal (evidenced in the development of very
large law firms), it became more adversary-driven and suffered a gen-
eral decline in professional civility.52 Second, commentators have also
suggested that there has been a fundamental increase in the amount
and the complexity of federal civil actions commensurate with the cre-
ation of new causes of action, particularly for torts and civil rights ac-
tions, which require more preparation and investigation into
mountains of documents. Increased reliance on discovery, commen-
surate with this increased complexity, may have placed additional
stress on the litigation system and exposed inherent flaws previously
less obvious.53 Third, increased dissatisfaction with discovery practice
may be intensified by the changed billing structure of the legal profes-
sion, which shifted from fixed fees to hourly fees for services. "When
fees are paid on the basis of time charges, discovery practice marries
the lawyers' professional instinct to leave no stone unturned to the
financial advantage of doing so," resulting in overly used and overly
expensive discovery.
54
52. Bone, supra note 47, at 597; Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice:
Legal Practice at War with the Profession and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931, 939-45
(1993); Robert E. Keeton, Times Are a Changing for Trials in Court, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
1, 13 (1994); Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing
Their Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2199-2200 (1988) (noting the changes in the legal
profession that lead to a more adversarial discovery system). Bryant Garth posits that the
increased adversariness, the use of discovery as a strategic weapon, and the willingness to
resist discovery in litigation in the 1970s and 1980s occurred primarily because of increased
business and legal profession competition. Accordingly, he argues that the "pulling out all
stops" or "scorched earth" approach was most prevalent in "high stakes" business litiga-
tion, although he acknowledges that aggressive tactics became "more common throughout
the profession." Garth, supra at 939-44. The widespread opposition by lawyers to reforms
like mandatory disclosure suggests that while increased adversarial aggressiveness may
have been fed or kindled by business and professional competition in the large firm and
corporate bar, that segment of the profession established the ethical norm for the profes-
sion as a whole. This may have been reinforced by the fact that at least a superficial under-
standing and acceptance of the notion of partisan client representation was widely
accepted as a fundamental tenet of the civil litigation system. See infra text accompanying
notes 298, 266-376.
53. See JOSEPH EBERSOLE & BARLOwE BURKE, DISCOVERY PROBLEMS IN CIVIL
CASES 77-78 (1980); Bone, supra note 47, at 597; Flegal, supra note 47, at 36-37; Rosen-
berg, supra note 52, at 2199-2200.
54. Rosenberg, supra note 52, at 2200, 2204-05.
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B. The Era of Dissatisfaction
(1) The Perceptions of Discovery Abuse
The apparent satisfaction with early discovery practice gave way
to growing dissatisfaction in the 1960s and 1970s as evidenced by the
significant increase in the literature on the subject of discovery55 and
the number of special conferences, reports, symposia, meetings,56 or
studies devoted solely or primarily to the issue of discovery
problems.5 7 Of the approximately thirty different studies on the Fed-
55. Because of the vastness of the literature on discovery problems and reform, com-
prehensive listing would be virtually impossible. For a sampling of literature on the topic,
see SEGAL, supra note 11, app. B (reviewing in excess of 100 articles on discovery written
between 1969 and 1978); Flegal, supra note 47, at 3-8 & nn.14-32 (discussing the discovery
abuse literature "explosion" in the late 1970s and early 1980s); authorities cited infra notes
94-130.
56. See eg., A.B.A., Report of Pound Conference Follow-up Task Force, 74 F.R.D.
159, 171, 191-92 (1977) (discovery problems and study recommendations); A.B.A. Sec. Li-
tig., Second Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse (Nov. 1980),
92 F.R.D. 137, 138 (1981) (expressing view that 1980 amendments were insufficient to ad-
dress continuing and serious discovery problems); Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000
A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83,95-96 (1976) (1976 National Con-
ference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice
("Pound Conference") Keynote Address, raising pretrial procedure abuse); Flegal, supra
note 47, at 1 (Introduction to the National Conference on Discovery Reform Conference
Proceedings); Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96,
107 (1976) (discussing the discovery abuse issues presented at 1976 "Pound Conference");
Maurice Rosenberg, Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 479 (1969)
(discussing Columbia Law School Alumni Association Conference on proposed revisions
to the federal discovery rules).
57. Empirical studies addressing the operation of the federal discovery rules include
PAuL R. CONNOLLY ET AL., JUDIcIAL. CoNTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PRocEss:
DiscovERY (1978); EBERSOLE & BURKE, supra note 53 (1980); C. RONALD ELLINGTON, A
STUDy OF SANCnoNs FOR DisCOVERY ABUsE (1979); GLASER, supra note 33 (1968);
Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the
System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 217 [hereinafter Brazil, Front
Lines]; Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal
Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 787 [hereinafter Brazil, Lawyers'
Views]; Wayne D. Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over Pretrial Development of Civil
Actions: Model Rules for Case Management and Sanctions, 1981 AM. B. FouND. RES. J.
875 [hereinafter Brazil, Improving Controls]; David S. Day, Expert Discovery Under Fed-
eral Rule 26(b)(4): An Empirical Study in South Dakota, 31 S.D. L. REv. 40 (1985);
Michael H. Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of
Procedure: Part II, An Empirical Study and Proposal, 1977 U. ILL. L. Rnv. 169; David L.
Shapiro, Some Problems of Discovery in an Adversary System, 63 MINN. L. Ruv. 1055
(1979); William H. Speck, The Use of Discovery in the United States District Courts, 60
YALE LJ. 1132 (1951); David S. Walker, Professionalism and Procedure: Notes on An
Empirical Study, 38 DRAKE L. Rnv. 759 (1988-89); Charles Alan Wright et al., The Practic-
ing Attorney's View of the Utility of Discovery, 12 F.R.D. 97, 97 (1952); Note, Federal Dis-
covery Rules: Effects of the 1970 Amendments, 8 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 623 (1972).
See also A.B.A. Sec. Litig., Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery
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eral Rules of Civil Procedure, conducted in the fifty years after the
Rules' enactment, almost half address discovery issues.58 Finally, dis-
satisfaction is most obviously reflected in the numerous discovery re-
form proposals that resulted in significant amendments to the
discovery provisions of Federal Rules in 1970, 59  1980,60
Abuse (1977), reprinted in 92 F.R.D. 149, 154 (1982) (nonempirical study resulting in pro-
posed discovery amendments based on the "collective and varied experience of its mem-
bers"); A.B.A. Sec. Litig., Second Report of the Section of Litigation Special Committee for
the Study of Discovery Abuse, reprinted in 92 F.R.D. 137, 138 (1982) (explaining that com-
mittee's proposed discovery amendments were based on view that the 1980 amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were inadequate to deal with the major problem of
discovery abuse); see generally SEGAL, supra note 11 (study of attitudes toward discovery
after 1970 amendments to the federal rules by reviewing articles on topic of discovery
written between 1969 and 1978); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation,
31 UCLA L. REV. 72 (1983) (study of costs in 1,600 state and federal cases randomly
drawn from 5 federal districts nationwide, which had terminated in 1978).
58. Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field
Experiments, 51 L. & CoNTErp. PROB. 67, 69 & n.7 (1988).
59. The introductory Advisory Committee statement of the 1970 amendments to the
discovery rules notes that while relatively few narrowly focused amendments to the discov-
ery rules had been made after their promulgation in 1938, the 1970 amendments reflected
"the first comprehensive review of the discovery Rules since 1938" and made substantial
changes. FED. R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory Committee's Explanatory Statement Concerning
Amendments to the Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 487-90 (1970). For a brief discussion
of the 1970 amendments, see Maurice Rosenberg, Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Dis-
covery, 45 F.R.D. 479, 481 (1969). Generally, some of the amendments were intended to
address problems with evasive responses to discovery, surprise at trial, and squabbles over
privileged or protected information by broadening the scope of discovery to permit inter-
rogatories and requests for admissions on an opposing party's contentions (Le., mixed
questions of law and fact), requests for production of documents without a showing of
good cause, and the obtaining by a witness of a copy of the witness's own statement. See
LEvnE, supra note 33, at 6-7; Note, Federal Discovery Rules, supra note 57, at 625, 640.
Also, the sanctions provisions of Rule 37 were substantially strengthened in the hope of
more effectively serving the purposes of the discovery rules. See Notes of Advisory Com-
mittee on 1970 Amendment to Rule 37,48 F.R.D. 538. Overall, the 1970 amendments may
be seen as a continuation of the trend to expand the scope of discovery while leaving
control of discovery in the hands of attorneys. See CONNOLLY Er AL., supra note 40, at 9-
27.
60. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 538-44
(1980) (enumerating several amendments to the Federal Rules and discussing why change
was necessary); Revised Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 80 F.R.D. 323,332 (1979); Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 77 F.R.D. 613, 626 (1978). Justice Powell vehe-
mently dissented from the 1980 discovery amendments, not because they were "inherently
objectionable" or "undesirable," but because they were wholly inadequate to deal with the
major problem of discovery abuse and the "tinkering changes" would "delay for years the
adoption of genuinely effective reforms." Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 446 U.S. 997, 998-1000 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart and Rehn-
quist, JJ.). See also A.B.A. Sec. Litig., Second Report of the Section of Litigation Special
Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse (Nov. 1980), reprinted in 92 F.R.D. 137, 138
(1982) (proposed discovery amendments based on view that the 1980 amendments to the
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1983,61 and again in 1993.62
The claims of discovery abuse have tended to focus on two types
of abuse-runaway discovery and resistance to legitimate discovery.63
Complaints about runaway discovery can be divided into claims that
(1) discoveryhas been used as a tactical weapon to impose excessive
costs on an opponent and (2) overly broad discovery allows parties to
go on "fishing expeditions." 64 Among the more commonly mentioned
activities used to resist legitimate discovery are refusing to provide
information, hiding information, raising frivolous privilege claims, dis-
ingenuously construing discovery requests narrowly, destroying docu-
ments, assisting in pejury, coaching witnesses to avoid disclosing
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were inadequate to deal with the major problem of dis-
covery abuse).
The "tinkering changes" referred to by Justice Powell included the amendment au-
thorizing early judicial intervention in discovery problems through the use of a discovery
conference and plan, either sua sponte or upon motion of a party (FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)),
clarification that the option to produce business records in Rule 33(c) requires specifica-
tion of location of business records in sufficient detail to allow the discovering party to
locate the documents from which an answer is to be derived, and the requirement that
records produced under Rule 34 be produced in a manner that will reasonably allow the
discovering party to access the documents and to avoid the abusive tactic of hiding signifi-
cant documents in with nonsignificant documents. See Amendments to the Federal Civil
Rules of Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 521-32 (1980).
61. See Preliminary Draft Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 90 F.R.D. 451, 478-79 (1981); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or
Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1, 19,22-24 (1984); Walker, supra note 57, at 762-67 (noting that
some rules of procedure have been blamed as a cause of the litigation explosion). For a
brief discussion of some of the circumstances surrounding the 1980 and 1983 discovery
amendments, see Flegal, supra note 47, at 1-9, 40-47. For a brief discussion of the 1983
amendments to Rules 11, 16 and 26(g), see infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
62. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms, reprinted in
146 F.R.D. 401 (1993).
63. See, eg., GLASER, supra note 33, at 35-36; Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery Abuse
Revisited" Some Specific Proposals to Amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26
U.S.F. L. REv. 189, 194 (1992) (explaining the two types of discovery abuse); Flegal, supra
note 47, at 14-24; Weyman I. Lundquist & Joseph A. Ball, Conclusions and Recommenda-
tions of National Conference on Discovery Reform, 3 REv. Lrr. 209, 210 (1982-83). It is
difficult to gauge which type has been predominant over the years. See Flegal, supra note
47, at 14 (finding that over-discovery is predominant); but see ELLINOTON, supra note 57, at
55-57 (finding that empirical studies suggest that evasive practices are most prevalent form
of discovery problem in big cases); Brazil, Improving Controls, supra note 57, at 875, 880,
928 (same).
64. The term "fishing expedition" is generally used to describe the use of discovery to
obtain facts upon which a claim can be based after a marginal or sham claim has already
been filed. See generally GLASER, supra note 33, at 62, 122-23.
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information, and providing deliberately evasive answers to discovery
requests .65
While the classic forms of abuse represent opposite types of
problems-one involving too much discovery, the other too little-
they share a common foundation. The "sporting theory" or partisan
motivation to win underlying the adversarial system seems to be a ma-
jor factor in most discovery abuse.66 Not surprisingly, this traditional
motivation is reflected in or reinforced by education, ethics, and eco-
nomics.67 Among the specific factors identified as contributing to dis-
covery abuse that relate directly or indirectly to partisanship are
financial incentives inherent in the attorney compensation system and
the costs of discovery; 68 the failure of courts to sanction attorneys and
parties for discovery abuse or otherwise effectively manage discovery
disputes;69 attorneys' cooperative complicity in the nonenforcement of
the discovery rules based on their fear that strict enforcement of rules
will establish precedent that will come back to haunt them later;70 law
firm and law school inculcation of law students and new lawyers about
discovery practices;71 pressure from clients or in-house counsel to en-
gage in abusive discovery practices; 72 client inattention to discovery;
73
65. See, e.g., GLASER, supra note 33, at 36; Dudley, supra note 13, at 194-95 (discuss-
ing and listing some abusive discovery tactics); Flegal, supra note 47, at 14; Brazil, Improv-
ing Controls, supra note 57, at 880. An attorney's statement to then-Professor Brazil
during his 1979 study of discovery problems perhaps relates the essence of evasion: "The
purpose of discovery ... is to give as little as possible so [your opponents] will have to
come back and back and maybe will go away or give up."' Brazil, Lawyers' Views, supra
note 57, at 829.
66. See, e.g., GLASER, supra note 33, at 114-16; Brazil, Improving Controls, supra note
57, at 879-80, 928-29; Wayne D. Brazil, Ethical Perspectives on Discovery Reform, 3 Rnv.
LING. 51, 62-67 (1982-83) [hereinafter Brazil, Ethical Perspectives]; Flegal, supra note 47,
at 24-27; Wolfson, supra note 32, at 45, 48 (noting that the cause of discovery abuse inheres
in a litigation approach characterized by the maxim: "never be candid, never be helpful,
and make your opponent fight for everything that he seeks").
67. See, e.g., Brazil, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 66, at 62-87; Brazil, Improving
Controls, supra note 57, at 928-29; Wolfson, supra note 32, at 46-51.
68. See, e.g., Brazil, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 66, at 76-78; Brazil, Front Lines,
supra note 57, at 235; Flegal, supra note 47, at 29-32; Wolfson, supra note 32, at 46.
69. See, e.g., Brazil, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 66, at 68-69 (describing the lack of
sanctions for discovery abuse under Rules 11, 26(c), & 37); Brazil, Front Lines, supra note
57, at 245-51; Flegal, supra note 47, at 15, 17-19, 24-25; Wolfson, supra note 32, at 47-48.
70. Brazil, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 66, at 74-86.
71. See, e.g., Brazil, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 66, at 70-74; Brazil, Lawyers'
Views, supra note 57, at 792-93, 797-99, 833-34; Flegal, supra note 47, at 15, 25-26, 29 (not-
ing that law firms and law schools overemphasize the teaching of discovery practices).
72. See Brazil, Front Lines, supra note 57, at 243-44; Brazil, Lawyers' Views, supra
note 57, at 860-61.
73. See, e.g., Flegal, supra note 47, at 32-33 (asserting that clients often do not take the
time to participate in their own litigation, thereby allowing for excessive discovery).
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ambiguity in the discovery rules; and the broad scope of discovery.74
Also contributing to discovery abuse are factors related to lawyer
competence, including inadequate training, improper assessment of
the theories of case and discovery needs, overextension of resources,
poor management skills, and compulsiveness based on either a fear of
malpractice or a basic personality disorder.75
Interestingly, the claims of discovery abuse and the types of abuse
claimed seem to have remained relatively constant over time, even
though there have been several amendments to the discovery rules
designed specifically to cure certain types of abuse.76 For example,
the Rule 26(f) Discovery Conference was added to the rules in 1980 to
assist in resolving discovery disputes and encourage cooperation
among counsel. In practice, however, it was seldom used, and when it
was used it was used as a method of delaying discovery until the con-
ference was held rather than as a means of improving resolution of
issues.77 Similarly, the 1983 amendments to Rule 16 on pretrial sched-
74. See eg., Brazil, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 66, at 67 (noting how ambiguously
written rules contributed to the onslaught of discovery abuse); Wolfson, supra note 32, at
47 & n.190 (noting continued ABA efforts in 1980-83 to have scope reduced from "relevant
to subject matter" to "relevant to the claims and defenses" based on assertion that the
standard is responsible for over-discovery); see also A.B.A., Second Report of the Special
Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse (1980), reprinted in 92 F.R.D. 137 (1982) (dis-
cussing discovery abuse and proposing reforms such as limiting the definition of the scope
of discovery). For a discussion of how ambiguity or indeterminacy of the discovery rules
allows expansive application of the ethic of partisanship or zealous advocacy, see infra
notes 365-379 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Brazil, Front Lines, supra note 57, at 236-39,244; Flegal, supra note 47, at
25-26, 29; Wolfson, supra note 32, 46-47.
76. See e.g., EBERsoLE & BuRKE, supra note 57, at 1 (little difference in arguments
between the 1930s and 1970s); LEvINE, supra note 33, at 115-22 (noting continuity of
claims of discovery abuse through 1960s and 1970s, despite changes in rules and lack of
empirical evidence supporting runaway abuse); Dudley, supra note 13, at 199 (discussing
the continuity of discovery abuse into 1990s); Mayer, supra note 22, at 95 (noting discovery
reform history reflects good intentions gone awry); Mullenix, Hope over Experience, supra
note 18, at 821 (noting that despite fact that discovery rules have been amended more than
any other civil rules, discovery abuse persists); Wolfson, supra note 32, at 45 (discovery
abuse not cured despite numerous amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the local rules of the courts addressing discovery problems). Compare Flegal, supra
note 47, at 1-49 (reviewing pre-1983 reform efforts, problems, and solutions) with Dudley,
supra note 13, at 194-95 (revisiting discovery abuse in 1992).
77. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence (Aug. 1991), reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 105
(1991); Mayer, supra note 22, at 95 (noting that the discovery conference was used as a
mere tool for causing delays); Bell et al., supra note 19, at 38 & n.147 (quoting Draft
Advisory Committee Notes Accompanying Proposed Amendments (Feb. 6, 1992) to effect
that Rule 26(f) was ineffective to prevent discovery abuses); Mullenix, Hope over Experi-
ence, supra note 18, at 798 & n.8 (referring to Rule 26(f) as a "barnacle" on the civil rules
and example of repeated efforts to curb refohm abuse). But see Proposed Amendments to
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uling and planning conferences reflected a view that increased judicial
management was needed to address discovery abuse and the amend-
ments were intended to create a mandatory "process of judicial man-
agement that embraces the entire pretrial phase, especially motions
and discovery." 78 However, post-1983 experience with the rule sug-
gests that it has done little to stem the claims of discovery abuse, per-
haps because federal trial judges burdened by heavy civil and criminal
case loads have not had the time to engage in close judicial manage-
ment of discovery and because those judges may lack the aptitude,
training, or interest in such intensive pretrial management. 79 Finally,
discovery abuse claims persist despite the strengthening and broaden-
ing of sanctions provisions such as Rules 11, 26(g), and 37 over the
years.80 In light of the attention discovery abuse has received for the
last thirty years or so and the efforts that have been made to control
abuse, the intractability and persistence of the abuse claims suggest
either that the partisan incentives to engage in discovery abuse are
very strong or that perhaps many abusive discovery practices identi-
fied by commentators and judges are not really considered abusive by
a large number of lawyers. 81
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms, Rule 26(f) advisory committee's note,
reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 641-42 (1992) (subdivision (f) expected to be rarely used when
enacted).
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a) advisory committee's note; see also Dudley, supra note 13, at
199-200 (noting that Rule 16 was intended to increase pretrial conferences and scheduling);
David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1983-87 (1989).
79. Dudley, supra note 13, at 199-204; see also Shapiro, supra note 78, at 1989-91
(reviewing general post-amendment practice under Rule 16).
80. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 26(g), 37 & advisory committee's notes; A.B.A. SEc. Li-
TIG., SANC-IONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER POWERS 12-13 (1986) (stating that "threat of sanc-
tions proven to be a paper tiger"); Judith L. Maute, Sporting Theory of Justice: Taming
Adversary Zeal with a Logical Sanctions Doctrine, 20 CONN. L. REv. 7, 21-28 (1986) (re-
viewing amendments to Rules 11, 26(g), & 37). Commentators have noted that at least
part of the failure of these sanction provisions to effectively stem the tide of discovery
abuse may relate to the persistent reluctance of the federal courts to employ the more
severe sanction provisions, such as evidence preclusion and dismissal, for discovery abuse.
See Dudley, supra note 13, at 217-18 (explaining that severe sanctions are only used in the
most extreme cases); see also MASSACHUSETrS CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., THE U.S. Dis-
TCr COURT SPEAKS 145-46 (1992) (survey of judges of the District of Massachusetts indi-
cating discovery sanctions rarely imposed except in the most egregious cases).
81. One prominent commentator recently noted that "[d]iscovery practice continues
to be the single most troubling element of contemporary procedure." Edward H. Cooper,
Discovery Cost Allocation: Comment on Cooter and Rubinfeld, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 465,
465 (1994). Professor Hazard has also noted:
The prevalence of such underside discovery practice [e.g., narrow disingenuous
construction of requests, failing to find damaging documents] cannot be measured
for evident reasons. It is believed pervalive enough, however, to sustain wide-
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
DISCLOSURE UNDER RULE 26(a)
(2) The Evidence of Discovery Abuse
While there has been substantial consistency as to the types of
discovery abuse that have been claimed in the literature over the
years, little empirical research has been done to objectify and quantify
discovery abuse. Similar to crisis rhetoric supporting claims of a "liti-
gation explosion" and calls for fundamental system reforms,82 claims
of discovery abuse have rested largely on nonevidence 83 and may well
spread suspicion and cynicism among the trial bar. This effect is itself sufficient
cause to question the present discovery Rules.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2237, 2240 (1989) (alteration in original).
82. See OLSON, supra note 3; supra n6tes 4-10 and accompanying text. The use by the
legal profession of crisis rhetoric is not novel. Indeed, a study has suggested that based on
the rhetoric of the professional literature there have been at least five "crisis" periods, or
possibly one long crisis, between 1925 and 1960. Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One:
The Concept of Legal Professionalism, 1925-60, in LAWYERS' IDEALs/LAwYERs' PRAC-
EICs: TRNSFORMANIONS IN mE AmrEscAN LEGAL PROFESSION 144,168-73 (Robert L.
Nelson et al. eds., 1992). Some critics argue that crisis rhetoric is used by leaders of the bar
to control the actions of members of the bar so as to prevent public esteem for the profes-
sion from falling below the point at which the bar is allowed to maintain its privilege and
control. Id. at 169-72.
83. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1151-68 (1992). Saks asserts
that there generally is an absence of evidence to accurately assess the status and behavior
of the litigation system and that most claims are based on mere conclusory assertions un-
supported by evidence; anecdotes that are either unreliable, nongeneralizable, distorted, or
untrue; factoids (information that sounds like a fact but upon closer examination will be
seen to be irrelevant or untrue); and factlets (pieces of real information that are accurate
but do not support the conclusions for which they are offered). 1d. See also TRUBEK ET
AL., supra note 57, at 82-84, 122-23 (empirical study of costs of ordinary litigation indicates
that rhetoric of civil litigation reform not supported by reality; emphasizing need for more
empirical research before seriously debating reforms); Galanter, News from Nowhere,
supra note 6, at 99-103 (litigation explosion rhetoric not based on empirical evidence but
naive speculation); Galanter, Reading the Landscape; supra note 3, at 10, 62-63 (same); cf.
Ronald D. Rotunda, Lawyers and Professionalism: A Commentary on the American Bar
Association Commission on Professionalism, 18 Loy. U. Cmn. L.J. 1149, 1151-52 (1987)
(noting historical repetition of claims of professional decline in law, and that such serious
charges need to be "supported by more than anecdotal analysis").
One primary example of inconsistency between the crisis rhetoric of an "explosion" of
civil case filings and the reality in federal courts is the fact that civil case filings actually
dropped slightly in federal courts six of the seven fiscal years between 1986 and 1993.
Statistics Reflect Active Year for the Judiciary, Tim TnmD BRANCH, Feb. 1994, at 4, 5
(newsletter of the federal courts published by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts). This is not to suggest that real problems with the legal system do not exist,
but only to point out the tendency of reform proponents to use crisis rhetoric and the
opponents to perhaps use statistics that merely debunk or cast doubt on the overstated
claims of crisis proponents to suggest that problems do not exist. See generally Thomas C.
Fischer, Are We Facing Legal Gridlock? 3 (unpublished speech presented at ABA 1992
Meeting, Senior Lawyers Division, "Evaluating Our System of Justice: Is Our Judicial and
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be generally exaggerated. 84 Frequently the assertions of the extent of
discovery abuse do not rest on evidence, but only cite to another
writer making a similar claim or simply make a conclusory statement
that derives its strength from the fact that it has been repeated so
frequently. Indeed, taking on lives of their own, many of the claims
that discovery abuse is the major cause of delay and expense in the
federal system are these kinds of conclusory assertions. 85
A second major type of evidence lacking credibility offered to
support claims of discovery abuse is the anecdote or handful of anec-
dotes drawn from cases-stories about cases in which discovery cost
more than the recovery, discovery was used to "fish" for a cause of
action, documents were destroyed or hidden, witnesses were deposed
repeatedly or abusively, or form interrogatories were used that called
for massive amounts of arguably irrelevant information. 86 There are
numerous problems with basing any decisions on anecdotes-so
many, in fact, that most research fields consider anecdotes (i.e., case
Litigation System Delivering Justice to All of the Public?") (on file with Hastings Law
Journal).
84. See, e.g., Garth, supra note 52, at 945 (claiming that there is no documented evi-
dence of routine discovery abuse); Weinstein, supra note 3, at 831 (concluding that discov-
ery abuse was not a problem, at least in the Eastern District of New York, and that claims
of abuse are generally exaggerated).
85. See Galanter, Reading the Landscape, supra note 3, at 10, 62-63 (arguing that
there is no evidence that American society is inherently litigious and riddled with discovery
abuse); see, e.g., Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Equal, Accessible, Affordable Justice Under Law:
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 1 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1992); Quayle: Are
There Too Many Lawyers in America?, NEW JERSEY L.J., Aug. 29, 1991, at 15 (quoting
then-Vice President Quayle's 1991 ABA speech to effect that discovery was 80% of the
problem); Amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 521-23
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (accepting and quoting the ABA Litigation Section's assess-
ment of the existence of 'serious and widespread abuse of discovery"'); A.B.A. Sec. Litig.,
Second Report Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse, reprinted in 92 F.R.D.
137, 138, 154 (1982) (explaining committee's conclusion was apparently based on members
experience that discovery abuse is major problem).
86. See, e.g., Flegal, supra note 47, at 9-10, 21-24 (listing different types of discovery
abuse). For examples of cases frequently cited in discussions of pervasive discovery abuse,
see Litton Systems, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1983)
(repeated concealment of documents by counsel in antitrust case by plaintiff); Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 305 (2d Cir. 1979) (destruction and con-
cealment of documents by defendant's expert and counsel in antitrust case); Robert W.
Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/
LAWYERS' PRACICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN TH= AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 230,
252 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) (describing the allegedly extreme adversarial con-
duct by A.H. Robbins' attorneys in the Dalkon Shield litigation, such as destruction of key
documents, cross-examining witnesses during depositions on details of sexual practices,
burying important documents in discovery in "mountains of trivial ones," and coaching
management witnesses).
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studies) almost worthless as a method of understanding larger issues.87
Apart from the fact that anecdotes can often be distorted or lack a
basis in fact,88 a single anecdote cannot be the basis for extrapolation
of general conclusions about causation or the operation of a system.89
It may be tempting to assume that because most litigators can easily
come up with a discovery abuse anecdote, such abuse is pervasive.
However, such a conclusion equating the actual frequency of a partic-
ular abuse with lawyers' abilities to recall particular instances of abuse
would be faulty and should not serve as the basis for reasoned proce-
dural reform.90
87. See, e.g., DONALD T. CAMPBELL & JuLtAN C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL &
QUASI-EXPERImENTAL DESIGNS FOR RnsEARcH 6-7 (1963); Saks, supra note 83, at 1159-60
(discussing the extremely limited usefulness of anecdotal evidence). However, lawyers and
legal commentators seem to have a tendency to place great confidence in anecdotes. Per-
haps this is because, in addition to lawyers' general lack of training in social science re-
search methods, cases have such a central role in legal argument and education. Saks,
supra note 83, at 1159.
88. Saks, supra note 83, at 1160.
89. See Galanter, Reading the Landscape, supra note 3, at 61-63 (discovery abuse
claims are based on "tiny minority of cases," but there is tendency to identify as general
problems by "narrow elite" judges, academics, large firm practitioners that deal with big
cases, and big clients). There is also some reliance on what Professor Saks has referred to
as "factoids"-"statements-that sound like facts, that seem as though they are conveying
some information, but on examination turn out to be either false or meaningless." Saks,
supra note 83, at 1162. The best example of factoid support for claims of discovery abuse
relates to opinion research of the general public or some segment of the legal profession
which finds that a majority of those questioned believe that discovery abuse is a significant
problem. Id. at 1163. Attitudes can certainly suggest the existence of a problem, but can-
not establish either its actual existence or its magnitude.
90. See Saks, supra note 83, at 1161. Professor Saks describes this psychological char-
acteristic as the "availability heuristic." Id. at 1161 n.36. It is therefore not surprising to
find that when litigators are asked to give specific information about the frequency of a
particular form of discovery abuse instead of responding to a general attitude question-
naire as to whether the form of abuse presents a problem, the responses provide a lower
estimate of the magnitude of the problem. See, e.g., EBERsOLE & BURKE, supra note 57, at
4-5 (50% of 246 attorneys surveyed reported discovery problems in cases, but only 4 attor-
neys reported actual instances of abuse of discovery rules). The questionable value of
anecdotes or opinion research is demonstrated by inconsistencies or paradoxes in results
when litigators answering an opinion poll indicate that discovery abuse is a massive prob-
lem, but the percentage of respondents admittedly engaging in abusive discovery them-
selves is very small. See, eg., EBERSOLE & BuRKx, supra note 57, at 30-39, 76 (examining
the differences of perceptions of opposing counsel and judges regarding discovery in partic-
ular cases, including observation that in the area of overdisclosure "one person's abuse is
another person's necessity"); GLASER, supra note 33, at 62-63, 121-23 (response to survey
showing that attorneys consider use of discovery as fishing or irrelevant harassment only if
it is being done by adversary); Brazil, Front Lines, supra note 57, at 235 & n.36 (while
Chicago lawyers surveyed in 1979 regarding discovery problems identified as common and
widespread use of unnecessary discovery to generate additional fees, known as "meter
running," none of the responding attorneys admitted to having engaged in such abuse).
March 1995] DISCLOSURE UNDER RULE 26(a)
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
(3) Conclusions from Empirical Studies
While little definitive information can be derived from the empir-
ical studies on discovery abuse to date, the data from studies con-
ducted over the last three decades is germane to the controversy
surrounding Rule 26(a) disclosure.91 Some commentators reviewing
data from empirical studies have concluded that "the better view is
that discovery normally works well, and that liberal discovery is on
balance a functioning system used effectively in more than half the
lawsuits filed." 9 This may be a somewhat overly optimistic assess-
ment of discovery practice, particularly in the absence of any agreed
upon definition of what "working well" means.93 Although, superfi-
cially, the evidence from studies does not support the popular claims
of wholesale widespread discovery abuse, there seem to be recurring
findings that suggest troubling systematic problems in discovery
practice.
First, relatively constant and significant levels of discovery
problems have been reported across studies over time that seem rela-
tively resistant to rules changes. For example, a study completed in
1963 on discovery problems conducted by The Project for Effective
Justice of Columbia Law School94 that concluded discovery problems
were not widespread 95 also found that discovery was apparently not
91. One significant limitation on the conclusions that can be drawn from existing em-
pirical data is the fact that most of the major studies on discovery, such as those by Con-
nolly and Brazil, were conducted prior to the 1980 and 1983 Civil Rules amendments that
contained discovery reforms. Dudley, supra note 13, at 193.
92. Mayer, supra note 22, at 87; see also Walker, supra note 57, at 781, 783-86, 789
(study of discovery in Iowa state trial courts indicated only 25% of all cases had any formal
discovery and of those only a few involved extensive discovery; the majority of judges and
attorneys thought discovery was working reasonably well and that discovery abuse has
occurred in only a small minority of cases); Randall Samborn, Little Discovery Abuse, Fu-
els Reform Opposition, NAT'L L.J., May 31, 1993, at 3 (National Center for State Courts'
studies showing no discovery in 42% of contracts, property, and tort cases).
93. Mayer seemingly suggests that effectiveness should be equated with successful ac-
cess to information (without surprise at trial) in half of the cases filed. See Mayer, supra
note 22, at 87. However, it is arguable that determining the effectiveness of discovery also
requires considering the costs of information exchange to the parties and the justice sys-
tem, the extent to which discovery practice is consistent with the formal discovery rules and
their instrumental purposes, and whether there are ways of reducing the costs and increas-
ing the utility of discovery.
94. See Advisory Committee's Explanatory Statement Concerning Amendments of
the Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 487 (1970); GLASER, supra note 33, at 37, 41-44. In
addition to Professor Maurice Rosenberg, William Glaser was an active participant in the
study. Note, Federal Discovery Rules, supra note 57, at 625 n.14.
95. Advisory Committee's Explanatory Statement Concerning Amendments of the
Discovery Rules, 48 F.R.D. at 487-90; LEVINE, supra note 33, at 3-5, 116; Maurice Rosen-
berg, Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 479, 488-90 (1969).
[Vol. 46
DISCLOSURE UNDER RULE 26(a)
eliminating or reducing surprise at trial, increasing the number of set-
tlements, or resulting in shorter and more efficient proceedings;
96
complaints about the other side's discovery practice occurred in more
than half of the cases.97 The frequency of claims about evasive re-
sponses to discovery suggested that, at the time of the Columbia
Study, many lawyers were still operating under the "sporting theory"
of adversarial justice.98 Similarly, a late 1970s study by the Federal
Judicial Center found that 50% of the attorneys surveyed reported
cases with discovery problems.99 In a study of Chicago lawyers spon-
sored by the American Bar Foundation in the late 1970s, Professor
Brazil concluded that, although about two-thirds of all attorneys sur-
veyed indicated that discovery was working at least adequately,10 0 dis-
covery in large-case litigation was in serious trouble. This conclusion
was primarily based on data showing that (1) in about 50% of large
cases settled and 33% of cases fully tried at least one side believed
that the other side had failed to uncover significant evidence; (2) more
96. See GLASER, supra note 33, at 70, 82, 91, 97-98, 100-01, 106-15; Rosenberg, supra
note 95,488-90; see also LEVINE, supra note 33, at 3-5. On the other hand, the study's main
author, Professor Rosenberg, concluded that the data did support the finding that discov-
ery increased the quality of settlements and the trial process. Rosenberg, supra note 95, at
98, 488-90. See also LEVINE, supra note 33, at 5 (explaining that by increasing a party's
knowledge of information that both helps and hurts the party's case discovery improves
the quality of settlements).
97. Rosenberg, supra note 95, at 490. Professor Rosenberg theorized that the pre-
dominance of discovery problems relating to the scope of discovery and the "relevance"
concept arose out of the fact that "the concept of relevance is, in effect, a depository for
most of the tensions that develop between adversaries in a lawsuit." Id.
98. Lawyers were "still motivated to conceal as much as possible, particularly evi-
dence or witnesses that will have a dramatic effect at trial." GLASER, supra note 33, at 234;
see LEVINE, supra note 33, at 5 (discussing the Columbia study and the "sporting theory" of
justice).
99. EBERSOLE & BURKE, supra note 57, at 4-5. The identification of problem cases
was done by surveying 246 attorneys in a particular federal district as to whether they
could "identify litigation in which the costs or burdens of discovery seemed disproportion-
ately large considering the legal issues involved, or in which problems with discovery oc-
curred, or in which there seemed to have been abuse or attempted abuse of the discovery
process." Id. at 4. The attorneys surveyed were selected by court clerks from lists of local
bar members on the basis of frequency of civil litigation and apparent knowledgeability
and competence. Id. Obviously, this methodology introduced several sources of potential
bias and lack of true representativeness. The results of the study, while interesting, are too
focused on a small group of cases and attorneys, with too many unexamined variables, to
add much to the overall assessment of the extent of discovery problems generally. Id. at 40
n.9.
100. See Brazil, Lawyers' Views, supra note 57, at 794-96. The validity and general-
izability of results from Brazil's study are undermined by the fact that attorneys surveyed
were not representative of attorneys in civil cases generally or in Chicago. In particular,
while large cases constitute a minority of the cases filed, the number of large case and small
case attorneys surveyed was balanced. See id. at 791, 897.
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than 60% of the large-case attorneys believed that evasion and exces-
sive discovery were problematic and believed that, in 80% of the large
cases, opposing counsel had engaged in evasive or incomplete re-
sponses to discovery requests; and (3) 85% of large-case lawyers be-
lieved that the courts do not adequately control discovery
problems. 101
A second relatively consistent finding in the studies has been that
the amount of discovery abuse, whether in the form of excessive or
evasive discovery, increases as the incentives for abuse in the cases
increase; that is, the more complex or larger the case is, the more
likely discovery problems will occur.'0 2 Thus, the Columbia study on
discovery found that discovery costs and the imposition of discovery
for purposes of oppression or harassment was a more significant prob-
lem in more complex cases. 103 A Federal Judicial Center study in 1979
also found that the occurrence of overdiscovery was related to the size
and complexity of cases.1°4 Similarly, Professor Brazil's study of attor-
ney perceptions of discovery generally revealed that discovery
problems or abuses were seen by the 180 Chicago attorneys surveyed
101. See Brazil, Lawyers' Views, supra note 57, at 870-71. But see ELLINGTON, supra
note 57, at 1-2 (suggesting that discovery problems exist in only about 15% of civil cases).
The Ellington study examined all dockets in closed cases in which there was any indication
of discovery activity in the federal district courts of Chicago and Atlanta in the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1978, with a particular focus of the frequency on discovery abuse and the
frequency with which sanctions were sought and imposed. Based only on review of dock-
ets, the authors found discovery activity in only 38% of the Chicago cases and 45% of the
Atlanta cases examined, and discovery problems in only 28% of the those cases in Chicago
with discovery and 27% of those in Atlanta. Id. at 3. Discovery activity was apparently
defined as the appearance on the docket sheet of an indication that there had been discov-
ery, motions to compel, motions for protective orders, and motions for discovery sanctions.
Id. at 13. It is likely, however, that the method of identifying cases with discovery activity
and discovery problems may have resulted in significant underidentification of the amount
of discovery activity and problems, especially if local rules or court orders provided that
filing discovery requests was not necessary. That there was underreporting of discovery
problems is also supported by the results from attorney interviews in which attorneys indi-
cated that they sought sanctions for discovery problems only as a matter of last resort for
repeated or willful discovery abuse. Id. at 6. The types of discovery problems involved in
order of frequency were failure of opponent to respond adequately to discovery requests,
disputes over the scope of discovery (e.g., issues of relevance and privilege), and excessive
discovery. Id. at 6, 56.
102. See Dudley, supra note 13, at 195-97; Galanter, Reading the Landscape, supra note
3, at 63; Garth, supra note 52, at 945.
103. GLASER, supra note 33, at 182-88.
104. See EBERSOLE & BURKE, supra note 57, at 73-78.
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as substantially more prevalent in large, complex cases as opposed to
smaller, simpler, more routine cases.'05
More importantly, the studies on discovery abuse have also pro-
vided data that may assist in understanding some of the underlying
causes and dynamics of discovery problems. In particular, several
studies have noted general lawyer misunderstandings or misapplica-
tions of fundamental discovery doctrines. For example, a study of the
effect of the 1970 revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
dealing with discovery practices, including a clarification of the work
product doctrine in Rule 26(b)(3), found that confusion remained
over the meaning and applicability of the work product doctrine. 106
Lawyer misunderstanding or misapplication of discovery doctrines
was confirmed by Professor David S. Shapiro in a more elaborate
study in the late 1970s.10 7 Professor Shapiro tested the hypothesis that
some of the problems with discovery may be due to "a gap between
the theory and practice of discovery" and an absence of clarity in the
105. See Brazil, Front Lines, supra note 57, at 217, 219, 220 n.1, 222-24. Smaller, sim-
pler case lawyers were defined as those whose median case had an amount in dispute of
$25,000 or less and involved liability theories that were "relatively straightforward (e.g.,
negligence) and which [did] not require analysis of vast quantities of data"; larger case
lawyers had a median case with $1,000,000 or more amount in dispute, and a complex case
would be typified by an antitrust suit. Id. at 222-23 & n.7. Although the data reflected
overlap between the discovery characteristics of large and small cases on various criteria,
generally it appeared that: (1) discovery accounted for a higher percentage of billable
attorney time in large cases than in small cases; (2) discovery is used less in smaller than
larger cases for tactical purposes relating to imposition of burdens and expense; (3) eva-
sion, friction, and harassment were less frequent in smaller cases than in larger cases; (4)
privilege and work product disputes occurred substantially less often in smaller cases; (5) in
large cases clients are more likely to be active in discovery matters and pressure attorneys
to evade discovery and use discovery as a tool of harassment; and (6) over-discovery is
more prevalent in large cases. Id. at 223-30.
Among the reasons offered to explain the differences in results between large and
small cases are that large cases, because of their complexity, information demands, and
lack of predictability, create greater discovery demands accompanied by potential for error
and confusion. They also create strong incentives for discovery abuse because of the high
monetary stakes involved. As the opportunities and incentives for discovery abuse in-
crease, the ability of the courts to adequately control discovery abuse is strained and di-
minished. See Brazil, Lawyers' Views, supra note 57, at 873.
The major limitations of the study relate to the size of the sample and the fact that the
attorneys were geographically limited to the Chicago area, thereby suggesting potential
nonrepresentativeness of the sample. Furthermore, because the study was based on the
opinions or perceptions of attorneys, it suffers from the validity problems common to sur-
vey research generally. In particular, perceptions suffer from reliability problems and can-
not objectively establish facts. See Brazil, Front Lines, supra note 57, at 221; Saks, supra
note 83, at 1162-63.
106. Note, Federal Discovery Rules, supra note 57, at 629-30, 641-43.
107. See Shapiro, supra note 57.
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rules, including those set out in Hickman v. Taylor, 08 rather than the
inevitable conflict between the goals of discovery and the adversary
system.10 9 The study revealed a wide variability in the understanding
of doctrines, a significant tendency to over apply privileges and work
product doctrine, and the pervasiveness of attempts to avoid provid-
ing information in response to proper discovery requests.1o
Slightly different, but related, discovery problem dynamics are
suggested by Professor Brazil's study. Overall, attorneys reported
that evasive or incomplete discovery responses impeded their access
to information from opponents in 60% of all cases (80% of large cases
and 40% of small cases) and that dilatory discovery responses by op-
ponents occurred in 50% of all cases (large or small)."' However,
108. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
109. See Shapiro, supra note 57, at 1055-57. To test his hypothesis, Shapiro conducted
a survey of 400 attorneys in which the attorneys were asked to answer, on the basis of their
present knowledge, a series of interrogatories and requests for admissions based upon hy-
pothetical fact patterns. The questionnaire tested attorneys' understandings of obligations
to disclose information, work product protection, and attorney-client privilege. Id. at 1058-
59. Generalizability of the study is undermined because lawyers in the study were not
randomly selected, but were instead selected from among those who were thought to have
familiarity with litigation, and because only 110 usable responses were received. Id. at
1059-60.
110. Id. at 1060-61, 1071, 1090, 1093-1100. In particular, a large number of attorneys
improperly sought to apply the attorney work product doctrine to interrogatories seeking
the substance of information available in an oral or written witness statements, despite the
fact that Hickman v. Taylor had indicated such "facts" are not protected. Id. at 1062-63,
1067, 1072-73 (citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508-09, 513). Respondents also tended to con-
strue requests narrowly and to avoid divulging information, such as the existence of wit-
nesses who could provide information that may answer an interrogatory the other side
would clearly want. Id. at 1062, 1073-75, 1092. Finally, there was a tendency to refuse to
admit a fact in a Rule 36 request despite the absence of contrary evidence and the absence
of a reason to doubt the truth of the fact derived from a witness statement. Id at 1078-79,
1983; but see id. at 1084-89 (arguing that no such duty should exist at least when the other
side bears the burden of proof and the evidence is probably inadmissible). The significance
of these findings in the disclosure controversy is discussed infra notes 312-370 and accom-
panying text. Overall, Professor Shapiro, while unable to determine whether clarifying the
discovery rules would cure many of the discovery abuses in light of the incentives in the
adversary system structure, nevertheless suggested that several of the rules should be clari-
fied. See Shapiro, supra note 57, at 1074-75, 1090-92. In particular, he suggested that Rule
26 should clearly indicate that work product protection does not apply to the factual sub-
stance of a witness statement or other factual information known to an attorney as a result
of investigation, at least when requested by an interrogatory. Id. at 1091. Shapiro also
recommended that Rule 33 be amended to clarify that a party responding to an interro-
gatory as to which the party is unable to give a definitive answer should still provide the
information that is reasonably available and relevant to the interrogatory. Id. at 1092.
111. Brazil, Lawyers' Views, supra note 57, at 833, 870-71. When a subset of attorneys
who had indicated that they had settled a case believing that the other side still had signifi-
cant information were asked to explain why they thought this was so, the most common
reason given (38%) was failure of the opponent to comply with discovery. Id. at 823.
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when attorneys .were asked to indicate why they may have failed to
disclose information to an opponent, the vast majority responded that
it was because the other side had failed to undertake discovery com-
petently, e.g., the failure by opposing counsel "to ask the right ques-
tions, or for the right documents or depose the right people."11 2 On
the other hand, despite the fact that, overall, attorneys indicated that
60% of the time their opponents' evasive practices impaired access to
information, only 20% of the same attorneys indicated that they had
themselves undertaken evasive practices such as engaging in actions
for the "purpose of distracting another party's attention from or ob-
scuring the existence of information."'1 3 This data lends support to
the hypothesis that discovery abuse, at least in the form of evasive
practices, is in the eye of the beholder. The data suggests that when
an attorney knows information in that attorney's possession is not dis-
closed it is because the opposing counsel did not ask the right ques-
tions, whereas when the attorney offers an explanation for similar
behavior by an opponent it is because of evasion.
Moreover, there is an even more fascinating twist suggested by
the data. While attorneys overall identified evasive or incomplete dis-
covery responses as problems in 60% of their cases, only 14% of the
cases were believed to involve bad faith or dishonesty by their oppo-
nents. This data and the attorney comments suggest that attorneys
generally did not consider evasive or incomplete responses to be
wrong, but instead to be part of the responsibilities of the adversarial
advocate to use ambiguities and narrow construction techniques to the
client's advantage.114 On the other hand, when this data is considered
together with the finding that attorneys overwhelmingly believed that
inadequate judicial management of discovery is the biggest discovery
problem," 5 it suggests one of the most interesting hypotheses regard-
ing discovery problems-attorneys are compelled by the adversarial
culture to engage in activities that they recognize are potentially
counterproductive and to seek the assistance of the courts to save
them from themselves." 6
112. Id. at 822-24.
113. Id. at 854-55.
114. I. at 838. Indeed, attorneys acknowledged their own difficulty in distinguishing
between arguably improper conduct and the responsibility they believed they had to "in-
terpret every discovery request as favorably to their clients as possible and provide damag-
ing information only when the precision of the probe and the absence of privilege left no
alternative short of lying." Id. at 855.
115. Id. at 824-25.
116. Id. at 862-69.
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Finally, the empirical work indicates that the sanction mecha-
nisms intended to control discovery abuse are far less effective than
the drafters of the Rules assumed. Overall, studies tend to show a
reluctance by parties to seek sanctions for discovery abuse by their
opponents," 7 a reluctance by the courts to impose discovery sanc-
tions, 118 and a relatively small amount of actual sanctioning activity by
the courts." 9 Among the reasons offered for judicial reluctance to
impose sanctions were: (1) judicial application of an unclean hands
notion (i.e., since it is likely that both parties are guilty of abuse,
neither will be punished); (2) lack of knowledge by judges that the
discovery system was being abused to such a degree; (3) apprehension
that the use of discovery sanctions will create or exacerbate acrimony
between counsel or parties; (4) concern that sanctions will penalize
the client for the attorney's conduct; (5) judges' lack of sufficient
knowledge about the issues or participants in a case to feel confident
that sanctions are appropriate; (6) empathy, sympathy, or indoctrina-
tion in the tradition of zealous partisanship resulting in judicial toler-
ance of behavior that is close to or crosses over the line between
aggressive advocacy and discovery abuse; and (7) the absence of clear,
determinate standards in the Federal Civil Rules for judging the pro-
priety or adequacy of discovery requests and responses, which results
frequently in reliance on normative standards that are far too lax. 20
Some attorneys indicated that the perceived judicial reluctance to im-
pose sanctions for discovery inhibited further attorney motions to
compel and motions for sanctions because the information was not
worth the cost required to obtain it and because attorneys did not
want to be seen by judges as imposing unnecessary burdens on the
courts and their opponents. 121 Other more negative effects of judicial
reluctance to impose sanctions or controls on the pretrial environment
included the tendency of such reluctance to encourage lawyers to vio-
117. See Ellington, supra note 57, at 151 (explaining findings of 1979 study of Chicago
and Atlanta federal court discovery practice); GLASER, supra note 33, at 140-42, 154-56,
161 (explaining findings of 1960's Columbia discovery study).
118. See ELLINGTON, supra note 57, at 4, 8-10 (summarizing 1979 Department of Jus-
tice study); Note, Federal Discovery Rules, supra note 57, at 641-43 (discussing the post-
1970 amendment follow-up to original Columbia study).
119. See ELLINGTON, supra note 57, at 4 (1979 study of sanctions in Chicago and At-
lanta federal courts found that sanctions requests were granted only in about one-fourth of
cases in which they were made).
120. Brazil, Improving Controls, supra note 57 at 923-33. These reasons are generally
consistent with those set forth in the Department of Justice study on the effectiveness of
sanctions. See ELLINGTON, supra note 57, at 8-10.
121. See Ellington, supra note 57, at 103.
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late clear duties because of competitive and economic pressures un-
checked by probable judicial restraints and the tendency for one side's
perceived abusive conduct to set off a retaliatory spiral of discovery
abuse.12
The studies indicating lawyer misunderstandings and misapplica-
tions of discovery doctrines as well as a relatively constant occurrence
of discovery problems that are not responsive to sanction controls,
particularly in more complex cases, suggest that lawyers may fre-
quently engage in conduct they would not define as discovery abuse,
but that judges or commentators may view as improper. To a great
extent the data from the studies are consistent with the notion that
discovery abuse seems to be defined by lawyers as "what the other
side does," with each side seeking as much information as it can under
the broad discoverability standard of the present Rule 26, while at-
tempting to withhold as much information as possible.123 The roots of
such an irrational and counterproductive dynamic may lie in the ad-
versary tradition of "zealous representation of the client" as the first
principle, without careful consideration of whether a particular form
of zealotry is authorized by law or even in the client's ultimate best
interest.124 The view that "intentionally imposing burdens upon an
opponent, except in the most egregious circumstances, is a common
and ethical aspect of normal litigation practice,"1  epitomizes how the
broad misunderstanding of adversarial zealotry yields behavior that
122. See Brazil, Improving Controls, supra note 57, at 922-23.
"123. See also Mayer, supra note 22, at 89.
124. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsiBILrry Canon 7 (establishing zeal-
ous representation within the bounds of the law); Lawrence M. Frankel, Disclosure in the
Federal Courts: A Cure-for Discovery ills?, 25 ARiz. ST. L.J. 249, 263 (1993) [hereinafter
Frankel, Cure for Discovery 1ls] (explaining that overemphasis on zealous advocacy and
game playing may result in situation in which parties push discovery to inefficient level
despite fact that both sides would be better off with less rather than more discovery); Ron-
ald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD.
L. Rnv. 869, 875-76 (1990) (arguing that client who is unsure of litigation position in future
would, in abstract, opt for cooperative professional behavior). See also Colin Campbell &
John Rea, Civil Litigation and the Ethics of Mandatory Disclosure: Moving Toward Brady
v. Maryland, 25 Az. ST. L.J. 237, 240-43 (1993) (discussing ethical obligations and tradi-
tional view that zealous advocacy for client is more important than duty to serve truth-
finding function of the court). But see Mayer, supra note 22, at 89-90 (arguing that it is
erroneous to attribute discovery crisis to misbehaving attorney's overzealousness); infra
text accompanying notes 353-378.
125. Mayer, supra note 22, at 100 & n.61; see also id. at 101-02 (stating that "filing
requests for the sole purpose of burdening an opponent is not necessarily improper or
unethical" and arguing that obligation to client includes impositional discovery that attor-
ney knows he or she can get away with because sanctions are unlikely).
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clearly crosses the legal and ethical line.' 26 Similarly, the inappropri-
ate frequency and ease with which lawyers assert privileges or work
product protections in the name of client interests also demonstrates
the influence of a superficial understanding of and adherence to parti-
san zealotry. Based on the admittedly sparse data, it is probably in-
correct to assume that it is "rogue," "misbehaving," or "flagrant
misconduct" that is at the heart of discovery abuse identified in most
cases in the studies.127 In this regard, the studies discussed above sug-
gest that a multitude of factors may underlie or contribute to discov-
ery abuse. Nevertheless, it seems relatively clear that the traditional
adversarial culture that instills zealous advocacy as a primary ethic is a
common denominator of most forms of abuse. On the basis of these
discovery studies, one might have predicted that attorneys so heavily
enculturated in partisan discovery practices would have difficulty with
any form of discovery reform that required nonpartisan behavior on
their part.
(4) Disclosure as a Response to Discovery Abuse
Proposed solutions to discovery problems have consistently in-
cluded increased judicial involvement through pretrial management
techniques and increased use of sanctions. 128 They have also involved
proposals for clarifying or strengthening rules of ethics and rules of
liability for improper discovery conduct 29 and for mandating discov-
126. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)(a)(iii) (limits on "unduly burdensome discov-
ery" taking into consideration the "needs of the case . . . and importance of issues at
stake"); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) (certification that discovery request is "not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in cost"); Winter, supra note 18, at 264-65 (discussing Proposed Rule 26(b)(2) limiting dis-
covery in which the "burden or expense of proposed discovery outweighs its likely bene-
fit"). See infra notes 356-398.
127. Thus, it is probably correct that "discovery reforms must seek to address how even
good and ethical attorneys" engage in discovery. Mayer, supra note 22, at 91. One impor-
tant step in that direction, however, is to instill in all attorneys the objective limits of adver-
sarial zealotry and the importance of the overall societal interest in cooperative behavior.
See infra notes 355-377, 396-403 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., EBERSOLE & BURKE, supra note 57, at 79; ELL1NGTON, supra note 57, at
11-12 (supporting greater judicial involvement in pretrial stage generally and greater use of
sanctions for discovery abuse, including discovery conference/plan concept embodied in
the 1979 proposed rules); Brazil, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 66, at 78-81. See also
Brazil, Improving Controls, supra note 57, at 888-89, 937-52 (noting the 1981 proposed civil
rules changes involving more pretrial involvement and control by judges, broader sanction-
ing power, and new certification requirements, and suggesting even more substantial re-
forms in these areas).
129. See, e.g., Brazil, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 66, at 81-85 (strengthening of Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure 11, 26, & 37); Brazil, Improving Controls, supra note 57, at
[Vol. 4
ery planning and dispute resolution conferences prior to judicial in-
volvement in pretrial planning or discovery disputes.130 Almost
twenty years ago several proposals for a very different approach to
discovery reform began surfacing that involved removing much of dis-
covery from adversarial practices instead of attempting to restrain
those practices through judicial controls, planning by parties, and
sanctions.
These discovery reforms* involving early, mandatory information
disclosure requirements were suggested by several influential com-
mentators, including United States Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil, a
member of the Federal Civil Rules Advisory Committee that pro-
posed Federal Rule 26(a), former United States District Judge Marvin
Frankel, and United States District Judge and later Director of the
Federal Judicial Center, William Schwarzer.131 While each of these
889-90, 929-30 (proposing Model Rules on Professional Conduct provisions on knowingly
failing to disclose facts, unlawfully obstructing another party's access to or concealing rele-
vant material, and barring unreasonable discovery requests or failing to make a diligent
effort to comply with a proper discovery request).
130. See, eg., Brazil, Improving Controls, supra note 57, at 893-97. More recently, ap-
plying an economic analysis of discovery abuse, some commentators have proposed a form
of cost shifting as a solution to discovery abuse. Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 42, at 455.
These authors define discovery abuse as the knowing misuse of discovery, with misuse of
discovery being defined as discovery as to which "compliance costs more than the expected
increase in the value of the requesting party's claim." Id. at 437. Under this proposal, a
party responding to discovery would only bear the cost of reasonably complying with dis-
covery requests up to the "switching point," after which the party seeking discovery would
bear any additional discovery costs. Id. at 455-56. The switching point must be determined
for a class of cases, apparently applying an analysis similar to that required under recently
amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(iii), which allows courts to deny discov-
ery if "the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking
into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues." The purpose of the cost-shifting rule would be a disincentive to
abuse and would result in equalization or symmetry of transaction costs, which would lead
to an accurate settlement. Cooter and Rubinfeld, supra note 42, at 456.
Obvious shortcomings with this proposed solution are that it does not, by definition,
address the common forms of discovery abuse involving evasion or resistance to discovery
and unintentional discovery abuse (e.g., based on incompetence). As-discussed elsewhere,
discovery evasion is particularly resistant to solutions because it often involves a situation
in which compliance with a discovery request will result in a loss of the case. For a further
practical and theoretical critique of this solution, see Edward H. Cooper, Discovery Cost
Allocation: Comment on Cooter and Rubinfeld, 23 J. LEGAL STuD. 465 (1994).
131. See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and
Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1295 (1978) [hereinafter Brazil, Adversary Char-
acter]; Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth Continued: More Disclosure, Less Privi-
lege, 54 CoLO. L. REv. 51 (1982) [hereinafter Frankel, More Disclosure]; William W
Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 703 (1989) [hereinafter Schwarzer, Discovery Reform]; William W Schwarzer, Slaying
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commentators has a slightly different view of the scope of the discov-
ery problem and the required solutions, the fundamental impetus for
their support of mandatory "disclosure" of information in the pretrial
process was their belief that the continued adherence to full partisan-
ship, at least during the pretrial stage, produces results inconsistent
with the goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-"to secure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."'1 32 They
generally recognized that the modem rules of procedure relating to
discovery were designed to allow lawyer-controlled discovery, driven
by the adversarial process, to produce the most efficient path to truth
and to avoid judicial involvement in the process to the extent possible,
primarily because of its excessive costs. 133 Even after amendments to
the Rules,134 continued problems with the discovery process were
viewed as the result of the inherent competitiveness, aggressiveness,
the Monsters of Cost and Delay: Would Disclosure Be More Effective than Discovery?, 74
JUDICATURE 178 (1991) [hereinafter Schwarzer, Slaying the Monsters]. See also Frank H.
Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 646 (1990) (discussing disclosure
proposal by Professor E. Donald Elliot); Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An
Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1057 (1975) (containing Judge Frankel's initial
discussion of voluntary disclosure of evidence as an element of professional responsibility)
[hereinafter Frankel, Umpireal View]; Maurice N. Nessen, Rethinking the Lawyer's Duties
to Disclose Information: A Critique of Some of Judge Frankel's Proposals, 24 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 677, 711-12 (1979) (endorsing Judge Frankel's proposal for mandatory disclosure
in civil cases of all relevant evidence without privilege). A disclosure obligation has also
been part of the German civil litigation system. See Langbein, supra note 37, at 827 (com-
plaint and answer must be accompanied by documents and list of witnesses supporting
claim). Detailed analysis of the German system has not been undertaken here primarily
because of the substantial and fundamental differences between the German and the
American civil litigation systems. See Arthur T. von Mehren, Some Comparative Reflec-
tions of First Instance Civil Procedure: Recent Reforms in German Civil Procedure and in
the Federal Rules, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 609 (1988).
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. See Brazil, Adversary Character, supra note 131, at 1296, 1303;
Frankel, More Disclosure, supra note 131, at 51-53; Schwarzer, Discovery Reform, supra
note 131, at 704-06; Schwarzer, Slaying the Monsters, supra note 131, at 178. See also Mark
Nordenberg, The Supreme Court and Discovery Reform: The Continuing Need for an Um-
pire, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 543, 571-85 (1980) (discussing the Brazil and Frankel propos-
als). Interestingly, Professor (now U.S. Magistrate Judge) Wayne Brazil and Professor
Nordenberg were both members of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that recommended Rule 26(a).
133. Flegal & Umin, supra note 40, at 613; Rosenberg & King, supra note 40, at 581;
Schwarzer, Discovery Reform, supra note 131, at 704-05.
134. See Nordenberg, supra note 132, at 553-60, 566; Rosenberg & King, supra note 40,
at 579, 589; Schwarzer, Discovery Reform, supra note 131, at 704-05. See supra notes 76-80
and accompanying text (discussing 1980 and 1983 amendments to the Civil Rules, including
the 1980 amendment authorizing judicially controlled discovery conferences (see FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(f) and 1983 amendments to increase judicial pretrial management and ability to
sanction attorneys for abuse). See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 16, 26.
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and incentives of the adversarial process, which were counterproduc-
tive in the pretrial process.
135
Magistrate Judge Brazil's original 1978 proposal to address these
problems would have included
shifting counsel's principal obligation during the investigation and
discovery stage away from partisan pursuit of clients' interests and
toward the court; imposing a duty on counsel to investigate thor-
oughly the factual background of disputes; imposing a duty on both
counsel and client to disclose voluntarily, and at all stages of trial
preparation, all potentially relevant evidence and information; nar-
rowing the reach of the attorney-client privilege and the work prod-
uct doctrine; making early discovery conferences mandatory;
substantially expanding the role of the court in monitoring the exe-
cution of discovery; and requiring thorough judicial review of, or
participation in, all settlements that exceed a specific dollar
amount.
136
Judge Schwarzer's more recent proposal advocated an approach
that would "require prompt disclosure of all material documents and
information by all parties at the commencement of every action, per-
mitting supplemental traditional discovery for good cause only.' 37
135. Among the problems that were seen to "distort the flow of evidentiary informa-
tion to the parties and the trier of fact and contribute significantly to the increased cost of
litigation," Brazil, Adversary Character, supra note 131, at 1304-05, and that stem primarily
from the incentives and environment created by an adversarially driven pretrial process
were: (1) too little regard for the objective of obtaining the truth through discovery; (2)
preoccupation with winning (reinforced by rules of professional conduct emphasizing zeal-
ous representation of clients); (3) economic incentives not to engage in early discovery
planning and to engage in potentially unnecessary discovery and resistance to discovery
because it constitutes the most significant and lucrative litigation activity; (4) fears of mal-
practice if an attorney voluntarily discloses anything potentially harmful to the client or
does not fight "tooth and nail" all the time; (5) professional perceptions of skill or compe-
tence that may positively view and reward the ability to evade disclosure or use discovery
as a tactical weapon to obtain a result that is otherwise not justified by the facts; (6) ineffec-
tiveness of clients' cost concerns in reigning in discovery costs or abuses because of attor-
ney malpractice concerns and the inability of clients to understand case needs realistically
or determine what is appropriate or necessary; (7) incentive to use broad wide-open dis-
covery as a fishing tool to find information not directly related to present claims, but in-
stead that might support new claims or induce settlement; and (8) reluctance or
inconsistency with which the courts have applied the rules sanctioning discovery abuse, and
practical difficulties for courts to be able to determine what is necessary or abusive discov-
ery. See Brazil, Adversary Character, supra note 131, at 1311-48; Brazil, Improving Con-
trols, supra note 57, at 883; Frankel, More Disclosure, supra note 131, at 52-53; Schwarzer,
Discovery Reform, supra note 131, at 706-16; Schwarzer, Slaying the Monsters, supra note
131, at 178-79. See also Easterbrook, supra note 131, at 636-43; Nordenberg, supra note
132, at 571-92. Although these problems are phrased slightly differently from those previ-
ously identified as being pervasive in discovery, see supra text accompanying notes 5-80,
there is substantial similarity and overlap.
136. Brazil, Adversary Character, supra note 131, at 1349.
137. Schwarzer, Discovery Reform, supra note 131, at 721.
March 1995]
Specifically, this contemplated a discovery rule mandating that a
plaintiff serve, along with the summons and complaint: (1) a copy of
all material,138 unprivileged 139 documents; (2) a list of all persons with
material information; and (3) written statements of material informa-
tion by persons under the control of the plaintiff.140 The responding
party would be required to serve similar information at or before the
time an answer or a motion on the merits was served. The duty of
disclosure would continue throughout the litigation; all discovery by
traditional methods would only be available after the disclosure if the
parties demonstrated to the court that it was particularly necessary.'
4'
Professor Michael Wolfson offered a slight variation on the fore-
going disclosure proposals based on the theory that the solution to
discovery abuse is to make pretrial proceedings as nonadversarial as
possible while recognizing that discovery is necessary to some ex-
tent. 42 Wolfson suggested that there are certain core bits of informa-
tion that are invariably exchanged through the discovery process, such
as the names of witnesses to an accident, and that the use of normal
discovery for this information presents an opportunity for applying
adversarial skills of avoidance, delay, and interpretation at too great a
cost to the client, the opposing party, the courts, and the legal sys-
tem. 43 Therefore, he proposed required disclosure, without waiting
for a request, of certain basic information that would be (1) routinely
discoverable based on experience, (2) directly related to the subject
138. The standard of what must be disclosed was "materiality," by which Judge
Schwarzer apparently meant anything that may have a bearing on the outcome of a case
(other than mere impeachment evidence). Schwarzer, Slaying the Monsters, supra note
131, at 181. Judge Schwarzer indicated that this standard is more stringent than the Fed-
eral Rule 26(b)(1) limits on discovery that are "reasonably calculated to lead to admissible
evidence." Id According to Judge Schwarzer, when a doubt exists about whether some-
thing is material, a motion for clarification asking the judge to make a determination would
be required. Id.
139. Judge Frankel's original disclosure proposal is essentially similar to Judge
Schwarzer's except that Judge Frankel would have required complete disclosure of all ma-
terial evidence favorable to the other side regardless of claims of attorney-client privilege.
Frankel, More Disclosure, supra note 131, at 51-53; see also Schwarzer, Discovery Reform,
supra note 131, at 721 n.58.
140. Schwarzer, Slaying the Monsters, supra note 131, at 180. This third element ap-
pears to represent a change from Judge Schwarzer's 1989 disclosure proposal, which would
not have required such written statements, but would have included a requirement that
parties make persons under their control available for depositions. See Schwarzer, Discov-
ery Reform, supra note 131, at 721-22.
141. Schwarzer, Slaying the Monsters, supra note 131, at 180-81; Schwarzer, Discovery
Reform, supra note 131, at 721-22.
142. Wolfson, supra note 32, at 52.
143. Id. at 54-55.
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matter of the case, (3) easily and broadly definable, and (4) un-
privileged. 144 The actual categories of information to be disclosed
would be proposed by the parties and designated by the court at a
routine discovery planning conference. According to Wolfson, the use
of this process would provide a clear understanding of the scope and
intent of the disclosure order as well as particularize the disclosure to
the circumstances of the case.145 Compliance with the disclosure or-
der would be ensured because regular discovery by the other party
would be available as a check and because the court's discovery order
would be subject to the severe sanctions of Rule 37.146
Disclosure-based reforms are intended to send a clear message to
the bar that discovery gamesmanship is unacceptable and that mutual
access to facts and economy in pretrial processes are considered pre-
dominant values. Proponents also intend for disclosure to reduce at-
torneys' personal monetary incentives to engage in unnecessary or
abusive discovery practices and encourage more adequate pretrial in-
vestigation, thereby increasing the likelihood that complaints and an-
swers filed will comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.
Shifting the burden of justification for discovery to those seeking the
discovery would decrease the amount of discovery activity generally
and involve the judiciary in pretrial management of cases through mo-
tions for clarification of disclosure obligations and for discovery. Fi-
nally, disclosure would accelerate disposition (including settlement) of
cases by getting facts out early and facilitate planning when discovery
is necessary by focusing the courts and parties on areas where factual
gaps exist.147
144. Id. at 55-56. An example of items to be disclosed would be the names of medical
personnel consulted and medical expenses incurred in a personal injury action. Id. at 55.
Because discovery may not even be contemplated in many cases, Wolfson proposed that
the parties could avoid a disclosure requirement by a joint declaration that no discovery
was necessary. Id at 59.
145. 1d. at 56-57.
146. Id. at 57-58. Because a court order would be involved, in the event of disclosure
evasions or noncompliance, severe sanctions would be available, including dismissal of an
action, preclusion of evidence on a claim or defense, establishment of facts, or a holding or
ruling of contempt. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (b)(2). Wolfson argued that the likelihood of
compliance was greater when the game of "adversarial hide and seek" is being played with
the court rather than in the "often unscrutinized and freewheeling" normal discovery pro-
cess. Wolfson, supra note 32, at 58 n.228. But see supra notes 117-122 and accompanying
text (Rule 37 sanctions ineffective in stemming discovery abuse).
147. See, eg., Brazil, Adversary Character, supra note 131, at 1351-61; Schwarzer, Slay-
ing the Monsters, supra note 131, at 180-83; Schwarzer, Discovery Reform, supra note 131,
at 722-23; Wolfson, supra note 32, at 51.
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These early proposals were greeted with substantial skepticism
and criticism. Among the criticisms were that required disclosure of
material facts at the time of filing a complaint is inconsistent with no-
tice pleading procedure and (in conjunction with Rule 11) is likely to
discourage some meritorious cases from being filed. Critics asserted
that rather than improve litigative efficiency, the total disclosure of
potentially material evidence may actually undercut efficient trial
preparation by allowing parties to bury each other in an avalanche of
irrelevant material and may motivate parties to investigate less thor-
oughly than under adversarial discovery unless the fruits of the inves-
tigation are somewhat protected. The materiality standard of
disclosure is supposedly overly stringent, inconsistent with current
privileges, and too radical a departure from current practice to be ac-
ceptable to the bar to the extent that it would require an attorney
(through investigation and disclosure obligations) to make an oppo-
nent's case. Moreover, the indeterminacy of the materiality standard
and potential for abuse will result in many more motions requiring
judicial involvement and routine requests for discovery to test the ac-
curacy or completeness of discovery, which will substantially increase
the burdens on the courts. Finally, absent changes to other rules, in-
cluding the sanction provisions (and the court's willingness or ability
to enforce those provisions), there is little incentive for attorney com-
pliance with broad disclosure requirements, particularly in light of the
likelihood that the same "winning" motivation for nondisclosure
would continue to exist and that clients under a disclosure regime
would be less willing to be candid with attorneys. 148
148. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 131, at 640, 642; Nordenberg, supra note 132, at
573-92; Brazil, Adversary Character, supra note 131, at 1351, 1357. In particular, because
the disclosure proposals of Judge Schwarzer and Judge Frankel generally apply a standard
of "materiality" and prohibit all discovery absent a showing of particular need they would
arguably provide a substantial opportunity for parties to engage in self-serving nondisclo-
sure. Cf. Hazard, supra note 81, at 2237, 2240 (discussing incentives to "trim and cheat"
through highly developed dialectical skills such as construing document requests to exclude
the "smoking gun"); Brazil, Improving Controls, supra note 57, at 883 (arguing that it is
unlikely lawyers will exercise self-restraint in engaging in gamesmanship in face of psycho-
logical, economical, and professional incentives).
As one commentator noted, despite constant complaints and recognition of the
problems inherent in the adversarial process, "the organized bar remains firmly wedded to
the adversary ethos," including nondisclosure of evidence favorable to the other side in the
context of discovery. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 589, 600-01 &n.39 (1985). Most of these same criticisms have been leveled at the
far less ambitious disclosure amendment to the Federal Civil Rules.
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A. The Advisory Committee's Discovery Proposal
It was against this backdrop that Federal Rule 26(a) disclosure
came into existence. Based largely on the widely held view that dis-
covery practice was in need of reform, the Advisory Committee began
consideration of the precursor to the proposed Rule 26 disclosure pro-
vision in 1990.149 According to the draft Reporter's Note and the
draft Advisory Committee Note accompanying the first disclosure
proposal labeled Rule 25.1, the purpose of the proposed rule was to
"materially reduce the cost of discovery before trial" by reducing the
reliance on discovery devices to obtain information. 150 The funda-
mental premise of the proposal was "elevated professionalism" under
which "parties should disclose their own evidence early and often."' 51
149. The possibility of consideration by the Civil Rules Advisory Committee of some
form of mandatory disclosure was first raised by the Committee Reporter at the Commit-
tee's November 1989 meeting. The Committee authorized the Reporter to prepare a draft
disclosure rule for consideration at the Committee's June 1990 meeting. The Reporter
prepared two drafts, on February 24, 1990 and March 8, 1990, and obtained input from
selected sources prior to the June meeting. Mullenix, Hope over Experience, supra note 18,
at 803-04,808,822-23 & nn.320-21. Professor Mullenix asserts that the proposed disclosure
rule was based on the assumption that the previous discovery rules were "ineffective and
counterproductive" because, rather than promote the free exchange of information, they
encourage gamesmanship. Id. at 820.
150. See Mullenix, Hope over Experience, supra note 18, at 803, 859, 860-61 (including
Mar. 8, 1980 Reporter's Draft Rule 25.1 with Reporter's Note and Advisory Committee
Note). The proposal was intended to be accompanied by other modifications to the discov-
ery rules, including limits on the number of interrogatories and depositions. Id. at 803,858.
Throughout this Article, reference is made to the "Reporter's Notes" or the "Advi-
sory Committee Notes" or the "Committee Notes." These materials are required under 28
U.S.C. § 2073(d) (1988), which provides that "in making a recommendation [for adoption
of a proposed rule], the body making the recommendation shall provide a proposed rule,
an explanatory note on the rule, and a written report explaining the body's actions, includ-
ing any minority or separate views." These materials constitute part of the legislative his-
tory of a rule, and should be consulted regarding the meaning, purpose, and policies of a
particular rule. See generally Levy, supra note 14, at 193-94.
151. Id. at 858 (Reporter's Note, Mar. 8, 1990, Proposed Draft Rule 25.1). The draft
Advisory Committee Note also stated that the proposed rule was based on "significant
court experience with local rules of the court," apparently referring to the local rules of the
District of Guam, the Central District of California, and the Southern District of Florida,
which included some form of informal exchange of information by parties. See id. at 814,
858,860. However, these local rule provisions are far more limited than the proposed Rule
25.1 and essentially only require parties to exchange documents the parties intended to use
in support of their case and a list of witnesses then known to the parties that the parties
contended supported their pleadings. See C.D. CAL. R. 6.1.1 to 6.1.4; S.D. FLA. R. 14; D.
GuAM R. 235-5; Mullenix, Hope over Experience, supra note 18, at 814-20. At the time,
there was virtually no empirical evidence evaluating how these minimal disclosure require-
ments worked. IdL
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The proposal did not contemplate a radical departure from current
discovery, as reflected in the draft Advisory Committee Notes. The
Notes indicated that the rule really was a call for the exercise of pro-
fessional responsibility by the bar to substitute less costly informal
methods of information exchange for the current formal methods,
while retaining "existing... discovery devices."'1 52
As initially presented to the Committee at its June 1990 meeting,
the draft rule had the following key components: (1) parties would be
required to disclose to each other, within 28 days of the filing of an
answer to the complaint, the names of "persons known to have per-
sonal knowledge of any fact alleged in any pleading," and information
on tangible evidence or documents "bearing on any fact alleged in any
pleading filed," evidence upon which the computation of damages is
based, and information on insurance coverage; (2) the initial disclo-
sure duty would be continuing; (3) additional pretrial disclosure would
be required as to names of witnesses, the substance and background
information about expert testimony, and exhibits intended to be used;
and (4) additional sanctions relating to noncompliance with the disclo-
sure requirements would be created including exclusion of evidence
not disclosed and the imposition of costs for expenses incurred by a
party as a result of another party's misleading disclosure.153
The version of proposed Rule 26(a)(1) published for public com-
ment in August 1991 contained slightly modified forms of these key
components. 54 The most significant changes were to the standard de-
152. Id. at 858 (Advisory Committee Note, Mar. 8, 1990, Draft Rule 25.1). But see
Mullenix, Hope over Experience, supra note 18, at 807 (quoting a Feb. 22, 1990 letter by the
Advisory Committee's Reporter accompanying the earlier, more ambitious version of the
proposal, which characterized the rule as "fairly radical").
153. The full draft of Rule 25.1 is set out in Mullenix, Hope over Experience, supra note
18, at 858 (Mar. 8, 1990, Reporter's Draft Rule 25.1). For a discussion of the Reporter's
drafting changes from a February 24, 1990 version, see id. at 802-07 & nn. 27-60.
154. See Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (Aug. 1991), reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 87-
89 (1991):
(a) Required Disclosure: Methods to Discover Additional Matter
(1) Initial Disclosures. Except in actions exempted by local rule or when
otherwise ordered, each party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide
to every other party:
(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each indi-
vidual likely to have information that bears significantly on any claim or defense,
identifying the subjects of the information;
(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all documents,
data compilations and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of the
party that are likely to bear significantly on any claim or defense;
(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing
party, making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 the docu-
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fining the scope of materials to be disclosed, the timing of disclosure,
and the discovery conference authorized under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(f). The August 1991 version reduced the scope of
materials required to be disclosed. Individuals with information and
the documents or tangible evidence to be listed by a disclosing party
were now those "likely to bear significantly on any claim or de-
fense."1 55 The published proposal changed the disclosure time to 30
days after the filing of an answer and provided for accelerated disclo-
sure by an opposing party within 30 days of a demand by a party that
had disclosed its own materials.1 56 Finally, based on the conclusion
that the "special 'discovery conference' envisioned by the 1980
amendment [Rule 26(f)] has not proved to be an effective device to
prevent discovery abuses," the proposal eliminated Rule 26(f).157
The draft Committee Notes described the purpose of the pro-
posed disclosure rule in modest terms. The rule was intended to "ac-
celerate the exchange of basic information and to eliminate the
ments or other evidentiary material on which such computation is based, includ-
ing materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered; and
(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement
under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy
part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or
reimburse for payment made to satisfy the judgment.
155. Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)-(B), reprinted in 137 F.R.D. at 87-88.- The
draft Advisory Committee Note explained that the limitation on disclosure resulting from
the term "likely to bear significantly on any claims and defenses" was intended to address
"burdensomeness or potential deception" arising from disclosure of unduly large lists of
people with some knowledge about "minor details." The relevant disclosure criteria was
whether a person, "if their potential testimony were known, might reasonably be expected
to be deposed or called as a witness by any of the parties." Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 26
advisory committee's note, 137 F.R.D. at 100. The disclosure was to be based upon a
"reasonable inquiry into the facts" and was to be supplemented as additional information
became available during the course of the proceeding. Id. at 101; see Proposed Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(e)(1), (g)(1), id. at 96, 98.
156. 137 F.R.D. at 88. The Advisory Committee Note explained that the provision for
accelerated disclosure by demand was to avoid delay in the situation in which an answer
had not been filed because of the filing of a Rule 12 motion. FED. R. Crv. P. 26 advisory
committee's note, 137 F.R.D. at 101.
157. Id. at 105. The Committee believed that the court had adequate authority to con-
trol discovery through Rule 16 and the proposed revision of Rules 26-37. Id. Rule 26(f), at
the time, authorized the court to initiate a discovery conference or provided for a party to
obtain a discovery conference upon motion if the party was unable to obtain agreement
from an opposing party on a discovery plan. See supra notes 60-77 and accompanying text.
The proposed rule, in addition to the early mandatory disclosures in Rule 26(a)(1)
discussed above, also required disclosure of: (1) at least 90 days before trial, a comprehen-
sive written report of expert witness evidence that may be presented at trial by that party
and (2) at least 30 days before trial, a list of all witnesses or evidence that will or may be
offered at trial. Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)-(3), 137 F.R.D. at 89-90.
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paperwork involved in requesting such information.' 1 58 That the rule
did not enlarge beyond traditional discovery the scope of information
to be disclosed was confirmed by the description of the disclosure ob-
ligation as "the functional equivalent of standing interrogatories"
seeking information "customarily secured early in discovery through
formal discovery.1' 59 Thus, as originally proposed by the Advisory
Committee, the disclosure provisions were substantially based on the
recognition that in the vast majority of cases there is an essential core
of information that is (or should be) invariably exchanged by the par-
ties in reaching a satisfactory resolution of the case. Requiring that
these materials be automatically disclosed would eliminate the costs
relating to preparation of "formal discovery requests with respect to
that information and [would] enable the parties to plan more effec-
tively for the discovery that would be needed.1 160
Further modifications to the Advisory Committee's proposed dis-
closure rules were made after consideration of the public comments
received by the Committee.161 In response to criticisms regarding the
scope of the disclosure requirement, the final version was changed to
require the disclosure of the names of individuals "likely to have dis-
coverable information relevant to the disputed facts alleged with par-
ticularity in the pleadings" and copies or descriptions of documents
158. Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 draft advisory committee's note, 137 F.R.D. at 99
(emphasis supplied).
159. Id. at 100.
160. See Addendum B to Letter from the Honorable Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman of
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to the Honorable Robert E. Keeton, Chairman of the
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 1, 1992), reprinted in 146
F.R.D. 521, 527 (1993).
161. See Letter from the Honorable Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman of Advisory Com-
mittee on Civil Rules, to the Honorable Robert E. Keeton, Chairman of the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 1, 1992), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at
519. In addition to soliciting written comments on the proposed changes to the rules, the
Advisory Committee held public hearings in Los Angeles on November 21, 1991, and in
Atlanta on February 19 and 20, 1992. Id. Probably in response to the overwhelmingly
negative comments on the proposed rule, as much as to the substantive appeal of the argu-
ment that the disclosure rule should be tabled until the results of the CJRA plans contain-
ing disclosure provisions were in, the Advisory Committee briefly abandoned proposed
Rule 26(a) at its February 1992 meeting in New Orleans. See Stephen B. Burbank, Igno-
rance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 845
(1993); Marcus, Prospects, supra note 4, at 809; Winter, supra note 18, at 268-69. The sub-
sequent revival of the rule was based at least in part on the view that the Committee "had a
duty to provide leadership," that the CJRA experimentation would be unlikely to provide
useful empirical data, and that a national Rule 26(a) on disclosure was important to estab-
lish "the cultural change the Committee sought." Marcus, Prospects, supra note 4, at 809
(citing Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Minutes of Committee Meeting 7 (Apr. 13-15,
1992)). See also Winter, supra note 18, at 268-71.
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within the parties' possession, custody, or control "relevant to dis-
puted facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings."'162
The other major change in the proposed rule related to the timing
and logistics of the disclosures and discovery. To clarify issues in the
case, facilitate disclosures, and encourage development of joint dis-
covery plans early in the case, the final proposal reinstated the Rule
26(f) discovery conference in a modified form, made such a confer-
ence mandatory, and tied the timing of the initial required disclosures
and discovery to that conference. 163 Under the final rule, unless
otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the court, disclosures
are to occur at the Rule 26(f) meeting or within 10 days after that
meeting and discovery cannot occur until after the Rule 26(f) discov-
ery meeting. The meeting must be held as soon as practicable, but at
least 14 days before the time for a scheduling conference or order
under Rule 16(b). 164
The disclosure provision represented only one of several meas-
ures considered to address discovery problems. Other measures in-
cluded: (1) clarification of Rule 26(b)(1)(a)(iii) to authorize district
courts to limit discovery when the benefit from discovery is out-
weighed by its likely cost or burden and (2) presumptive limits on the
162. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)-(B), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 606-07. See Winter,
supra note 18, at 268-69; Addendum B to Letter from Pointer, supra note 160, at 527. The
change of language was intended to clarify and narrow the scope of the disclosure obliga-
tion by (1) using the familiar discovery terms of "relevancy" and "discoverable informa-
tion" and eliminating the suggestion that attorneys would be required to make decisions as
to what information was most significant to an adversary; (2) clarifying that only informa-
tion relating to facts in dispute was to be disclosed; (3) tying the breadth of the disclosure
requirement to the level of specificity or vagueness of the pleadings so that attorneys
would not have to conduct unreasonably broad searches for all information conceivably
related to a vague allegation in a notice pleading; and (4) requiring disclosure to occur
after a meeting of the attorneys at which they would be expected to clarify the disputed
issues and adjust disclosure and discovery in light of common sense. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26
advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 630-31; Excerpt from the Report of
the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, reprinted in 146
F.R.D. 515, 517 n.3 (1992); Winter, supra note 18, at 269.
163. See Addendum B to Letter from Pointer, supra note 160, at 527-28. Rule 26(f)
was changed from a procedure for court involvement in resolving disagreements when a
party had proposed a discovery plan to a mandatory meeting for the parties to "discuss the
nature and basis of their claims and defenses and the possibilities for a prompt settlement
or resolution of the case, to make or arrange for the disclosures required by (a)(1), and
develop a proposed discovery plan." Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Forms of May 1, 1992, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 535, 622 (1993).
164. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1), 26(d), 26(f). The scheduling order referred to must
be issued within "90 days after the appearance of a defendant and within 120 days after the
complaint has been served on a defendant." FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
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number of interrogatories or depositions. 165 Together with the disclo-
sure proposal, these proposed amendments to the discovery rules
were seen as an integrated approach to addressing the problems of
excessive use of or resistance to discovery at great cost without corre-
sponding benefit or effect on the outcome and the use of discovery as
an impositional "club" against an adversary.166 However, the most
important purpose and effect of the amendments was to send the
message that there was going to be a change in the litigation
"culture." 16"
B. Reaction to the Supreme Court's Approval of the Proposed
Disclosure Rule
The attack on the disclosure rule intensified into a major lobbying
campaign once the proposed rules were transmitted to Congress. 168
Congress was bombarded with complaints about the rules from nu-
merous interest groups, including the products liability bar, the ABA,
the Justice Department (which had literally reversed its position on
the rules), 169 public interest lawyers, and civil rights lawyers.1 70 Com-
165. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(iii), 30(a), 33(a); Winter, supra note 18, at 264. The
amendments also authorize nonstenographic deposition transcription. FED. R. Civ. P.
30(b)(2).
166. Winter, supra note 18, at 263-64. See also William W Schwarzer, In Defense of
"Automatic Disclosure in Discovery," 27 GA. L. Rv. 655, 658 (1993) [hereinafter
Schwarzer, In Defense] (noting that one of the purposes of disclosure was to facilitate early
narrowing of issues and inexpensive information exchange without adversarialness and to
discourage the "discovery game" in which parties use discovery to exhaust opponents
(quoting Bell et al., supra note 19, at 12)).
167. See supra note 161 (discussing revival of rule at April 1992 Advisory Committee
meeting); Bell et al., supra note 19, at 40 & n.157 (1992) (quoting Minutes of the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules 2 (Dec. 1, 1990) and statements of Committee members).
168. The goal of the lobbying effort was to get Congress to act pursuant to the Rules
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, prior to December 1, 1993, when the proposed rules would
automatically take effect if Congress did not take contrary legislative action. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2074 (1994) (rules prescribed under section 2072 and transmitted to Congress by May 1
of a particular year shall go into effect "no earlier than December 1 of that year unless
otherwise provided by law").
169. Carrington, supra note 22, at 309; Rhonda McMillion, ABA Seeks Delay in
Amending Federal Discovery Rules, ABA J., Sept. 1993, at 119; Linda S. Mullenix, Should
Congress Decide Civil Rules?, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 22, 1993, at 15; Henry J. Reske, Early
Discovery Adopted, ABA J., Feb. 1994, at 16; Randall Samborn et al., Administration Op-
poses New Disclosure Rule, Nat'l L.J., July 26, 1993, at 5; Daily Exec. Rep. (BNA) No. 146,
at D-39 (Aug. 2, 1993).
170. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Should Congress Decide Civil Rules?, NAT'L L. J.,
Nov. 22, 1993, at 15; Ann Pelham & Eva Rodriguez, House Bows to Pressure from Law-
yers, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 8, 1993, at 6; Carl Tobias, Let Sleeping Legislation Lie, CoNN. L.
TRIB., Feb. 7, 1994, at 24. Although lobbying was led by insurance and corporate defense
bar representatives, opposition to disclosure was broadly based. Pelham & Rodriguez,
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mittee Hearings were held on the proposed rules. Legislation that
would have deleted the mandatory disclosure requirement of Pro-
posed Rule 26(a)(1), H.R. 2814, was introduced by Representative
Hughes on July 30, 1993 and began to wind its way through the legisla-
tive process.171 By late October the well-informed view by those fol-
lowing the lobbying onslaught was that disclosure was dead. The
accuracy of this view seemed confirmed by the House when it passed
H.R. 2814 on a voice vote November 3, 1993 and forwarded the bill to
the Senate.' 72 There was little reason to doubt that the legislation kill-
ing disclosure would pass the Senate as well, and the antidisclosure
lobbying forces began to celebrate. 173
As it turned out, the celebration was at least momentarily prema-
ture. Because of a curious and somewhat ironic set of circumstances,
the details of which are not altogether clear, the disclosure deleting
legislation never came to the Senate floor for a vote in time to prevent
the rules from going into effect on December 1, 1993. According to
one account, the legislation deleting disclosure became hostage to a
certain Senator's interest in eliminating other proposed amendments
to the discovery rules limiting the quantity of depositions and inter-
rogatories. 74 Although a last minute compromise was supposedly
supra. While one could expect the corporate defense bar to object to disclosure, given its
potential for requiring substantial burdens and release of information, the fact that plain-
tiffs' lawyers and public interest law groups also objected, often in hyperbolic terms, was
somewhat unexpected. See Marcus, Prospects, supra note 4, at 808 (quoting Nan Aron of
the Alliance for Justice to the effect that "the proposal 'would end public interest litigation
as we know it"' (quoting Ann Pelham, Judges Make Quite a Discovery; Litigators Erupt,
Kill Plan to Reform Federal Civil Rules, LEGAL Tmms, Mar. 16, 1992, at 1)). The signifi-
cance of the widely varied sources of opposition should not be overlooked. While wide-
spread opposition might be based on perceptions of serious practical flaws in the disclosure
proposal, or at least as Professor Marcus posits, flaws that cause various groups to perceive
themselves as particularly harmed by the rule compared to their opponents, it may indicate
the real problem with disclosure is that it is overtly inconsistent with widely accepted no-
tions of civil litigation adversarial culture. Marcus, Prospects, supra note 4, at 808, 815-16.
See Pelham & Rbdriguez, supra; infra notes 298-301 and accompanying text.
171. See generally Honorable William J. Hughes, Congressional Reaction to the 1993
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 SEroN HALL LEGAL J. 1, 2-3
(1993). For an interesting discussion of why special interest lobbying of Congress, as well
as increased congressional involvement in civil litigation rule making should be viewed
with concern, see Marcus, Prospects, supra note 4, at 816-18.
172. Hughes, supra note 171, at 4.
173. See g., Alfred W. Cortese & Kathleen L. Blaner, Should Congress Decide the
Civil Rules, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 22, 1993, at 15 (touting politicization of rule-making process
and effect of partisan lobbying that appeared to have saved the profession from the bur-
dens of impractical disclosure).
174. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(2)(iii), 30(a), 33(a); see supra note 165 and accompanying
text.
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worked out, which would have only delayed the effective date of the
disclosure rules for six months and increased slightly the numerical
limits on interrogatories, the compromise apparently fell through
when it was rejected by another Senator who favored retaining the
discovery numerical limits and the Senate ran out of time before it
adjourned for the first session of the 103rd Congress. 175 Thus, the rea-
son that the disclosure provisions became effective December 1, 1993
apparently had little to do with congressional acceptance of the princi-
ples of disclosure, but rather with the fact that an effort to eliminate
even more of the Advisory Committee's proposed discovery reforms
backfired in the context of legislators' interest in adjourning.
Nevertheless, faced with their unexpected failure, antidisclosure
lobbyists immediately set about to obtain the repeal of the newly ef-
fective disclosure rules.176 They also adopted another, perhaps more
effective strategy, which was to get individual districts to opt out of
the disclosure rules by local rule and court order.' 77 According to the
Federal Judicial Center, as of February 23, 1994, twenty-three districts
had decided to opt out of the Rule 26(a) disclosure and another eight
districts did not adopt the rule but gave individual judges the authority
to require disclosure. Thirty-two districts had adopted the Federal
Rule on disclosure and another thirty-one districts had some form of
mandatory disclosure as part of their civil justice reform plans.' 78
175. See Tobias, supra note 170, at 24. See also Hughes, supra note 171, at 10-11 (fail-
ure of attempts to reach compromise before adjournment for Thanksgiving); Stempel,
supra note 5, at 681-82 (describing the role of Senator Howard Metzenbaum in preventing
the bill from being considered by unanimous consent prior to the holiday recess).
176. John Flynn Rooney, Discovery Rule Lacks Uniformity, CHI. L. BULL., Apr. 19,
1994, at 17; Randall L. Samborn, Rules for Discovery Uncertain, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 20, 1993,
at 1.
177. Rule 26(a)(1) provides that automatic disclosure applies "[e]xcept to the extent
otherwise ... directed by court order or local rule." Several districts have been pressured
to opt out of disclosure, and many of those districts have done so. See, e.g., Hughes, supra
note 171, at 12 (legislation to repeal disclosure should not be introduced, but courts can use
opt-out method); Denis F. McLaughlin, Your Guide to Amended Rules of Civil Procedure,
N.J. LAW., Jan. 10, 1994, at 1 (describing pressures for district to opt out or modify rule);
Samborn, supra note 176, at 1 (reporting opt-out of Delaware, Eastern District of Michi-
gan, and Southern District of New York); Janet Seiberg, Rule Wrangling, CONN. L. TaB.,
Jan. 24, 1994, at 3 (describing pressure by lawyers for district to opt out or modify the
disclosure rule); Daniel Wise, 3 Bar Groups Seek Delay in Federal Discovery Changes, N.Y.
L.J., June 9, 1994, at 1 (defense bar organizations attempt to get Southern District of New
York to delay implementation of Rule 26(a)); Panel Urges Federal Judges to Opt Out of
Mandatory Disclosure, CONN. L. TRIB., Mar. 14, 1994, at 12 (report of advisory panel rec-
ommending opting out).
178. Mark Hansen, Early Discovery Hits Snag, ABA J., May 1994, at 35. Ironically,
but not surprisingly, some disclosure opponents, who originally argued that federal Rule
26(a) should not be enacted but that the many different local rules on disclosure should be
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A. Criticisms and Defenses of Mandatory Disclosure
Perhaps one should not be surprised that a profession steeped in
adversarial culture and gamesmanship would unleash a flood of criti-
cism on the disclosure proposal. 7 9 It is also not surprising that the
criticisms of the rule originated from very different perspectives and
sought to serve very different, and often inconsistent, purposes. As
Jeffrey Stempel has aptly noted regarding civil litigation reform gener-
ally, the "wide variety of potentially interested parties pursuing pre-
ferred agendas virtually guarantees that many elements of the
litigation reform community will be on different pages from one an-
other regarding the reform agenda."' 8 0 Thus, one should expect to
see a wide variety of criticisms asserting that the disclosure rule serves
or harms the interests of one particular group or another.' 8 ' Further-
more the negative response of the organized bar was somewhat pre-
allowed to operate and be studied, shifted to arguments that the many variations of disclo-
sure procedure now operating in the courts, and accompanying confusion, is a good reason
to abandon the federal rule, which is "'supposed to establish uniformity, but everybody's
going off in different directions."' Id. See also Rooney, supra note 176, at 17 (quoting
Alfred W. Cortese, Jr.); Ann Pelham, House Junks Plans To Modify Discovery Rules, THE
RECORDER, Nov. 8, 1993, at 1. A subsequent Federal Judicial Center study indicates that
52 districts had opted out of Rule 26(a)(1), while 37 courts had adopted the rule. Twenty-
nine of the 52 opt-out courts have some form of mandatory disclosure, by local rule or
CIRA plan. Edward D. Cavanaugh, Mandatory Disclosure's Voluntary Reality, LEGAL
TimS, Nov. 21, 1994, at 15.
Another reaction to the amended rule has been to emphasize, if not encourage, the
possibility of avoidance of disclosure or the other discovery limitations through agreement
of the parties. In addition to authorizing court ordered exceptions to disclosure, the
amended disclosure and discovery rules also iuthorize the parties to stipulate out of the
requirements on disclosure and authorize party agreements regarding the timing, amount,
and scope of other discovery. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a), 26(2), 29, 30(a), 33(a); Robert E.
Bartkus, New Rules Intended to Reduce Friction, N.J. L.., Feb. 21, 1994, at 10.
179. See, eg., Frankel, Cure for Discovery Ills, supra note 124, at 282-83 (noting that
much criticism is from those accustomed to overly adversarial litigation system who are
shocked or dismayed at the notion of supplying information to their adversaries without a
request and whose current goal is to avoid disclosing information).
180. Stempel, supra note 5, at 739.
181. See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 19, at 32 & n.120 (examples of partisan concerns
expressed in comments of various groups asserting that disclosure would hurt their constit-
uents, either plaintiffs or defendants, more); Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating Abusive
Discovery Through Disclosure: Is It Time Again for Reform?, 138 F.R.D. 155, 159 (1991)
(expressing concern that because of disclosure, plaintiff's theories of recovery will be re-
stricted to theories in initial pleading and that disclosure will result in effectively narrowing
discovery so as to disproportionately affect plaintiffs who need discovery more); Georgene
M. Vairo, Reinventing Civil Procedure: Will the New Procedural Regime Help Solve Mass
Torts?, 59 BROOK. L. Rnv. 1065, 1068-69 (1993) (discussing liberal preservationist critique
of disclosure that it restricts access to courts because, in combination with Rule 11, it will
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dictable. The organized bar generally can be expected to support, as
guiding principles or ideals, increased access to justice, adequate judi-
cial system funding, and improved judicial case management. 182 The
bar will also support moderate reforms intended to achieve these
goals, or at least give the appearance that these goals are being served
by the litigation system. However, the organized bar will not support
efforts beyond "tinkering" reforms if the reforms threaten to alter the
fundamental structure of the system, 183 including a system in which a
zealous bar marshals and presents proof.184 Arguably, because it was
perceived as fundamentally altering the existing structure, the disclo-
sure proposal was strongly resisted by the organized bar.185 Given the
history of discovery and other civil procedural reforms, many mem-
bers of the litigation community may believe that, as a practical mat-
require plaintiffs to engage in more investigation to obtain disclosure and because of limits
on pro plaintiff rules of discovery).
182. See ABA WORKING GROUP ON CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM PROPOSALS REPORT,
BLUEPRINT FOR IMPROVING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM iv-vii (1992) [hereinafter
BLUEPRINT]; Garth, supra note 52, at 933-38.
183. See Garth, supra note 52, at 935-38; Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on
Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 600-01 (1985) (discussing organized bar resistance to
fundamental change in adversarial norms including Model Rules change to authorize dis-
closure of favorable evidence to other side); Winter, supra note 18, at 277 (asserting that
the organized bar has little incentive to support discovery reforms that cut back on unnec-
essary legal services).
184. See BLUEPRINT, supra note 182, at iv-vii. One possible explanation for this ten-
dency of the organized bar to resist fundamental change is that the purpose of the organ-
ized bar is primarily to serve the self-interest of the bar, ultimately protecting income and
power of attorneys. See Garth, supra note 52, at 933; Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., The Inte-
grated Bar and the Freedom of Nonassociation-Continuing Siege, 63 NEB. L. REV. 30, 34-
40 (1984). Even activities purportedly undertaken to serve the public interest can actually
be seen as ultimately serving the self-interest of the bar. Id at 36-39; Garth, supra note 52,
at 933-36. Reforms will be rejected if they are viewed by the organized bar as being incon-
sistent with the immediate self-interest of lawyers being served by the current structure.
Another related contributing factor to the organized bar's resistance to fundamental
change stems from the fact that organized bar associations, such as the American Bar As-
sociation (ABA), are made up of many lawyers with varied and inconsistent interests. See
generally Stempel, supra note 5, at 739. Because these often inconsistent interests cancel
each other out on specific reform issues, a bar organization can be expected to take posi-
tions consistent with the status quo. See also Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas
of Professionalism: The Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in LAWYERS' IDE-
ALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICE: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION
188-94 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) (official bar rhetoric stays general and vague
because it is speaking for an internally varied and divided bar).
185. See, e.g., BLUEPRINT, supra note 182, at 69-70 (supporting the "concept" of disclo-
sure of core information and limitations on discovery, but opposing actual proposals be-
cause of perceived needs for "refinement" and view that adaptation of current judicial
management of discovery would be better); Rhonda McMillion, ABA Seeks Delay in
Amending Federal Discovery Rule, ABA J., Sept. 1993, at 119 (discussing ABA opposition
to disclosure); Henry Reske, Early Disclosure Adopted, ABA J., Feb. 1994, at 16 (same).
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ter, the disclosure rule would cause more problems than it would cure
by introducing new terminology and new opportunities for disputes,
gamesmanship, or abuse.186
What is most remarkable about the criticism of the new disclo-
sure rule' 87 is the ferocity and breadth of the opposition to disclosure
generally by the corporate defense bar, the plaintiffs bar, or
academia, given the relatively modest practical goals of the rule. The
common argument by these groups, expressed by a variety of com-
mentators, is essentially that the rule is inconsistent with our "Ameri-
can judicial system, which relies on adversarial litigation.' 188
The arguments in opposition to Rule 26(a) disclosure can be
broadly divided into two categories: (1) arguments that challenge the
rule on pragmatic grounds and (2) arguments that the rule is inconsis-
tent with the fundamental tenets of our civil litigation system. A prag-
matic evaluation of the disclosure rule requires consideration of
whether it will yield a benefit in terms of ameliorating problems re-
lated to discovery abuse or misuse, cost and delay in litigation, and the
just resolution of disputes. The importance of this last criteria should
not be overlooked; after all, the primary directive of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure is that they should be "construed and administered
to secure just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action."18 9
However, the central focus of this Article is not to predict pre-
cisely how effectively the Rule will work, but to examine the strength
of the strident practical critique of disclosure. The focus of the analy-
186. See e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges' Self-Interest and Procedural Rules:
Comment on Macey, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 647, 659 (1994) (changes to rules can be expected
to cause significant increase in satellite litigation over meaning and compliance similar to
that experienced with 1983 Rule 11 amendment, which is fresh in minds of many); Mul-
lenix, Hope over Experience, supra note 18, at 820 (repeated failures of amendments to
correct discovery abuse as "lawyers create new ways to circumvent the rules"); Judith Res-
nik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 1030 (1984) ("The history of procedure is a series of
attempts to solve the problems created by the preceding generation's procedural
reforms.").
187. The analysis here focuses on the most controversial provisions of the disclosure
rule, which are the requirements in Rule 26(a)(1)(A) relating to disclosure of the names of
persons likely to have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with par-
ticularity in the pleadings and in Rule 26(a)(1)(B) calling for disclosure of a description of
documents relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings.
188. Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure (Apr. 22, 1993), reprinted in 146
F.R.D. 507, 511 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also authorities cited infra notes 294-297.
189. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (emphasis added). See William D. Underwood, Divergence in
the Age of Cost and Delay Reductiow The Texas Experience with Federal Civil Justice Re-
form, 25 TEx. TECH L. REv. 261, 273 (1994).
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sis is to determine whether the rule is so obviously badly conceived, as
opponents claim, that it cannot possibly have a positive impact, or in-
stead, if the opposition is more fundamentally based on the perceived
inconsistency of Rule 26(a)(1) with our adversarial justice system or
partisan interests. 190 The Article then examines the nature of Rule
26(a)'s relationship to the adversarial system to determine if the rule
is actually as inconsistent as opponents perceive it to be. The assess-
ment of how the disclosure rule fits doctrinally into an adversarial liti-
gation system must be guided by explication of the purposes, specific
elements, and doctrines of the adversary system as it exists in the fed-
eral court system, both formally and informally. The crucial question
should be the extent to which the disclosure rule is consistent with and
serves the overarching values and purposes of the civil litigation
system.
B. Pragmatic Criticisms and Responses
Before discussing the practical operation of Rule 26(a)(1), an im-
portant point should be made regarding the nature of the criticisms of
190. At this point, because of the novelty and lack of substantial experience with dis-
closure, particularly as envisioned under Rule 26(a)(1), practical evaluation of the disclo-
sure obligation is necessarily largely conjectural. What seems to be relatively clear based
on the experience of those districts or states that have some version of a disclosure obliga-
tion is that the "parade of horribles" predicted by disclosure opponents has yet to material-
ize. Edward D. Cavanaugh, Bumps on the Road to Speedier Justice, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 3,
1994, at 22. See, e.g., Frankel, Cure for Discovery Ills, supra note 124, at 275-77 (disclosure
provisions in South Carolina, Central District of California, Guam, and Southern District
of Florida similar to federal rule "apparently have not caused major controversy, have
been fairly well received, and may provide a limited reduction in cost and delay"); Myers,
supra note 11, at 20-28 (disclosure accompanied by sanctions working in Arizona disclo-
sure rules); Pelham, supra note 178, at 1 (judges and lawyers appear satisfied with North-
ern District of California rule requiring disclosure of documents that "tend to support
positions that the disclosing party has taken or is reasonably likely to take in a case");
Samborn, supra note 176, at 1 (analyzing Eastern District of New York CJRA disclosure
rule that "bears significantly" on claims and defenses, and revealing substantial majority of
350 lawyers surveyed indicated no negative effects and half said positive change; half said
no change from discovery); Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at 661 (early experience
of 24 CJRA districts with variants of disclosure does not support claims about excessive
motions practice engendered by the rule); Carl Tobias, Automatic Disclosure: Let It Be,
LEGAL Tinms, Jan. 31, 1994, at 25 (anecdotal evidence from the early implementation dis-
tricts that have some form of disclosure indicates that disclosure works well once judges,
litigants, and attorneys become familiar with it); Carl Tobias, A Progress Report on Auto-
matic Disclosure in the Federal Districts, 155 F.R.D. 229, 231 (1994) (same). While more
widespread experience with disclosure may yet reveal serious fundamental practical
problems with the rule and may well provide valuable information to be used in ultimately
assessing the costs and benefits of the rule and making improvements, the absence of evi-
dence of serious problems to date suggests that at least some of the dire predictions by
opponents should be viewed skeptically.
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disclosure. One suspect form of attack on the Rule 26(a)(1) disclo-
sure requirement is to point out all of the ways that lawyers can avoid
compliance with the rule or can use the rule to impose abuse. Critics
argue that disclosure will not work because it is based on an unrealis-
tic assessment of the incentive structure of an adversary system; attor-
neys will concentrate exclusively on the goal of winning for the clients
who pay them and who pressure them to win. 191 Disclosure can be
avoided, critics argue, by an unreasonably narrow construction of the
rule's purportedly ambiguous phrase "relevant to disputed facts al-
leged with particularity" so that relevant damaging documents will re-
main hidden. Furthermore, by burying relevant documents in a
mountain of irrelevant ones, the rule can be used as a weapon to im-
pose additional costs on an opponent.192 While the extent to which
the disclosure rule is subject to avoidance or misuse is debatable, the
argument, in and of itself, seems largely beside the point. As the Arti-
cle's discussion of the history of discovery abuse suggests, it seems
unquestionable that some lawyers will find a way to circumvent any
rule that may work against their partisan interests, and some lawyers
may even turn a measure intended to reform litigation practices into a
weapon to serve partisan interests.193 However, this cynical view of
professional behavior is not a reason to avoid the adoption of rules
intended to reduce litigation abuse.194 Rules set the standard for be-
havior. They must be consistent with the aspirational principles estab-
lished based upon the assumption that law abiding lawyers and clients
will obey those rules. The focus in assessing the practical operation of
the rule is whether disclosure is consistent with fundamental aspira-
tional principles of the civil litigation system, discussed in Part III.C
below, and whether the disclosure rule will result in long-term net
degradation of the system, that is, more abuse, cost, and delay, and
less justice than exists under the current regime.195
191. See, e.g., Frankel, Cure for Discovery Ills, supra note 124, at 266-67, 273; Mayer,
supra note 22, at 113-22; Underwood, supra note 189, at 277.
192. See, eg., Bell et al., supra note 19, at 44; Frankel, Cure for Discovery Ills, supra
note 124, at 273; John C. Koski, Mandatory Disclosure: The New Rules that Intended to
Simplify Litigation Could Do Just the Opposite, ABA J., Feb. 1994, at 85; Mayer, supra
note 22, at 116-21; Mengler, supra note 181, at 158; Underwood, supra note 189, at 279-80.
193. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text; Mullenix, Hope over Experience,
supra note 18, at 820, 827 (repeated failures of amendments to correct discovery abuse as
"lawyers create new ways to circumvent the rules").
194. Cf. Mullenix, Hope over Experience, supra note 18, at 827 ("proposed rule under
attack because ... dismal view of professionalism precludes honest dealing").
195. This is essentially a speculative cost-benefit analysis. The reason that no net long-
term increase in cost should be used as the criteria is that even if the disclosure system is no
March 19951 DISCLOSURE UNDER RULE 26(a)
Preliminarily it should be noted that the arguments of the attack-
ers and defenders of disclosure probably show that as a profession,
lawyers have learned their partisan advocate lessons well. Opponents
of disclosure tend to be hyperbolic; their descriptions of the reach and
effect of the disclosure obligation predict a worst-case scenario. For
example, some critics have characterized the disclosure rule as requir-
ing parties to supply their opponents with "virtually all information
needed to prepare for trial" and to do so "in all types of litigation,
from simple collection cases to patent, securities and antitrust transac-
tions."'1 96 As a result, the potential sweep, impact, and burden of the
more efficient than the current system, some value must be given to having rules facially
consistent with aspirational principles. Here the disclosure rule arguably serves the basic
principle that underlies discovery in the first place-that civil litigants and judges are enti-
tled to information relevant to resolving a dispute efficiently, justly, and accurately. See
supra note 35 and accompanying text. Another common objection to the disclosure rule
that should at least be briefly mentioned was that empirical study of disclosure in the Civil
Justice Reform Act "experimental plans" should have been undertaken first before adopt-
ing a national rule. See, e.g., McMillion, supra note 185, at 119; Carl Tobias, In Defense of
Experimentation with Automatic Disclosure, 27 GA. L. REV. 665 (1993); Laurens Walker,
Avoiding Surprise from Federal Civil Rulemaking: The Role of Economic Analysis, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 569, 581 (1994). In light of the delaying effect that such study would have on
implementation of disclosure, the motives of these calls for study are suspect. Cf. Mul-
lenix, Hope over Experience, supra note 18, at 829 (empirical study also results in postpon-
ing solution to the problem). Moreover, given empiricism's practical limitations in the area
of civil procedure, its immense cost, its questionable value, and the perceived need to ad-
dress discovery problems throughout the federal system now, little would likely be gained
from waiting. See Robert G. Bone, The Empirical Turn in Procedural Rulemaking: Com-
ment on Walker (1), 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 595, 597, 609-11 (1994); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.,
Repealing the Law on Unintended Consequences? Comment on Walker (2), 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 615, 616-17 (1994). See also Deborah R. Hensler, Researching Civil Justice:
Problems and Pitfalls, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROns. 55 (1988) (generally discussing
problems faced in undertaking research on civil justice system); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope
over Experience, supra note 18, at 828 ("empirical research is labor-intensive, slow, and
prone to methodological problems that encourage disputes"); Stempel, supra note 5, at 731
n.259 (noting practical problems with relying on CJRA experimental Expense and Delay
Reductions Plans, including "erratic implementation . . . [and] insufficient monitoring
..... "); Ernest E. Svenson, Mandatory Discovery Reform, LrrIG. NEWS, Oct. 1993, at 3, 11
(noting need for discovery reform now and quoting Judge Schwarzer's response to CJRA
experimentation argument, including low likelihood that the highly varied CJRA plans will
supply "any clear empirical answers" beyond what is currently available). Finally, "experi-
mentation" is also beside the point given the minimal actual effect that disclosure is likely
to have in most cases-an effect that is more symbolic than anything, signaling that a
"change in the culture of adversariness" in discovery is necessary. See Bell et al., supra
note 19, at 40 (quoting Minutes of Dec. 1, 1990 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules (Committee Members James Powers, Mariana R. Pfelzer, Dennis G. Linder,
and Wayne Brazil)); Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at 658-59.
196. Underwood, supra note 189, at 278; Bell et al., supra note 19, at 39; Mayer, supra
note 22, at 113-22 (critique of disclosure presented in context of complex, contentious case
rather than average case). Mayer also broadly states that "[j]ust because the parties know
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rule, as well as any potential ambiguity in its operative term "disputed
facts pleaded with particularity," are seen as enormous.
On the other hand, the new rule's proponents seemingly cast the
rule in a perhaps unreasonably positive light. They tend to minimize
the extent of the disclosure obligations, focusing on routine cases in
which material to be disclosed is obvious.197 Proponents also down-
play the potential ambiguities of the rule and may overestimate the
cooperative capacity of the bar to work through those ambiguities. 198
They may also overestimate the likely actual cost-saving benefits of
the rule. t99
While many of the assertions of increased burdens or problems
caused by disclosure should be viewed skeptically, some of the criti-
cisms of the rule require more thorough consideration. Justice Scalia
captured the main practical problems that many critics see with disclo-
sure in asserting that disclosure actually "adds a further layer of dis-
covery" that will "likely increase the discovery burdens on district
judges" as the parties litigate about the meaning of the rule's terms,
standards, and obligations and whether the parties have complied with
those obligations.2°° According to this perspective, disclosure will ac-
what facts are in dispute does not mean that they would know what documents and infor-
mation are relevant to those facts." Id. at 115. This point seems to be an exaggeration at
best. Arguably, the development of the analytical ability to make determinations of basic
relevance is expected from lawyers litigating in federal courts. See generally William H.
Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. Rv. 1083, 1122, 1132 (1988) [here-
inafter Simon, Ethical Discretion] (asserting that lawyers expected to be able to make com-
plex judgments rather than merely engage in mechanical rule following). For another
strained claim, see Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preference, Public Choice, and the Rules of
Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 639 (1994) (disclosure rule will result in more document
production and cost because it will require production even in small cases in which no
discovery would have been undertaken before). But see Alexander, supra note 186, at 656-
58 (disclosure amendments would not increase the amount of discovery in cases in which it
is not currently undertaken because (1) of ability of parties under Rule 29 to stipulate out
of disclosure or discovery, and fact that court can exempt cases from disclosure by class or
individual case; (2) small cases probably do involve basic discovery anyway; (3) the restric-
tion of disclosure to disputed facts pleaded with particularity should limit the amount of
disclosure; and (4) wide flexibility in parties' ability to negotiate over form and amount of
disclosure of documents or description of documents).
197. See, e.g., Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at 657; Winter, supra note 18, at
275-76; Wolfson, supra note 32, at 62.
198. See, eg., Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at 661-62; Winter, supra note 18,
at 275-76.
199. See, e.g., Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at 663-64 ("disclosure will obviate
wasteful and unnecessary discovery").
200. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 507, 510
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Underwood, supra note 189, at 279-82 (discussing the
inevitability of vague disclosure requirements resulting in discovery disputes).
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tually cause more problems than it cures because of increased costs or
burden on the courts stemming from the additional litigation arising
out of ambiguities, uncertainties, and duplication of activity caused by
the disclosure rule.20' Critics further argue that such an increased bur-
den is not justified because, as the Advisory Committee itself noted,
the information being obtained through disclosure could have been
routinely obtained through traditional discovery. 202 Thus, for pur-
poses of pragmatic analysis, the principal issues are the extent of am-
biguity of the rule's operative terminology, the likelihood of litigation
over the rule's meaning, and the extent to which the disclosure rule
requires additional costs resulting from that purported ambiguity.
(1) Meaning of Key Terms and Likelihood of Disputes
The terms of Rule 26(a)(1) most frequently identified as prob-
lematic are "alleged with particularity," "discoverable information,"
and "relevant." Critics argue that these terms are unfamiliar, at least
in the context of disclosure, and that motions and disputes over these
terms are likely to be common as parties seek to clarify their obliga-
tions under the rule or seek sanctions under Rule 37 for alleged fail-
ures of other parties to disclose.203 Critics also argue that ambiguity
will result in the overproduction of "marginally relevant docu-
ments. '204 Proponents of disclosure have generally responded that
201. See, e.g., Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. at 510 (Scalia,
J., dissenting); Bell et al., supra note 19, at 41-46; Macey, supra note 196, at 639; Under-
wood, supra note 189, at 278-82. A typical statement of this argument is that because of
the vagueness of the disclosure standard, "practitioners will be at risk of having to guess
how the standard would be defined by both the court and the opponent in a given case and
the parties would have neither a specific request from the opponent nor a specific standard
in the Federal Rules to guide them in deciding what to disclose." Because sanctions are
available for noncompliance, "motions to dismiss under Rule 12, motions for protective
order under Rule 26(c), and motions for sanctions under Rule 37 will doubtless increase."
Bell et al., supra note 19, at 41-43.
202. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's notes, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at
629 (1993); Underwood, supra note 189, at 280.
203. See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 19, at 41-44; Hughes, supra note 171, at 6-7; Koski,
supra note 192, at 87; Gerald G. MacDonald, Hesiod, Agesilaus, and Rule 26: A Proposal
for a More Effective Mandatory Initial Disclosure Procedure, 28 WAKI FOREST L. REv.
819, 835-44 (1993); Mayer, supra note 22, at 112; Underwood, supra note 189, at 281.
204. Bell et al., supra note 19, at 44; see Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 146 F.R.D. at 511 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (irrelevant documents will be
produced because of the early inception of disclosure duty); Koski, supra note 192, at 87
(parties may produce "reams of marginally relevant documents, so that time must be spent
litigating the relevance of the few important ones ... traditional discovery ... [is] more
cost effective" because litigants will not be "inundated with endless boxes of documents of
negligible significance"). This argument regarding overproduction of documents seems
particularly weak. "The rule requires disclosure not production." Schwarzer, In Defense,
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the terms are not excessively vague and are drawn from other familiar
areas of procedure from which guidance can be obtained; to the ex-
tent there is ambiguity, mechanisms under the rule are available to
resolve the ambiguity without further litigation; there is always some
ambiguity in new rules or laws that is ironed out as courts interpret
and apply the rules; and any slightly increased cost that arises in a few
cases during the initial period after adoption of the disclosure rule will
be outweighed by the long-term benefits achieved in the majority of
cases.205 A close examination of the arguments suggests that, while
neither side of the argument is entirely convincing, disclosure oppo-
nents have generally failed to demonstrate that the disclosure rule is
unworkable.
The terms used in Rule 26(a) were specifically adopted by the
Advisory Committee in response to comments that the disclosure
term initially proposed, "bears significantly on any claim or defense,"
was unreasonably vague and likely to cause disputes, particularly in
determining the significance of information required to trigger a dis-
closure obligation. The terminology in the final version of the rule
was selected specifically because of its use in the discovery or plead-
ings rules and the additional certainty the term afforded.20 6 "Rele-
vant" and "discoverable" information, for example, are pervasive
concepts already found in procedural and evidentiary law. They spe-
cifically appear in Federal Rule 26(b)(1) defining the scope of discov-
ery, and lawyers' general abstract understanding of these potentially
vague terms can be expected to have developed largely through expo-
sure to the interpretive case law over the years.20 7 What is relevant or
supra note 166, at 663. It would seem that the lawyer and client's primary instinct is to be
conservative in their approach to disclosure and choose the method that reveals the least,
such as listing by general category and location documents relevant to disputed facts
pleaded with particularity or tending to be underinclusive in producing actual documents.
Id. See Mayer, supra note 22, at n.113 (fear of overdisclosure not realistic in light of sanc-
tions structure). It is also doubtful that disclosure will result in production of more irrele-
vant documents than occurs in traditional discovery. By requiring parties in response to a
request for production to produce documents "as they are kept in the ordinary course of
business," Rule 34 necessarily results in the production of potentially large amounts of
irrelevant documents under traditional discovery practice. FED. R. Crv. P. 34(b).
205. See Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at 661-64; Winter, supra note 18, at
267-69, 275-77; see also Alexander, supra note 187, at 656-59 (refuting arguments Rule 26
will impose high costs on litigation); Frankel, Cure for Discovery Ills, supra note 124, at
274-77 (discussing the possibility disclosure will reduce opportunities for game playing).
206. See, eg., MacDonald, supra note 204, at 836-37; Underwood, supra note 189, at
279 n.82; Winter, supra note 18, at 267-69; supra notes 161-167 and accompanying text.
207. See Underwood, supra note 189, at 281. For many years, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(1) has provided in pertinent part: "Parties may obtain discovery regard-
ing any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pend-
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discoverable in a particular case obviously depends on the specific cir-
cumstances of that case, but there are some general principles that
would seem applicable to both discovery and disclosure. Within the
scope of the concepts of relevance and discoverability generally is
"any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other mat-
ter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in a case. '20 8 Infor-
mation that itself would not be admissible into evidence at a trial
would be discoverable and relevant if the information is "reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. '209 Be-
cause Rule 26(a)(1)(A) and (B) tie the term relevant to "facts specifi-
cally alleged" rather than the "subject matter or issues in a case," the
scope of the term "relevant" in the disclosure rule is obviously more
limited than when it is applied in discovery. However, it does not ap-
pear that the use of these terms in the disclosure rule introduces any
new source of ambiguity, and it seems doubtful that the terms by
ing action ... , including the ... identity and location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). Indeed, lawyers' general
familiarity with these terms is evidenced by basic interrogatories that commonly call for the
identity by name, address, and telephone number of all persons believed to have knowl-
edge of relevant facts, or the name and address of each person who has knowledge of any
discoverable matter. Underwood, supra note 189, at 280; Kenneth R. Berman, Q: Is This
Any Way to Write an Interrogatory? A: You Bet It Is, LrnG., Summer 1993, at 42, 45. Of
course, as you might expect in our partisan discovery system, such interrogatories may
draw objections on the ground of overbreadth, but these objections can be cured by nar-
rowing the subject matter of the particular interrogatory. Id. at 46. Thus, with its "particu-
larity" limitation, it would appear that the disclosure requirement operates similarly to
regular exploratory interrogatories. See Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at 661
(finding that traditional discovery also frequently has "vague, catch all discovery requests"
that result in discovery motions; no reason to expect that more discovery motions will
occur under disclosure).
208. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 & n.12 (1978).
209. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). One commentator has noted that the terms "relevant"
and "discoverable" cannot be considered to have the same meaning in the disclosure rule
since Rule 26(a)(1)(A) requires disclosure of names of persons "likely to have discoverable
information relevant to disputed facts" and Rule 26(a)(1)(B) only requires a description of
documents or copies of documents "relevant to disputed facts," leaving out the term "dis-
coverable." Mayer, supra note 22, at 112 n.97. While the drafting inconsistency is some-
what perplexing, it may be that the Advisory Committee wanted to make clear that in
complying with the document disclosure requirement, it was not permissible to fail to dis-
close or describe an otherwise relevant document because the party believed that it was
privileged. Using the term "discoverable" in the context of document request might sug-
gest otherwise. See FED. R. Qv. P. 26(b)(5) & advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146
F.R.D. at 617, 639 (1993). The Advisory Committee explained that "[a] party must notify
other parties if it is withholding materials otherwise subject to disclosure under the rule or
pursuant to a discovery request because it is asserting a claim of privilege or work product
protection." Id. at 639.
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themselves will significantly contribute to increased disputes in the
context of disclosure.
Similarly, the use of the phrase "with particularity" is not novel in
the Civil Rules. An exception to the notice pleading system of the
federal rules is that "all averments of fraud or mistake... shall be
stated with particularity.'210 The concept of "particularity" also oc-
curs in Rule 34(b), which states that a request to produce must de-
scribe items to be produced, either by category or individual item,
with "reasonable particularity." Like the terms "relevant" and "dis-
coverable," the concept of "particularity" is abstract and depends on
the context of the specific case and case law interpretations to provide
guidance. Unlike the case law on the other terms, however, the case
law that provides general guidance as to "particularity" under Rule
9(b) and Rule 34 may not be very helpful in the context of disclosure.
The particularity requirement of pleading in Rule 9(b) is intended to
serve different purposes than those served by Rule 26(a)(1) disclo-
sure. Factual particularity for claims of fraud and mistake reflects an
exception to general notice pleading based on a policy disfavoring
those claims and on a need to provide better notice for defendants to
defend adequately against fraud claims and protect themselves from
claims suggesting moral turpitude that are easily alleged.211 In that
context courts have generally held that detailed evidentiary pleading
is neither required nor appropriate. Instead, the threshold standard of
sufficiency is assumed to be that satisfied by Form 13 of the Federal
Rules-enough detail to give the adverse party fair notice of the na-
ture of the claim and to enable that party to prepare a response.
212 If
the particularity of the pleading is insufficient under Rule 9(b),
greater particularity may be sought by an opponent under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), resulting in an amendment to the
210. FED. R, Crv. P. 9(b) (emphasis added).
211. 5 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHuR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 1296 (1990 & 1994 Supp.); see e.g., Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 557
(2d Cir. 1979), cerL denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980) (holding that particularity of fraud in
pleadings intended to provide fair notice, protection of reputation or goodwill of defend-
ants, and discouragement of frivolous litigation for its in terrorem effect).
212. See Ross, 607 F.2d at 557 n.20 (quoting 2A JAMES W. MooRE ET AL., MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACrICE 9.03); 5 WIGrr & MMLER, supra note 211, § 1298, at 648. Form
13, which addresses pleading fraud under Rule 9(b), is expressly made sufficient under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 84. The model allegation of fraud given in a suit to re-
cover on a promissory note is as follows: "Defendant... on or about __ conveyed all his
property, real and personal [or specify and describe] to [another] defendant.., for the
purpose of defrauding plaintiff and hindering and delaying the collection of the indebted-
ness [to plaintiff] ...." FED. R. Civ. P. form 13.
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pleading under Federal Rule 15, or insufficient particularity may re-
sult in a motion to strike or dismiss the pleading, potentially resulting
in dismissal of the count.
213
Rather than gauging the sufficiency of pleadings, "particularity"
in the context of Rule 26(a)(1) disclosure is both a limiting and ex-
panding concept with a variable standard that creates a potential con-
tinuum of disclosure obligations. By tying the disclosure obligation to
the level of factual specificity in the pleadings, the particularity term
protects a party from overly burdensome and difficult disclosure deci-
sions in cases in which the pleadings contain little in the way of spe-
cific information about the nature of the claims. At the same time,
when a party pleads facts with greater detail, the rule enables that
party to obtain more information through disclosure without the ne-
cessity of a discovery request.2 14 The extent to which something is
pleaded with sufficient clarity to trigger a disclosure obligation and the
extent of the disclosure obligation is governed by common sense ap-
plied to a specific case, rather than by technical rules or a fixed stan-
dard.215 The kind of judgment called for is precisely that which is
expected of legal practitioners.
2 16
Some critics of disclosure have asserted that Rule 26(a) creates a
standard that is even more restrictive than Rule 9(b) because it ex-
pressly calls for "fact" pleading rather than pleading the "circum-
stances" with particularity as in Rule 9(b). These critics apparently
interpret the rule as creating a high fixed threshold of detail that must
be pleaded before any disclosure is triggered. Therefore, they argue,
the rule will not result in disclosures in most cases because parties in
the majority of cases will still follow notice pleading under Federal
Rule 8 and never reach the level of factual detail that would trigger
213. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 211, § 1300.
214. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a) advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 627,
631 (1993). "The greater the specificity and clarity of the allegations in the pleadings, the
more complete should be the listing of potential witnesses and types of documentary evi-
dence." Id.
215. Id. Delineation and clarification of factual disputes calling for disclosure were
also expected to be facilitated through party discussions at the Rule 26(f) discovery meet-
ing. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 641-44;
infra text accompanying notes 241-263.
216. See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 196, at 1122 (thinking required of practi-
tioners is "complex, informal judgment," not "mechanical rule-following"; "essence of the
professional judgment of the lawyer is [the] educated ability to relate the general body and
philosophy of law to a specific legal problem") (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-5 (1980)).
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disclosure.217 This argument ignores the substaitial incentive of par-
ties to plead detail to the maximum extent they can to obtain informa-
tion quickly and cheaply. Moreover, it is directly contrary to the
Advisory Committee's directive that the particularity standard must
be seen as a variable standard that can create some disclosure obliga-
tion even in cases with little factual detail and greater disclosure with
more pleading detail2 18
Similarly, the Rule 34 "reasonable particularity" requirement,
used to limit the party's burden in having to search for documents, is
not especially helpful when applied to Rule 26(a). The nature of the
description involved and the duty of the party responding to a Rule 34
request are quite different from those present in disclosure, and the
case law interpreting Rule 34 is of little use in interpreting the disclo-
sure rule. In fact, Rule 34 has been construed by some courts to pre-
clude requests that call for the kind of broad, subjective judgment
about relevance that the disclosure rule expressly contemplates.319
Rather than a delineation of facts from which a party and lawyer are
to identify and list relevant documents, Rule 34 contemplates a de-
scription by the requester of a document or thing that is sufficient for
an ordinary party to understand what is being requested.220
217. See Macdonald, supra note 203, at 836-38 & n. 95. Rule 8(a)(2) requires only a
"short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R.
Civ. P. 8(a).
218. See supra note 214. The Committee noted that "[b]road, vague, and conclusory
allegations sometimes tolerated in notice pleading-for example, the assertion that a prod-
uct with many component parts is defective in some unspecified manner-should not im-
pose upon responding parties the obligation at that point to search for and identify all
persons possibly involved in, or all documents affecting, the design, manufacture, and as-
sembly of the product." FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a) advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146
F.R.D. at 631. On the other hand, Judge Ralph Winter, a former member of the Civil
Rules Advisory Committee, has noted that the level of detail required to trigger disclosure
is not that great. For example, if a plaintiff pleads only that he was injured by a defective
train wheel, there would be no disclosure obligation created with regard to defective train
wheels, but if a plaintiff pleads injury by defective wheel on Amtrak train 77, the defendant
would have to disclose information relating to defective wheels on train 77. Jaret Seiberg,
All or Nothing, CON. L. Tnm., May 2, 1994, at 12 (quoting former Advisory Committee
member and Second Circuit Judge Ralph Winter); see Winter, supra note 18, at 269.
219. See In re Hunter Outdoor Prod. Inc., 21 B.R. 188, 192 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982)
(insufficient description if requires subjective opinion as to what is being requested); Un-
derwood, supra note 189, at 281-82.
220. See ROGER S. HAYDOcK & DAVID F. HERR, DIscOVERY: THEORY, PRACTICE,
AND PROBLEMS § 4.8 (1983); 8A CHARLES ALAN WRiGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & RICH-
ARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2211 Z1994). Under traditional
discovery methods, one can get a party to undertake an analysis of the relevance of docu-
ments to specific facts similar to that required under Rule 26(a) by posing an interrogatory
that requests a party to list documents relating to certain facts. HAYDoCK & HERR, supra,
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Because the particularity requirement may increase the amount
of evidence or facts pleaded, some critics have argued that disclosure
is a return to "fact" pleading or that it is inconsistent with notice
pleading.221 While it is true that the effect of Rule 26(a) may be to
increase the evidentiary detail contained in initial pleadings, it is by no
means clear that encouraging increased evidentiary pleading is neces-
sarily a bad thing. Moreover, it is not accurate to state that this is a
regression from "notice" to pre-federal rule "fact" pleading. As one
of the Advisory Committee members has commented, the "Commit-
tee had no desire to abandon notice pleading, but given that pleadings
often do allege facts, it undertook to draft a proposal limiting auto-
matic disclosure to facts that are actually pled. ' 222 The purpose of the
particularity term in the disclosure rule is facilitation of the exchange
of basic information early in the case, not the elimination of insuffi-
cient claims through hypertechnical pleading requirements and issue
definition that characterized common law and code forms of fact
pleading and that were downplayed as pleading functions in the Fed-
eral Rule's pleading scheme under Rule 8.23 The consequence of fail-
ing to plead facts with particularity under Rule 26(a) disclosure is not
a loss of a claim or defense, or a requirement to replead, as would be
the case under the problematic fact pleading systems. Instead, it is
simply an alteration of obligations and opportunities to obtain infor-
mation through the disclosure mechanism that is intended to acceler-
ate progress toward resolution on the merits.
224
While some of the general discovery concepts, such as relevance
and discoverable information, along with court interpretations of
§ 4.8, at 239. The Advisory Committee indicated that the disclosure obligation to provide a
description of the documents in the party's possession was to serve this same preliminary
purpose. See FED. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(B) advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D.
at 630 (disclosure of description of documents will assist in framing document requests in a
manner likely to avoid squabbles).
221. See, e.g., MacDonald, supra note 203, at 836-38 & n.95; Mayer, supra note 22, at
114.
222. Winter, supra note 18, at 268.
223. See generally 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 211, § 1202 (discussing objectives
of pleadings in the Federal Rules); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 433,437-40,451-54 (1986) [herein-
after Marcus, Revival] (discussing the revival of fact pleading).
224. See Seiberg, supra note 218, at 12 (citing Advisory Committee Member and Fed-
eral Judge Ralph Winter). Professor Marcus has observed that "pleading practice is little
better than an expensive waste of time" unless it facilitates a decision on the merits. Mar-
cus, Revival, supra note 223, at 492-93. While the particularity requirement in Rule 26(a) is
ultimately geared toward that objective, a collateral consequence may be increased dis-
putes over pleading especially in the context of motions to impose sanctions for
noncompliance.
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those concepts, may be transferable to disclosure, the flexible concept
of pleading facts with particularity as the operative standard of disclo-
sure is somewhat novel. These concepts can be expected to generate
significant uncertainties as litigants grapple with the rule's meaning
initially. However, any ambiguity that exists is not substantially differ-
ent from the ambiguity that accompanies any rule with a flexible stan-
dard.225 Just as the courts have developed guidance in other contexts
as to the meaning of particularity, relevance, and discoverability,
courts will soon articulate threshold disclosure standards for Rule
26(a). However, the likelihood that the initial uncertainties will result
in widespread litigation disputes requiring expenditures of significant
party and court resources is far from clear and much of the outcry in
this regard must be viewed as highly speculative "premature
alarmism."226
Developing a better sense of how likely or extensive disputes
over disclosure obligation might be and the extent of the additional
burden on the courts and parties that is likely to arise requires closer
examination of several factors: (1) the types of cases to which disclo-
sure most likely would be applied under Rule 26(a)(1) and the extent
of disclosure obligations; (2) the extent to which disclosure procedures
in Rule 26 will ameliorate disputes; and (3) the incentive structure
under the disclosure rule.
(2) Likely Use of Disclosure and Extent of Obligations
Critics of Rule 26(a) disclosure have consistently made their ar-
guments about the likely inundation of the courts with disclosure dis-
putes and motions in the context of complex cases involving numerous
issues and tons of documents.227 Disclosure supporters first point out
225. See Winter, supra note 18, at 267-71.
226. Mullenix, Hope over Experience, supra note 18, at 827. Professor Mullenix notes
that it is difficult to conceive of a dispute arising from the disclosure rule that could not be
handled by a judge or magistrate judge during pretrial proceedings.
227. See Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at 656-57; Winter, supra note 18, at
275-76 ("[L]itigators who attacked ... disclosure were largely products-liability-defense
attorneys; they gave examples that were almost universally of complex litigation in which
the plaintiffs' allegations were largely conclusory and potentially involved thousands of
documents at various places on the planet."). See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 19, at 1, 39,
48-49 (focusing on product liability, toxic torts, patents, and securities cases in article sup-
ported by the Product Liability Advisory Council Foundation). These authors magnify the
ambiguity and resultant necessity for motions to resolve disputes by using as an example a
case in which the pleadings only state that plaintiff was injured by a vehicle defectively
manufactured by defendant. Id. at 42. Obviously, such a pleading would create virtually
no disclosure obligation under any reasonable interpretation of the rule. See supra notes
214-218 and accompanying text.
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that "complex" cases constitute a relatively small portion of the cases
in the federal courts.228 However, the rule is intended to operate pri-
marily in the context of typical cases and whether disclosure is appro-
priate is to be determined flexibly based on the lawyer's experience
and knowledge of the circumstances of a particular case. This is re-
flected in the fact that Rule 26(a) allows exclusion of entire categories
of cases or individual cases by agreement of the parties, by local rule,
or by order of the court.229 Indeed, the Advisory Committee Note
accompanying the disclosure rule specifically states: "The disclosure
obligations... will not be appropriate for all cases, and it is expected
that changes in these obligations will be made by the court or parties
when the circumstances warrant. '230
Moreover, the rule on its face contains a number of limitations
that clearly indicate neither an intent for the disclosure rule to supply
all information needed at trial nor that the rule is to be blindly applied
to all cases. Thus, the rule limits required disclosure to the names of
individuals "likely to have discoverable information relevant to dis-
puted facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings" and the subject
of that information, but does not require disclosure of the information
itself. Similarly, the rule requires "a description [of documents] ... in
the possession, custody, or control of the party that are relevant to
disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings," but not dis-
closure of the actual documents or contents of those documents.
231
Furthermore, the initial disclosures need only be based upon "the in-
228. See Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at 657 & n.7 (finding that products
liability cases constituted only 5% of all civil filings in statistical year ending Sept. 30,
1992); Winter, supra note 18, at 275-76 (arguing that critics focused on small number of
cases with complex issues, such as products liability).
229. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1); Alexander, supra note 186, at 657 (ability of parties
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 29 to stipulate out of discovery procedures, and fact
that court can exempt cases from disclosure by class or individual case will reduce inappro-
priate application of disclosure); Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at 656-57 (disclo-
sure intended to "have principal effect in routine cases"): Winter, supra note 18, at 275-76
(same).
230. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 627,
629 (1993).
231. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a)(1)(A)-(B). The Advisory Committee Note accompanying
the disclosure rule makes clear that disclosures are primarily for purposes of obtaining
basic information needed in most cases to "help focus the discovery that is needed, and
facilitate preparation for trial or settlement." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory commit-
tee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 629-30 (emphasis added). They also indicate that the
rule contemplates only a brief general description of the subject of an individual's knowl-
edge and a general categorization and description of the nature of documents so as to
provide the other side with a basis to decide what depositions may be needed and what
documents may need to be examined and to provide information "to frame their document
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formation then reasonably available to" a party.232 These limitations
on disclosure obligations are significant because it can be assumed
that, in deciding whether to engage in a dispute over disclosure or file
a disclosure-related motion, litigants and their lawyers will weigh the
extent of the burden created by the disclosure obligation against the
costs of litigating disputes and their consequences.233 The more bur-
densome the disclosure duty, the more likely a party will seek protec-
tion from disclosure or be inclined to construe the "particularity"
standard narrowly so as to reduce the burden of disclosure.23-
Nevertheless, when a party believes that it would be clearly prob-
lematic to apply the rule broadly, agreement can be sought from the
opponent for an alternative disclosure plan or for no disclosure at all.
That failing, a party can seek relief from the court in a case not al-
ready exempted from disclosure categorically. As discussed in the
next subpart, the issue is whether recourse to these alternatives to
Rule 26(a) disclosure will be effective or will entail significant costs
and burdens beyond those that would be incurred under traditional
discovery.
Disclosure opponents have also claimed that the disclosure obli-
gation and potential burden have been significantly increased by the
provision that requires supplementation of initial disclosures with in-
requests in a manner likely to avoid squabbles .... " ILd. at 630. Ultimately, the rules are to
be applied "with common sense in light of the principles of Rule 1 . . . ." Id. at 631.
232. FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(a)(1). The Advisory Committee Notes explain that the rule
calls for only a "reasonable inquiry into the facts of the case" under the circumstances, but
does not "demand an exhaustive investigation at this stage of the case." FED. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(1) advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 632-33. The reasonableness
of the investigation is to be determined considering factors such as "the number and com-
plexity of the issues; the location, nature, number, and availability of potentially relevant
witnesses and documents; the extent of past working relationships between the attorney
and the client, particularly in handling related or similar litigation; and of course how long
the party has to conduct an investigation .. " Id.
233. See generally infra notes 275-282, 279, 402-404 and accompanying text (discussing
cost-benefit analysis).
234. In light of the limitations on the disclosure obligations, it is also probably a mis-
take to accept at face value the claims of critics that the rule cannot be applied to complex
cases. Even in these cases, there must be a core of readily identifiable persons with rele-
vant knowledge and information on the general categories and locations of documents that
can be disclosed without unreasonable burden. The rule, after all, does not contemplate
exhaustive disclosure of all information initially. It requires only disclosure of information
within the party's knowledge after a reasonable inquiry, followed by discovery and by sup-
plemental disclosure of new information when it comes to light. See FED. R. CIv. P.
26(a)(1) (disclosures shall be based on information "then reasonably available to [a party]"
regardless of whether a party has completed the investigation); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e) (duty
to supplement initial disclosure at "appropriate intervals" if information disclosed is mate-
rially incomplete or incorrect); Underwood, supra note 189, at 286-87.
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formation acquired after the initial response. Rule 26(e) requires sup-
plemental disclosures if "the party learns that in some material respect
the information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if the addi-
tional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known
to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing. 2 35
Critics assert that parties will now continuously have to monitor new
information and review prior disclosures for correctness and disclose
additional information even when the opponent has not expressly
sought information in discovery.2 36 While this new duty to supple-
ment significantly increases a litigant's and lawyer's237 disclosure du-
ties, it is not as broad or as troublesome as critics suggest. First, the
reference point for the duty of supplementation is still the original
disclosure standard of 26(a)()-"disputed facts alleged with particu-
larity in the pleadings," not some general standard of relevance to the
subject matter of the suit.238 Only information (e.g., names of wit-
nesses, descriptions of documents) about which other parties have not
been made aware in writing or during discovery need be supple-
mentally disclosed, and supplementation need not occur continuously
but only at "appropriate intervals."'239 Finally, the supplementation
requirement creates a duty to disclose information, but should not cre-
ate any new duty of inquiry or investigation that would not already be
demanded by ethical obligations to the client, other Civil Rules, or
malpractice avoidance. 240
235. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(e)(1).
236. See Mayer, supra note 22, at 120; Underwood, supra note 189, at 286-87. One
commentator suggests that this supplementation duty will require the party to "consider
theories of relevancy rejected or overlooked by his opponent." Mayer, supra note 22, at
120. As discussed in the text, this construction is simply not supported by the face of the
rule or the Committee Notes.
237. The duty to supplement, which is imposed on a party, applies both to information
acquired by the party and that party's counsel. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e) advisory committee's
note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 627, 641 (1993).
238. Id. The duty to supplement is not unique to disclosure, but applies to discovery
responses to interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admissions. Id.
239. Id.
240. See Alexander, supra note 186, at 659 (no added costs from finding information
because a lawyer would do so anyway in preparation of her own case and failure to do so
would "probably constitute malpractice"); Wolfson, supra note 32, at 60, 62 ("ethical re-
quirement of thorough and appropriate case preparation, backed up by fear of malpractice
suit" promotes pretrial preparation and Rule 26(g) requires reasonable inquiry in respond-
ing to discovery). See also FED R. Civ. P. 11 (reasonable inquiry as to factual and legal
support for positions taken in court); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) (same as to discovery requests
and responses); infra notes 340-348 and accompanying text.
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(3) Procedural Devices to Facilitate Disclosure
Recognizing the novelty of disclosure and the potential ambiguity
of the "particularity" standard, the Advisory Committee provided
lawyers not only with the explanatory guidance in the Committee
Notes discussed above, but also with procedural mechanisms for
working out the details of disclosure and for reducing the likelihood of
disputes arising in the process. Unless the parties agree otherwise or
unless the court by local rule or order authorizes, discovery cannot be
undertaken through traditional methods until after the parties have
met and conferred as required by Rule 26(f). 241 Rule 26(f) requires
that the lawyers for parties meet early in the litigation242 "to discuss
the nature and basis of their claims" and the possibilities for "settle-
ment or resolution..., to make or arrange for the disclosures...,
and to develop a proposed discovery plan" including parties' views on
specifically enumerated topics. t 3  Within 'ten days after the Rule
26(f) meeting, the parties must make their initial disclosures unless
they have reached an agreement with their opponents for different
disclosure requirements or have been relieved of that obligation by a
court order or local rule.244 The Advisory Committee Notes and dis-
closure advocates emphasize that one of the primary purposes of this
Rule 26(f) meeting is to discuss and clarify claims, defenses, and dis-
241. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(d). The exception to this general rule applies in situations in
which the Civil Rules of Procedure otherwise would authorize early discovery, e.g., Rule
30(a)(2)(C) (deposition of person leaving the country). See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d) advisory
committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 640.
242. Rule 26(f) provides that the meeting should occur "as soon as practicable and in
any event at least 14 days before a scheduling conference is held or a scheduling order is
due under Rule 16(b)." FED. R. Crv. P. 26(f). Some mathematics are involved to deter-
mine the last possible point at which the Rule 26(f) conference may be held since the Rule
16(b) conference order is due after the court receives the Rule 26(f) meeting report and
"within 90 days after the appearance of a defendant and within 120 days after the com-
plaint has been served on a defendant." FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(6). Some commentators
have cited the timing requirement as a possible source of confusion and ineffectiveness of
the disclosure rule. See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 19, at 43 n.163; Underwood, supra note
189, at 283-84. Nevertheless, the principal point is that the timing rule is quite practical and
flexible: the meeting should be as early in the case as possible and certainly before the trial
court is required to become involved and issue a scheduling order addressing potential
discovery problems and other case management issues. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory
committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 642.
243. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(f). Among the topics for consideration in the plan are changes
in Rule 26(a) disclosure requirements; discovery subjects, timing, and limitations; and any
other pretrial management orders that may be appropriate. Id.
244. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
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closures prior to the time disclosures are due.245 The rule expressly
assigns the parties primary responsibility for working out issues and
making a good faith effort to resolve issues before seeking judicial
intervention. Before seeking court-ordered relief from some aspect of
disclosure, a party must have "in good faith conferred or attempted to
confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute
without court action. '246 Similarly, before seeking a court order com-
pelling disclosure or imposing sanctions against the other side for fail-
ing to meet disclosure obligations, a party must certify that good faith
efforts to resolve the disclosure dispute have been made.247
The overall thrust of these provisions is essentially to say to law-
yers: "There are several types of information that invariably must be
exchanged in any civil action and that should not be the subject of
wasteful squabbling. The rules will allow you, as competent profes-
sionals, to work out the exact details of how and when that informa-
tion will be exchanged but will preclude you from engaging in
traditional discovery or discovery motions until you have at least met
to discuss the details of the case, settlement, disclosure of information,
and a proposed plan for discovery that is tailored to the needs of the
case." Perhaps what is so daunting to some lawyers is the extent to
which the new rules place responsibility on lawyers to take charge of
their cases and to behave reasonably in resolving matters with the
other side. Given the fact that lawyers often see discovery abuse as
what their opponents do and the fact that lawyers have consistently
sought court intervention to save them from themselves in the context
of discovery disputes,248 resistance to the responsibilities created by
the disclosure rules is perhaps understandable, but certainly not
laudable.
In light of the focus of the amendments on lawyer good faith,
reasonableness, and communication, it is not surprising that oppo-
nents of disclosure have directed little of their attack toward the Rule
26(f) meeting requirement and have instead directed their criticism
toward the standard for disclosure in the abstract. By doing so, they
have avoided acknowledging their responsibility to discuss and clarify
disclosure obligations with the opposing parties and counsel. Indeed,
some of the most ardent opponents of disclosure have suggested that
245. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1), (f) advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146
F.R.D. at 631, 643; Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at 661-62.
246. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
247. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(A).
248. See supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
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the concept of a mandatory discovery meeting itself is a good idea, as
long as it does not involve mandatory disclosure.249 One of the most
common criticisms of the Rule 26(f) meeting procedures seems to be a
reiteration of the "other side won't play by the rules" claim frequently
heard in the context of discovery abuse.2 0 As discussed previously,
the argument that a small number of lawyers will not follow the rules
is not an acceptable reason to decline to adopt rules aimed at reducing
costs and improving justice unless there is reason to expect that the
rule will actually exacerbate problems.251 Here disclosure opponents
have failed to make a case that the Rule 26(f) conference requirement
will not be helpful in clarifying obligations and reducing disputes,
much less that the meeting itself will make things worse overall.
Some critics also attack the disclosure meeting procedure on the
ground that the prior version of the discovery conference, added to
the rules in 1980 to encourage cooperation among lawyers, failed to
reduce discovery abuse z2 However, the earlier version of the confer-
ence was quite unlike that envisioned under amended Rule 26(f).
First, the prior Rule 26(f) discovery conference was not mandatory. A
court could order a conference, or a conference could be sought by a
249. See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 19, at 49-50. Other disclosure critics who have
focused heavily on the purported vagueness of the disclosure standard as one of the funda-
mental defects of the disclosure rule do not even address the effect of Rule 26(f). See, e.g.,
Mayer, supra note 22, at 113-22; Underwood, supra note 189, at 279-81; see also Amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.RID. 507, 511 (1993) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (discussing the imprudence of adopting a mandatory disclosure rule).
250. See e.g., Bell et al., supra note 19, at 49, 52; Mayer, supra note 22, at 116-17. The
former authors state: "Although the Advisory Committee assumed that litigants would
work cooperatively to define the boundaries of disclosure, eliminating much of the wasted
time and cost of the current discovery process, a more reasonable assumption is that zeal-
ous advocates will inevitably seek to use the inherent ambiguity of the automatic disclosure
standard to advance their clients' interests." Bell et al., supra note 19, at 49. See also Hank
Grezlak, Concerns Over Discovery: Federal Rule Amendments Bring Mixed Reactions,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 19, 1993, at 1, 6 (Philadelphia Bar Association opposition to
Rule 26(a) based on argument that agreements under the rule will not be reached easily
"because of the nastiness or zealousness of some attorneys" and fact that "opposite sides in
cases have different motives and agendas"). Although obstructionist tactics are often
equated with zealous advocacy, it is not clear that the client's best interests ultimately
would be served by the actions suggested by these authors. It is equally as arguable that
the client's interests would be served better by counsel cooperatively attempting to agree
on the scope and timing of the disclosure requirement, as well as other aspects of the
discovery process, so that client litigation costs would be minimized. See generally infra
notes 403-404 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 192-195 and accompanying text.
252. Mayer, supra note 22, at 95. As noted previously, because the discovery confer-
ence had been viewed as ineffective and seldom used, the Advisory Committee originally
proposed the repeal of Rule 26(f) in its original form. See Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Advisory Committee's Note, 137 F.R.D. 99, 105 (1991).
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party who had prepared a discovery plan and had sought unsuccess-
fully the good faith cooperation of the opposing party in framing that
plan or resolving disputes as to the contents of the plan. Not surpris-
ingly, without being mandatory and without a specified outcome for
the meeting, "[l]awyers did not choose to utilize the conference in the
cooperative manner envisioned by reformers. ' 253 In contrast, the
amended Rule 26(f) conference is mandatory, regardless of whether
the parties decide to stipulate out of disclosure. Moreover, because
disclosure of information based on disputed facts in prior pleadings is
mandatory, unless parties reach a contrary agreement, and because a
mandatory discovery report must be submitted to the court after the
meeting,254 substantial incentives are provided for the parties to at-
tempt to reach agreement on the scope of disclosure through the
conference.
A more troubling concern about discovery reform generally
raised in the context of disclosure procedures by some critics is that,
for ethical and strategic reasons, lawyers are really incapable of com-
municating with each other with clarity.255 According to this perspec-
tive, much of the problem with discovery arises from the fact that the
language of many discovery requests is inherently indeterminative, in-
evitably creating communication and interpretation difficulties. "A
lawyer engaged in discovery practice will have a difficult time objec-
tively reading discovery requests while promoting his client's inter-
ests. '256 In construing a written discovery request, the reader is not
committed to an objective understanding of the writer's intent, but
may actually be committed to construing the request in a manner that
does the least damage to the client, either as a matter of zealous rep-
resentation or client pressure.257 The "relevant to facts alleged with
particularity" standard in disclosure is seen as exacerbating the inde-
terminacy and the communication problems lawyers face, because it is
even broader than specific discovery requests.
258
This communicative incapacity argument, arising out of the con-
text of written discovery requests and the broadly written discovery
253. Mayer, supra note 22, at 95.
254. The Advisory Committee contemplated that the "report will assist the court in
seeing that the timing and scope of disclosures ... and the limitations on the extent of
discovery.., are tailored to the circumstances of the particular case." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)
advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 627, 642 (1993).
255. See Mayer, supra note 22, at 95-116.
256. Id. at 96.
257. See id. at 97-98, 103.
258. Id. at 113-15.
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rule language, is not persuasive in the context of disclosure because
parties are required to meet early in the litigation and confer on the
disclosures to be made under the "particularity" standard. Both inad-
vertent and intentional lack of interpretive objectivity in the discovery
context are possible, in part, because discovery operates through a
lengthy formalized exchange of paper communications that facilitates
stalling and less than full disclosure. For example, parties must wait
thirty days for the written responses to their interrogatories, which
may include broad objections and vague responses, or may involve a
motion seeking a protective order from the court.259 At that point the
original requesting party must evaluate the written response and de-
termine whether it is adequate or whether a motion to compel, requir-
ing intervention of the court, is required. More delay occurs before
any discovery motion will be heard by the court. During this process,
parties frequently may not be aware of an opposing party's narrow
interpretation of an interrogatory and that it has resulted in some rele-
vant information not being provided.2 60 It is not until a dispute actu-
ally erupts and percolates into court that the parties may have to
directly communicate with each other and explain more completely
the precise information they are seeking and have withheld. At that
point their nonobjective positions are often severely tested by direct
confrontation with the other side and possible inquiry from the
court.261
On the other hand, because the disclosure process requires the
parties to meet to discuss the specifics of disclosure, including the na-
ture and basis of the factual claims or defenses being made in the
pleadings, this direct confrontation or dialogue must occur earlier in
the case than would occur under traditional discovery. Arguably, dur-
ing this interchange the lawyers cannot avoid obtaining a more objec-
tive understanding of the information that is required to be disclosed
than would occur based only on written discovery exchanges. This is
especially true if counsel competently serve their clients' interests by
259. See FED. R. Crv. P. 33(b), 26(c).
260. This is similar to the "silent" assertion of privilege that the amendment to Rule
26(b)(5) was intended to address. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(5) & advisory committee's
note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 627, 639-40 (1993).
261. This may also partially explain why a neutral or objective reader of court opinions
discussing discovery disputes is often struck by the apparent unreasonableness of parties'
positions in the dispute. See, e.g., Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1539-42
(11th Cir. 1993); Nault's Auto. Sales, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 148 F.R.D. 25,
28-29 (D.N.H. 1993); Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858
P.2d 1054, 1058-59 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
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attempting to clarify disputed facts at issue and thus ensure an appro-
priate breadth of the required disclosures.262 In light of the discus-
sions at the Rule 26(f) meeting, lawyers may also not be in a position
to justify nondisclosure as easily by asserting that they did not under-
stand what was intended by a factual allegation in a complaint. 263 It is
only if all parties to a case made a strategic decision to opt out of
disclosure that indeterminacy would seem to be as problematic as that
which has been attributed to traditional discovery, and one is hard
pressed to conceive of a motive for all sides in a case to make this
strategic choice except in the most complex cases. Thus, the potential
for reducing the level of indeterminacy of traditional discovery is at
least one factor that may refute the claims by some commentators that
"existing discovery procedures are at least as efficient as
disclosure."
264
(4) Incentives for Compliance with Disclosure
Accompanying the disclosure requirements are additions to
Rules 26(g) and 37 intended to induce compliance with the new dis-
closure obligation. Rule 26(g)(1) adds a requirement that attorneys
certify "to the best of [their] knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after a reasonable inquiry, the disclosure is complete and cor-
rect as of the time it is made," and Rule 26(g)(3) directs the court to
impose an appropriate sanction, including attorneys' fees and ex-
penses, upon the attorney or the party or both for a violation that is
not substantially justified.265 Rule 37(a) now authorizes a motion to
262. Cf. Wolfson, supra note 32, at 57 ("By participating in the definitional process, the
parties have an opportunity to explore the needs of their particular case, raise arguments
about the categories themselves and the information to be included therein, [and] under-
stand the meaning, scope and intent of each category .... "). See also Schwarzer, In De-
fense, supra note 166, at 661-62 (concluding Rule 26(f) conference and discovery plan for
mandated Rule 16 conference will result in more clarity and fewer motions since court and
lawyers will have more information about their own and their opponent's case to plan
rationally). In this regard, the Rule 26(f) conference may have much in common with the
deposition discovery device that is quite useful for exploring facts within a deponent's
knowledge because of the ability to probe deeply and to expand appropriately the areas of
inquiry in response to the content of the deponent's testimony. See generally HAYDOCK &
HERR, supra note 220, § 2.1.1 (discussing advantages of depositions).
263. But see Mayer, supra note 22, at 117 ("It would be a poor lawyer indeed who
could not provide a good faith reason for underdisclosure or explain why a subsequently
corrected underdisclosure was harmless."). In making this comment, Mayer does not ac-
count for the effect of the Rule 26(f) conference as a possible limiting factor on the ability
of lawyers to justify underdisclosure.
264. Underwood, supra note 189, at 280. See Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at
662-64.
265. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(g).
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compel disclosure for a failure to disclose as required by Rule 26(a)
and authorizes appropriate sanctions if the movant has first in "good
faith conferred or attempted to confer with the party not making the
disclosure in an effort to secure the disclosure without court ac-
tion."266 Rule 37(c) is revised'to add self-executing sanctions consid-
ered particularly appropriate for failures to disclose, false disclosures,
and misleading disclosures. If a party fails to disclose information re-
quired by Rule 26(a) (initial disclosure) and 26(e) (supplemental dis-
closure), the party shall not "be permitted to use as evidence at a trial,
at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not so dis-
closed" unless the nondisclosure is substantially justified and harm-
less.267 Instead of, or in addition to, this sanction, the court can
impose other appropriate sanctions after giving the party an opportu-
nity to be heard. These sanctions may include reasonable expenses
and attorneys' fees caused by the failure to disclose, sanctions author-
ized under Rule 37(b)(2)(A); (B), and (C), and "informing the jury of
the failure to make disclosure. '268 Rule 37(g) also now authorizes the
imposition of costs and attorneys' fees against a party or lawyer who
fails to cooperate in good faith in the "development and submission of
a proposed discovery plan."269
Opponents of disclosure have attacked the sanctions provisions
from seemingly opposite directions. Some assert that the availability
of severe sanctions will cause a proliferation of motions practice and
increase the costs of litigation. They argue that parties will attempt to
use the sanctions provisions, not only to recover costs and attorneys'
fees in obtaining compliance with disclosure obligations, but also to
obtain the more strategic sanctions such as barring the use of evidence
at trial or obtaining an instruction to the jury about the failure to dis-
close specific evidence. 270 The motivation identified for such a
proliferation of sanctions litigation is apparently "the increasingly ad-
266. FED. R. Crv. P. 37(a)(2)(A).
267. FED. R. Crv. P. 37(c) & advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 627,
691-92 (1993).
268. FED. R. Crv. P. 37(c). The other sanctions referred to in section 37(b)(2) include
taking certain facts as being established, refusing to allow a party to introduce evidence on
a matter, striking pleadings, dismissal, or default judgment. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A),
(B), (C).
269. FED. R. Crv. P. 37(g).
270. See, &g., Bell et al., supra note 19, at 42-43, 45. In particular, concern has been
expressed that sanctions would be sought when documents surfaced during discovery that a
party believed should have been disclosed by an opponent initially during disclosure. Id. at
43.
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versarial and uncivil nature of modern litigation."'271 Other critics
with a very different perspective claim that the sanctions provisions
are inadequate to ensure compliance with disclosure obligations be-
cause they are not designed to be enforced strictly in the typical case.
In particular, sanctions are not available when nondisclosure was
"substantially justified," 272 and the more severe forms of preclusion-
ary sanctions are not available when the nondisclosure was "harm-
less. ' 273 Because of the seemingly ready availability of excuses for
nondisclosure, lawyers will conclude that the risk of incurring more
serious sanctions is not sufficiently great to warrant disclosing damag-
ing information.
It is likely that neither of these arguments accurately depicts the
overall dynamics of sanctions practice under the disclosure rule.
Neither argument convincingly demonstrates that disclosure would re-
sult in sanctions-related litigation beyond that encountered in tradi-
tional discovery, except perhaps for the initial increase in litigation
that can be expected as the courts flesh out the meaning of "substan-
tial justification" and "harmless" failure to disclose in Rules 26(g) and
37(c). Indeed, to some extent the disclosure opponents' arguments
work against each other. For example, the first argument predicting
burgeoning litigation over sanctions seems to be premised only on a
notion of blind adversariness and ignores the possibility recognized in
the second argument that in many instances the standards of Rules
26(g) and 37(c) make it unlikely that sanctions motions or arguments
will be successful. An unstated but logical extension of the second
argument regarding laxity of the sanctions standards is that if one as-
sumes lawyers consciously make a cost-benefit analysis regarding the
extent of disclosure they will make, one would also assume lawyers
would make a similar analysis with regard to the cost and likely
chances of success in seeking sanctions from opponents for their pur-
ported failure to comply with disclosure obligations. In other words,
accepting the argument that sanctions are unlikely, one would also
assume that sanctions motions would not be likely except when liti-
gants have ascertained they will likely succeed.274
271. Id. at 43, 44-45.
272. FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(g)(3).
273. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c); see Mayer, supra note 22, at 117 ("It would be a poor lawyer
indeed who could not provide a good faith reason for underdisclosure or explain why a
subsequently corrected underdisclosure was harmless.").
274. Mayer, supra note 22, at 118-19; see also Frankel, Cure for Discovery Ills, supra
note 124, at 266-67 (arguing that shift favoring disclosure over discovery not likely to be
successful because incentives underlying overzealous behavior remain unaltered and favor
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On the other hand, the second argument probably overstates the
laxity of sanction standards and perhaps understates the likelihood of
court enforcement of sanctions for abuse in the disclosure process. It
is also based on the assumption that the majority of litigants obey
rules only because of the risk of sanctions. With regard to the likeli-
hood of sanctions, the recent trend has been toward a greater willing-
ness by courts to impose at least monetary sanctions (e.g., costs and
attorneys' fees) under Rule 37 for discovery abuse, but courts have
shown continued reluctance to impose more serious sanctions under
Rule 37(b) such as striking pleadings, entry of default, or dismissals
except in the most egregious cases. 275 While the imposition of sanc-
tions and the amount of sanctions litigation under disclosure generally
can be expected to change little from that under traditional discovery,
there are aspects of modified Rule 37 that may more effectively pro-
vide an incentive to comply with disclosure as to the most centrally
relevant information. Unlike Rule 37(b) sanctions for failure to com-
ply with discovery requirements, which are generally within the
court's discretion, amended Rule 37(c) creates a presumptive sanction
of preclusion of use of nondisclosed evidence that must be applied
unless the court finds that the nondisclosure was harmless and sub-
stantially justified. Depending on the construction of these terms, the
Advisory Committee could reasonably believe that the "automatic
sanction provides a strong inducement for disclosure of material that
the disclosing party would expect to use as evidence ... "276 That the
terms "harmless" and "substantial justification" were not intended to
have the liberal scope attributed to them by some commentators is
demonstrated by the Advisory Committee's examples of the limited
situations in which the "harsh penalties" would not be appropriate:
inadvertent omission of the "name of a potential witness known to all
advocacy over professionalism). Among the incentives posited as weighing against compli-
ance with disclosure under the Federal Rule are (1) the most successful firms are the ones
that win for clients and they will most likely be the ones that do not adhere scrupulously to
disclosure requirements; (2) profit drive, client pressures, and the benefits perceived by
lawyers from engaging in "hardball" tactics; and (3) low likelihood that judges will more
strictly enforce disclosure requirements than they currently enforce discovery require-
ments. ld. at 266 & n.78.
275. Dudley, supra note 13, at 217-18.
276. FED. R. Crv. P. 37(c)(1) advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 689,
691 (1993). See also Dudley, supra note 13, at 221-22 (touting effectiveness of presumptive
application of more severe preclusionary sanctions for failure to obey discovery require-
ments in complex cases). The incentive would seem particularly strong to disclose what
would be viewed from the disclosing party's perspective as favorable evidence, as opposed
to unfavorable evidence, given that one effect of the disclosure may be to influence a
favorable settlement outcome.
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parties; the failure to list as a trial witness a person so listed by an-
other party; or the lack of knowledge of a pro se litigant" about the
disclosure requirements unless those requirements had been called to
the pro se litigant's attention by another party or the court.277 The
more relevant a particular piece of information is to the facts of the
case, the more important it is to the parties and the more difficult it
will be for the party to argue successfully that nondisclosure was inad-
vertent or substantially justified.
The relationship between the importance of the information to
the parties, the viability of excuses for nondisclosure, and the appar-
ently narrow construction to be given to "substantial justification" are
also important factors in considering the potential sanctions for the
failure to disclose information that is potentially harmful to one's case.
The Advisory Committee recognized that presumptive preclusion of
evidence not disclosed is ineffective to compel disclosure of unfavora-
ble information, but believed that effective compliance could be
achieved through a wide variety of other severe sanctions, including
"declaring specified facts to be established, preventing contradictory
evidence, or, like spoliation of evidence, allowing the jury to be in-
formed of the fact of nondisclosure .... -"278 Although the imposition
of meaningful sanctions for nondisclosure of unfavorable evidence re-
quires a motion by an opposing party and the rule appears to leave the
court with substantial discretion, courts can be expected to view
claims of inadvertence, harmlessness, or substantial justification skep-
tically when the undisclosed information is obviously relevant to the
facts alleged and clearly unfavorable to a nondisclosing party. In
other words, sanctions in addition to costs and fees are most likely to
be sought and imposed in cases in which the violations are the most
egregious, and conversely, the deterrent effect of the sanctions provi-
sion should work best in cases in which the pressure to avoid disclo-
sure is the greatest. At least superficially, the incentives of the
sanction provisions seem to work in the right direction and to be mini-
mally adequate, if not ideal, in design.
277. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c) advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 689, 691
(1993).
278. Id. at 691-92. The Committee did not explain the difference in treatment of
favorable and unfavorable evidence, but it is probably based on the Committee's practical
concern that only sanctions for failure to disclose favorable evidence can be self-executing.
However, given the history of reluctance of the courts to impose severe sanctions for dis-
covery abuse generally, the incentive for disclosure of unfavorable information should
have arguably been strengthened by a presumption of sanctions for nondisclosure absent
substantial justification. See Dudley, supra note 13, at 221-23.
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Moreover, in analyzing the likelihood of compliance with disclo-
sure requirements, one must avoid applying an oversimplified version
of cost-benefit analysis to a monolithic and cynical view of lawyers
and litigants. In particular, substantial skepticism is based on the as-
sumption that the majority of lawyers would choose to cheat outright
rather than to disclose information that will be profoundly damaging
to their client's case.2 79 If this were true, one would expect to see far
more evidence of blatant discovery evasion than actually appears to
exist.28 0 As a general proposition, in complex cases in which the
stakes are high for both the client and the lawyers, the pressures to
engage in various forms of discovery abuse (and presumably disclo-
sure abuse) may be overwhelming, absent strict enforcement of sanc-
tions that outweigh the benefits of abuse.28' However, one must be
careful about concluding that this proposition holds true in more typi-
cal cases. Not only may the risk of less stringent sanctions on the law-
yers or clients be sufficient to guarantee compliance, but other
incentives may generally tend to ensure that parties and their lawyers
conscientiously attempt to comply with the disclosure rules.
Professionalism is another important incentive, but one that dis-
closure critics have substantially discounted.282 The basic professional
assumption is that most lawyers attempt to comply with the rules of
procedure and ethical responsibilities as they understand them. Prior
to the disclosure amendment lawyers could interpret the rules of dis-
covery in light of longstanding conceptions of the adversarial role and
interpretive case law283 as allowing adversarial discovery practices or
game playing. Discovery practices in which no information is given
unless in response to a "proper" request were viewed as allowed and
279. See, eg., Frankel, Cure for Discovery Ills, supra note 124, at 273-74 ("It is prepos-
terous to think lawyers on the honor system are going to come forth with the smoking gun
280. See generally supra notes 82-113 and accompanying text.
281. See e.g., Brazil, Improving Controls, supra note 57, at 952; Dudley, supra note 13,
at 220. For example, in cases in which ultimate liabilities may exceed millions of dollars,
monetary sanctions of a few thousand dollars may be simply the "cost of doing business."
Dudley, supra note 13, at 221. See, e.g., Barbara J. Gorham, Fisons: Will It Tame the Beast
of Discovery Abuse?, 69 WASH. L. REv. 765, 787 (1994) (arguing that sanctions in high
stakes products liability case not high enough to deter type of nondisclosure of "smoking
gun"). Indeed, there may be some cases in which even the most severe sanctions, including
attorney discipline, will not be viewed as sufficiently weighty to overcome the incentive to
engage in abusive litigation tactics.
282. See eg., Bell et al., supra note 19, at 40; Frankel, Cure for Discovery Ills, supra
note 124, at 266.
283. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); see supra note 44-45 and accompanying
text.
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the guiding principle of discovery was how to interpret a particular
discovery request to avoid giving opponents the information that they
were after.28 4 The professionalism assumption underlying disclosure
is that once it is made manifestly clear that lawyers and parties have
an obligation to stop this adversarial game playing and disclose certain
basic information, most will comply. 285 The critics' reply to the pro-
fessionalism argument is essentially that lawyers indoctrinated for
years in adversarial discovery practices geared toward winning any
way possible under the law cannot be expected to change overnight in
response to a mere rules change, especially when incentives to engage
in overzealous advocacy remain largely intact.28 6 While it is too soon
to tell which view of the profession will ultimately prove correct, early
experience with disclosure suggests that many attorneys in fact do re-
spond as would be expected under the professionalism model.287
Moreover, there is reason to believe that if judges openly endorse and
reinforce the professionalism message and expectation of disclosure,
strictly enforcing the obligations created under the rules, a more sig-
nificant positive impact can be expected.288
(5) Bottom Line on Pragmatic Concerns and Costs
The critics of disclosure have identified the key aspects of Rule
26(a) that are likely to be problematic, but their critique falls short of
284. See Edward H. Cooper, supra note 81, at 477-78; Frankel, Cure for Discovery Ills,
supra note 124, at 266; Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at 659. See also Mayer,
supra note 22, at 100-01 (argument that use of discovery for "improper advantage," such as
intentionally imposing burdens on an opponent is arguably ethical and normal part of liti-
gation practice). But see infra notes 352-375 and accompanying text.
285. See Frankel, Cure for Discovery Ills, supra note 124, at 266; Schwarzer, In Defense,
supra note 166, at 659. This message was made express in the Advisory Committee Notes
to Rule 26(a) where it is stated: "The disclosure requirements should ... be applied with
common sense in light of the principles of Rule 1, keeping in mind the salutary purposes
that the rule is intended to accomplish. The litigants should not indulge in gamesmanship
with respect to the disclosure obligations." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) advisory committee's note,
reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 627, 631 (1993) (emphasis added).
286. See, e.g., Frankel, Cure for Discovery Ills, supra note 124, at 266-67.
287. See supra note 190; Frankel, Cure for Discovery Ills, supra note 124, at 276-77
(game playing and satellite litigation may be less of problem under disclosure rules similar
to the federal rules than under discovery).
288. See CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 40, at 18; Dudley, supra note 13, at 221-22;
Frankel, Cure for Discovery Ills, supra note 124, at 267, 276-77. A related factor that may
influence compliance with the disclosure rule is the "local legal culture," which includes the
subtle attitudes and unwritten practices of lawyers and judges in a particular locale. See
Dudley, supra note 13, at 211. The greater the extent that the local legal culture rejects lax
disclosure practice and gamesmanship, the more likely lawyers may feel compelled to be-
have consistently with the disclosure rules.
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establishing a compelling case that disclosure will actually exacerbate
litigation problems and costs to an extent that would justify their vo-
ciferous opposition. Indeed, it would seem that Rule 26(a) was
designed with sufficient limitations, adaptability, and incentives so
that most problems with vagueness, noncompliance, and misuse have
been anticipated and can be ameliorated. It is undoubtedly true that
there will be initial start-up costs to parties and the courts as lawyers
and litigants get used to the disclosure concept and as the uncertain-
ties in the rule are worked out. However, it is far from clear that the
costs of disclosure will ultimately be higher than those under the pre-
Rule 26(a)(1) discovery practice.28 9 On the one hand, disclosure may
reduce costs by eliminating the time for preparation of some discovery
paper work; increasing the efficiency of subsequent discovery; increas-
ing the likelihood of the resolution of litigation more quickly by nar-
rowing issues, settlement, or dispositive motions earlier; and reducing
the opportunities for evasion and manipulation if courts clearly delin-
eate and enforce the standards that control disclosure obligations. 290
On the other hand, litigation costs may well increase under Rule 26(a)
because, first, litigants will test the parameters and meaning of the
disclosure rule through motions for protective orders from disclosure,
motions to compel disclosure, and motions seeking sanctions for inad-
equate disclosure and, second, many litigants will continue to use the
discovery process to the same extent previously because of distrust of
their opponents' compliance with disclosure.291
The significance of the practical concerns about any potential in-
creased cost from disclosure is related to the fact that, as proponents
and opponents both note, disclosure really is not intended to provide
any information that is not already available through existing discov-
ery mechanisms.292 Instead, it is intended only to reduce modestly the
cost of obtaining basic information under current discovery by accel-
erating the exchange of information and eliminating some of the pa-
per work needed to obtain that information for parties to better assess
289. See Alexander, supra note 186, at 658-59; Frankel, Cure for Discovery Ills, supra
note 124, at 274-77.
290. Alexander, supra note 186, at 658; Frankel, Cure for Discovery Ills, supra note
124, at 274-75; Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at 663-64; Winter, supra note 18, at
271, 276-77.
291. See eg., Alexander, supra note 186, at 659; Bell et al., supra note 19, at 44-46;
Hughes, supra note 171, at 6-7; MacDonald, supra note 203, at 842; Mayer, supra note 22,
at 121; Underwood, supra note 189, at 280-82.
292. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 186, at 658; Underwood, supra note 189, at 280;
Winter, supra note 18, at 271.
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the need for further discovery or the advisability of settlement and to
prepare for trial.293 Nevertheless, even assuming that the disclosure
rule does result in some increased costs, as the next subpart makes
clear, they can be justified if they more effectively serve the values or
goals of the civil litigation system. Unfortunately, what also seems
clear from the analysis of the pragmatic arguments about the disclo-
sure rule is that there may not be a universal understanding of just
what the values or goals of the system are, and this lack of shared
understanding may account more for the widespread outcry over dis-
closure than the rule's purported inadequacies.
C. Consistency of Disclosure with the Adversarial Civil Litigation System
The claim that disclosure is generally inconsistent with the funda-
mental tenets of our litigation system has been repeated frequently,
but seldom with explanatory detail or analysis. Generally, critics have
simply stated that the rule is inconsistent with the adversary system,
work product doctrine, and ethical obligations to clients. They base
this on their view that, in the process of making a determination of
what information must be disclosed, a party will have to decide what
an opponent needs to make his or her case and will "be required to
assist in making [that] case . . -294 Critics have also asserted that
disclosure undermines the attorney-client privilege because it requires
293. See generally supra notes 159-168 and accompanying text; Alexander, supra note
186, at 657; Winter, supra note 18, at 271. Increased costs associated with disclosure may
also raise questions about the justification for the rule if one considers the empirical evi-
dence suggesting that discovery generally is not as riddled with abuse as popularly per-
ceived. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text; see also Samborn, supra note 92, at 3
(finding by National Center for State Courts that "no formal discovery is filed in 42 per-
cent of the ... cases that it examined ... strikes at the heart of a judiciary proposal to
amend Rule 26 ... ").
294. Bell et al., supra note 19, at 46-47. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 186, at 656
(guessing by lawyer at what should be disclosed breaches ethical obligations to clients);
Alfred W. Cortese, Jr., & Kathleen L. Blaner, Civil Justice Reform in America: A Question
of Parity with Our International Rivals, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 1, 45-46 (1992) (disclo-
sure inconsistent with our "fiercely adversarial" system and forces lawyer to do opponent's
work); Hughes, supra note 171, at 6 ("mandatory disclosure is anathema to the adversarial
process"). See also Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 507,
511 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (obligation to disclose damaging information in context
requiring application of considerable judgment "would place intolerable strain upon law-
yers' ethical duty to represent their clients and not to assist the opposing side. Requiring a
lawyer to make a judgment as to what information is 'relevant to disputed facts' plainly
requires him to use his professional skills in the service of the adversary."); Richard C.
Ferris II, Note, Friend or Foe?-The Proposed Amendments to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 2 REGENT U. L. REv. 39, 58 (1992) (citing comments on proposed Rule
26(a) by the Lawyers for Civil Justice). A further rationale for perceived inconsistency
with the work product privilege is that disclosure might reveal "a 'legal theory or line of
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an attorney "to disclose to the client's adversary what counsel has
learned during his investigation, good or bad, about the client's case"
and violates the duties of loyalty and zealous representation by requir-
ing an attorney to interpret what facts are relevant by disclosing ad-
verse information for the benefit of the opponent.295 A consequence
of such disclosure, they argue, is the damage to the attorney-client
privilege because once attorneys explain they must "root zealously
through their clients' files in search of damaging information simply to
turn it over to their opponent," clients will become "evasive and less
forthcoming. 296
These arguments, although vociferously and frequently made,
represent a visceral response based on some general, vague notion of
the way the system is supposed to work, rather than a carefully rea-
soned or substantiated analysis based on actual doctrines.297 Closer
examination of the arguments shows that the disclosure rule is incon-
sistent with few, if any, specific doctrines underpinning the rules gov-
erning litigation in the federal courts. To the extent that disclosure is
viewed by lawyers as inconsistent with their previously embraced no-
tions about attorney-client relationships and ethical conduct, these no-
tions themselves may be inconsistent with the formal rules or may be
notions that are simply no longer acceptable in the current litigation
climate. The controversy over disclosure has highlighted the fact that
lawyers have not had a consistent, universal professional vision of the
proper pretrial conduct in the civil litigation system for quite some
factual inquiry' that [an] opponent never considered" or might disclose a lawyer's mental
impressions. Id at 57; Cortese & Blaner, supra at 46.
295. Hughes, supra note 171, at 6 & n.22 (citation omitted); see, e.g., Laura A. Kaster
& Kenneth A. Wittenburg, Rulemakers Should Be Litigators, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 17, 1992, at
15.
296. Ferris, supra note 294, at 56-57 (citing comments of the Lawyers for Civil Justice).
See also Carol Campbell Cure, Practical Issues Concerning Arizona's New Rules of Civil
Procedure: A Defense Perspective, 25 AR=Z. ST. LJ. 55, 81-83 (1993) (disclosure violates
the duty of confidentiality under Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
But see, e.g., Mills, supra note 28, at 160-61 & n. 47 (disclosure obligation, like discovery
obligations, are imposed upon clients not lawyers; lawyers are limited by ethical rules like
Model Rule 3.3 and 3.4 from assisting client in providing false or misleading answers in
discovery); Campbell & Rea, supra note 124, at 242 (ethical duty under Model Rule 3.4 to
disclose information in discovery upon request). See generally infra notes 355-363 and ac-
companying text.
297. An example of this visceral response is the comment by one attorney about the
proposed disclosure rule: "I have a problem that I am supposed to give up what I am
supposed to disclose to my adversary, and that just really seems to be contrary to every-
thing that I have done in my practice." Bell et al., supra note 19, at 47 n.177 (quoting Nov.
21, 1991 statement of James S. Bianchi at Public Hearing of the Advisory Committee).
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time, and many of the formal and informal rules or doctrines that
compose the system have been in uneasy tension with each other.
(1) The "Adversary System"
It is difficult to respond to the claims that the disclosure rule is
inconsistent with our adversary system because there appears to be no
proffered definition of just what the adversary system, as envisioned
by the disclosure rule, entails. 298 Instead, this claim appears to reflect
lawyers' informal or workplace understanding of the adversary sys-
tem, ungrounded in the formal rules, and likely to be synonymous
with largely unbridled, zealous advocacy on behalf of clients. As one
commentator recently expressed it:
Lawyers, from their first day of law school, are socialized into a way
of thinking about the lawyer-client relationship that is rooted in an
adversary model. Lawyer culture cherishes the "you and me against
the world" ethic. This ethic holds that the lawyer owes virtually
complete and undivided loyalty to the client without regard to any
other values.
2 99
While a complete discussion of the adversary system and the role
of lawyers in that system is beyond the scope of this Article, 300 a brief
examination of the definition, purpose, and components of the civil
adversary system is necessary to properly evaluate the claims that dis-
298. Indeed, there may be little agreement within the legal profession as to what the
American adversary system is. See Stephen A. Salzburg, Lawyers, Clients, and the Adver-
sary System, 37 MERCER L. REV. 647, 649 (1986).
299. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate At-
torney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 187 (1993) [hereinafter Thornburg,
Sanctifying Secrecy]. See also Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 196, at 1134 (discussing
tendency to conflate adversary system with partisan advocacy). This phenomenon was ap-
parent in much of the negative response to the disclosure rule, which frequently quoted
well-worn, simplistic notions of partisan advocacy and homilies. See, e.g., Ferris, supra note
294, at 56 ("'[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at
all hazards and costs to other persons ... is his first and only duty' (quoting TRIAL OF
QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightengale ed., 1821))); Cure, supra note 296, at 58 n.9 (disclosure
will allow opponent to litigate "'on wits borrowed from the adversary"' (quoting Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring))); Cortese & Blaner, supra note
294, at 46 (disclosure inconsistent with our "fiercely adversarial" system and forces lawyer
to do opponent's work).
As many law school teachers of professional responsibility or civil procedure can at-
test, students take readily to the notion of adversarial zealotry and balk at limits imposed
on zeal, such as Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
300. For a thorough discussion of the issue, see, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN
JUsTIcE (1980); MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM
(1975); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); William H.
Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L.
REv. 29 [hereinafter Simon, Ideology of Advocacy].
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closure is anathema to it. Such an examination reveals that disclosure
is not inconsistent with the formal justifications and structure of the
modem adversary system; the possible exception is that the disclosure
required by Rule 26(a) adjusts parties' responsibilities for marshalling
evidence beyond that initiated by the 1938 Discovery Rules. In sharp
contrast, there is no doubt that even the minimal disclosure called for
in Rule 26(a)(1) is inconsistent with the informal adversary system to
which lawyers are seemingly so fervently attached.,
Two important preliminary points must be made. Many criticisms
of the disclosure rule seem to assume or imply that the adversarial
system, in and of itself, is intrinsically good. However, the adversarial
model or scheme is not an end in itself, but is a method of adjudicating
disputes that has been accepted based on its effectiveness in accom-
plishing certain goals. In other words, the adversarial system is a utili-
tarian or instrumental means and to evaluate its operation and the
relationship of the disclosure rule to the adversarial system, one must
start by identifying the system's purposes or goals.301 The principal
justification and ultimate purpose given for the adversary system in
civil litigation is that it is the best method for arriving at the truth.302
As one of the adversary system's champions describes it, the "system
proceeds on the assumption that the best way to ascertain the truth is
to present an impartial judge or jury with a confrontation between the
301. See Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy, supra note 299, at 188-89. On the other hand,
the readiness with which lawyers invoke the adversarial system and appear emotionally
attached to that system in the face of changes like Rule 26(a) disclosure suggests that ad-
versariness may have acquired an intrinsic, nonutilitarian value. See LUBAN, supra note
300, at 81 (reviewing arguments that adversariness is intrinsically good because the tradi-
tional lawyer-client relationship is a moral good and valued tradition). Cf. 24 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGrHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACriCE AND PROCEDURE,
§ 5472, at 77 (1986) ("non-instrumental justification for the privilege rests upon the belief
or intuition (or emotion, if you will) that it is wrong for courts to compel revelation of
attorney-client confidences"). The intrinsic value of adversariness may be related to laissez
faire notions such as "survival of the fittest."
302. See, ag., FREEDMAN, supra note 300, at 3 (adversary system determines truth
fairly and efficiently); Robert J. Kutak, The Adversary System and the Practice of Law, in
THE GOOD LAWYER 172, 174 (David Luban ed., 1983) (competitive marshalling and argu-
ment of facts is best for accuracy); David Luban, Calming the Hearse Horsa" A Philosophi-
cal Research Program for Legal Ethics, 40 MD. L. REv. 451, 468 (1981) (adversary system
justified as best method for achieving truth). This is not to suggest that the system as it
actually is employed may not have other purposes. See, ag., LUBAN, supra note 300, at 74-
81 (protects individual legal rights and ethically divides labor); Tommy Prud'homme, The
Need for Responsibility Within the Adversary System, 26 GoNz. L. Rav. 443, 44647 (1991)
(primary effect and purpose is generation of income for lawyers); Simon, Ideology of Ad-
vocacy, supra note 300, at 119-20 (promotes stability and the status quo). See also supra
note 42 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of discovery in facilitating arrival at
truth).
March 1995] DISCLOSURE UNDER RULE 26(a)
proponents of conflicting views, assigning each the task of marshalling
and presenting the evidence for its side in as thorough and persuasive
a way as possible. ' 30 3 Accordingly, discussion of arguments regarding
the propriety of disclosure must keep this ultimate goal of accuracy or
truth in mind.
The second preliminary, but crucial, point is that there is no such
thing as the adversary system with an inherently fixed structure that
has been handed down from the jurisprudential heavens. Instead,
what exists is our civil adversary system that must be seen as an evolv-
ing, complex, interrelated, and often contradictory amalgam of broad
structures, legal rules or doctrines, ethical rules, and informal rules
that come into play in the civil dispute resolution process. The impor-
tant issue for analysis here, then, is how Rule 26(a) disclosure interre-
lates with these components of our adversary system. This analysis
will focus on the major areas touted by critics as being adversely af-
fected by disclosure: the formal procedural doctrines such as the at-
torney-client privilege and work product protection that preserve
some aspects of the adversarial character of the discovery process, 3°4
and lawyers' ethical responsibilities. In considering the formal doc-
trines of practice, the informal practice rules or subculture will also be
discussed.
The fundamental elements of the adversary civil adjudicatory sys-
tem in the narrow sense are generally: (1) a neutral decision maker;
(2) individual parties responsible for marshalling and presenting the
evidence and attacking their opponent's case; and (3) formal rules,
including substantive, ethical, and procedural laws.305 The second ele-
ment is most often equated with partisan or zealous advocacy and is
often treated as being synonymous with the term adversary system,
particularly by lawyers. On the other hand, the third element, the for-
mal rules that constrain the "clash of one-sided representations," are
often virtually ignored in general descriptions of the system, except
303. Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1060,
1065 (1975); but see LUBAN, supra note 300, at 70-74 (critiquing ability of system based on
"clash of opposing points of view" to get at truth); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives
on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 596-99 (1985) (questioning assumption that truth
will "emerge from two advocates arguing as unfairly as possible on opposite sides").
304. See Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy, supra note 299, at 188 n.132 ("privilege per-
sists because lawyers at heart never gave up their fondness for the element of secrecy and
opportunity for surprise inherent in the prediscovery adversary system"); Cooper, supra
note 81, at 476-77 (work product seeks to reconcile "cooperative character of discovery
with the adversary character of trial").
305. See LUBAN, supra note 300, at 56-57; Freedman, supra note 303, at 1065; Maute,
supra note 80, at 13.
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perhaps by judges.306 The second element of parties marshalling their
evidence is obviously directly affected by disclosure. The extent to
which Rule 26(a) disclosure represents a radical alteration of the
methods of evidence development under our formal adversary system
requires consideration of the way that formal procedural rules, includ-
ing ethical rules, have actually defined the parties' duties in practice.
At least since adoption of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, we have not had a pure adversary system in which the parties
are strictly responsible for independent marshalling of evidence at
trial or are allowed to engage in unrestrained partisan advocacy. In-
stead, there have been a series of adjustments in the formal rules of
litigation largely made as it became clear that the adversary system,
particularly the tendencies of zealous advocacy, did not always meet
our goals regarding just outcomes and reasonable costs in dispute res-
olution.3 07 Moreover, there has been constant tension between these
formal procedural rules and the dynamics of partisan advocacy as it
306. LuiAN, supra note 300, at 57. See id. at 51, 57-58; Maute, supra note 80, at 16
("Folklore of lawyers' 'blind devotion' emphasizes zeal, with minimal focus on the legal
boundaries that circumscribe permissible conduct."); Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note
196, at 1084-88 (finding lawyers' discussions of ethics tend to be categorical with lawyer
libertarian (Code) model emphasizing zealous client advocacy versus judges' regulatory
approach to resolve substantive issues). See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 300, at 3-4; Craig
Enoch, Incivility in the Legal System? Maybe It's the Rules, 47 SMU L. REv. 199, 225-26
(1994). A similar phenomenon can be observed when lawyers invoke the principle of zeal.
ous advocacy under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility without mention of the
limitation "within the bounds of the law." MODEL CODE OF PROFSISO NAL REFnsONSmrL-
rry Canon 7 (1980) ("A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds
of the Law"). See infra note 354-377 and accompanying text.
307. See generally Cooper, supra note 81, at 476-78 (discussing discovery and adversary
system); Maute, supra note 80, at 14-16, 19-28 (focusing on reforms in response to percep-
tions of shortcomings, delays, inaccuracies arising from zealotry in 1983 amendments to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Model Rules of Professional Conduct). See supra
text accompanying notes 32-54. See also Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Profes-
sional Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN.
L. REv. 503, 550-51 (1985) ("American legal institutions rarely function in a fashion even
remotely approaching full adversary procedures."); Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note
196, at 1134-35 (libertarian partisan advocacy approach not widely accepted before the late
19th century). The limits of partisanship were noted well before the adoption of the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility:
[An] advocate plays his role well when zeal for his client's cause promotes a wise
and informed decision of the case [and] plays his role badly and trespasses against
the obligations of professional responsibility, when his desire to win leads him to
muddy the headwaters of decision, when, instead of lending a needed perspective
to the controversy he distorts and obscures its true nature.
Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Report of the Joint Conference on Professional Responsi-
bility, ABA I., Dec. 1958, at 1159, 1161.
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has been embraced informally by lawyers.3 08 With these points as
background, the relationship of Rule 26(a) disclosure to the specific
components or doctrines of our modern civil adversarial system be-
comes the focus of the analysis.
(2) Attorney-Client Privilege
Even a cursory review of the amended Rules of Civil Procedure
provides a quick response to any claim that Rule 26(a)(1) disclosure
of names of persons with knowledge and documents is inconsistent
with the basic principles of the attorney-client privilege. Although
there are significant jurisdictional variations in formulation, the attor-
ney-client privilege is generally recognized as an absolute protection
from testimonial disclosure of confidential communications between a
lawyer and a client relating to legal advice that do not have the pur-
pose of furthering a crime or fraud and that the client otherwise does
not impliedly or expressly waive. 30 9 On its face, amended Federal
Rule 26(a) does not impinge upon the privilege even for initial disclo-
sures. The operative provision of the federal discovery rules limiting
the scope of discovery to matters "not privileged" remains intact,310
and the Advisory Committee Notes accompanying the December
1993 amendments expressly acknowledge that a party may object to
the production of documents during Rule 26(a) disclosure on the basis
of "privilege or work product protection."'31 1 Thus, documents that
memorialize attorney-client communications relating to particular dis-
308. See, e.g., GLASER, supra note 33, at 12 (arguing that discovery undermines adver-
sary system); LUBAN, supra note 300, at 54, 180-85 (describing denunciation of discovery,
when introduced, as ending the advocate's role; describing controversy over confidentiality
provisions of Model Rules of Professional Conduct, during development, which were
viewed as infringing on advocacy); Maute, supra note 80, at 54 (describing controversy
over 1983 Rule 11 amendment because it sought drastic change in the over-adversarial
culture); see generally supra notes 32-125. Similar tensions are also reflected in the tradi-
tional model of a lawyer's ethical roles as a partisan advocate and as an "officer of the
court" with separate duties to the administration of justice. See generally Gilson, supra
note 124 at 874; Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 196, at 1084-89, 1133-35; David B.
Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARv. L. REv. 468, 471, 479 (1990). Indeed,
much of traditional legal literature has focused on dissatisfaction with adversarial zeal.
309. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS §§ 6.3.1, 6.4.10 (1986); 24
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 301, § 5473.
310. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
311. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 612,
631 (1993). The Advisory Committee's Note accompanying Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 26(a)(1)(C) regarding disclosure of documents supporting damage claims also ex-
pressly provides that the disclosure obligation only exists as to documents "not privileged."
Id. at 631. See also Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at 659; Thornburg, Sanctifying
Secrecy, supra note 299, at 195 n.154; Winter, supra note 18, at 270.
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puted facts would still be privileged if the conditions of the privilege
are met.
More importantly, however, the privilege would not be impli-
cated by disclosure because the attorney-client privilege applies to
communications but not to the underlying facts that were communi-
cated.3 12 The vast bulk of information covered by Rule 26(a)(1), such
as lists of persons with discoverable information relevant to disputed
facts pleaded with particularity and lists of documents relevant to dis-
puted facts pleaded with particularity, are likely to be factual and thus
outside the privilege.
Other rather significant aspects of the underlying dynamics of dis-
closure and the attorney-client privilege should not be overlooked.
Modern attorney-client privilege is primarily based not on the theory
that the privilege itself is intrinsically good, but that the privilege must
be available to allow the client to speak candidly and fully to the attor-
ney.313 A slightly more complete statement of this utilitarian or in-
strumental argument is that: (1) Clients require the services of
lawyers to navigate through the legal system by assisting them in de-
termining the legality of their conduct and in resolving disputes; (2) to
effectively serve clients in this regard, lawyers must have all relevant
facts, both favorable and unfavorable, from the client; (3) clients will
not supply their lawyers with complete information or will not use
lawyers at all unless the client-lawyer relationship is confidential; (4)
and to satisfy the utilitarian or instrumental argument, the benefits of
312. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,395-96 (1981); 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 301, § 5484, at 320; Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy, supra note 299, at 171-72.
The fact-communication distinction has proven to be one of the most difficult for law stu-
dents, lawyers, and even courts. In essence, clients may be asked to reveal what they know
about a particular matter, but may not be asked to reveal what they said to their lawyers
about the matter. There is a tendency for lawyers to overapply the privilege even to facts
communicated by a client to a lawyer or, particularly in the context of corporate attorneys,
facts a client employee learns from counsel. See e.g., 24 WRIG-rr & GRAHAM, supra note
301, § 5484, at 320-21. See generally Shapiro, supra note 57; supra notes 107-110 and ac-
companying text. Moreover, in some instances, the existence of the privilege has meant
that facts may end up not being disclosed, particularly when the opponent is unable to ask
the right question or is unaware of a particular witness, because the document or commu-
nication that would reveal the facts will remain privileged. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy,
supra note 299, at 172 n.69, 192-93; 24 WRiGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 301, § 5472, at 85.
313. WoLrnAM, supra note 309, § 6.3.2; 24 WiGrHT & GRAHAM, supra note 301,
§ 5472, at 78-86; Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy, supra note 299, at 160-61. But see Vincent
C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 ST.
JoHm's L. REv. 191,217-18 (1989) (discussing noninstrumental rationales raised in support
of privilege include client's right of privacy and autonomy and notions of attorney honor).
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increased client candor must outweigh its costs to society.314 Disclo-
sure critics have seemingly relied on a similar utilitarian argument to
support their attack. That is, client candor will be undermined by the
disclosure rule if adverse relevant facts must be revealed without a
proper request from the other side. Presumably this is what is meant
when some disclosure critics refer to interference or undermining of
the attorney-client relationship. 3
15
There are two major problems with the argument that disclosure
will reduce client candor. First, critics of the attorney-client privilege
have forcefully asserted that the utilitarian argument does not hold up
particularly well under scrutiny and that, in fact, the costs to society
do not justify the benefits posited.316 In particular, the factual as-
sumption that client candor depends on the existence of the privilege
lacks empirical support. After reviewing available studies on the is-
sue, one critic recently concluded that the available studies cast doubt
on the assumptions: "(1) that clients know about the privilege and
can, therefore, be influenced by it; (2) that clients are influenced by
the privilege in making disclosures; and (3) that clients, even with the
privilege, are honest with their lawyers. ''317
314. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 313, at 213-15; Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy,
supra note 299, at 161-62; Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REv.
351, 358 (1989); 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 301, § 5472, at 80-86.
315. See supra notes 294-296 and accompanying text. Although confidentiality is often
thought of as improving the attorney-client relationship by fostering dignity, loyalty, or
trust, the fundamental justification invariably seems to return to the notion that represen-
tation of the client's best interest is served by the knowledge a lawyer acquires through
confidentiality. See Zacharias, supra note 314, at 359 & n.33.
316. See, e.g., Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy, supra note 299 passim; Zacharias, supra
note 315, at 361-76; 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 301, § 5472, at 80-89; but see Ron-
ald J. Allen et al., A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product
Doctrine, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 359, 360 (1990) (finding benefit of privilege may justify cost
based on argument that cost of confidentiality to the other side in procuring information
ultimately serves utilitarian purpose of increased client candor and lawyer channeling of
litigation in "directions unanticipated by client").
317. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy, supra note 299, at 162-63. See also 24 WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 301, § 5472, at 84 (empirical evidence on effect of privilege not
"wholly favorable" to proponents); 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRA-AM,
JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 5422.1, at 211 (1994 Supp.) (finding instru-
mental argument rests on incomplete and unprovable empirical assumptions); Alexander,
supra note 313, at 276-82 (based on survey of corporate officers, corporate attorneys, and
outside lawyers, study results suggested that lawyers have more belief in effect of privilege
than do clients and that corporate counsel were less likely than outside counsel to believe
that privilege is needed to obtain candor); Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer
and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71
YALE L.J. 1226, 1232 (1962) (finding misunderstanding or unawareness of attorney-client
privilege in study and that clients would rather speak to a lawyer without the privilege than
to a marriage counselor). Another study had similar findings: client misunderstanding or
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The second major problem is that, as noted above, even as formu-
lated under the utilitarian argument, the privilege does not apply to
facts known by the client, regardless of whether those facts have been
embedded in a communication between the lawyer and the client.
The cost-benefit analysis that justifies confidentiality of communica-
tions would not justify the social cost that would be accompanied by a
loss of access to facts generally.318 Thus, any general claim for en-
couraging client candor as to facts is quite weak overall.
It might be argued that there was more of an inducement for cli-
ent candor under the attorney-client privilege before the disclosure
amendment because of the difference in the likelihood that adverse
facts would be disclosed under discovery in comparison to the re-
quired disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1). Hypothetically, a lawyer com-
municating with a client about future litigation before the disclosure
amendment would have told the client: "The privilege protects our
communications, and I need to know all of the facts in order to best
represent you. Those facts, including the harmful facts, will not be
disclosed unless you authorize it or if the opponent asks for them
through discovery, such as in an interrogatory or during deposition
questioning. It is also possible that the opponent will never ask for a
particular fact or that we will be able to finesse a request by objecting
to a particular discovery request. '319 Now under disclosure the
message is the same as to the need for candor, but the lawyer must
also tell the client that certain information, such as names of witnesses
you know who are likely to have relevant facts and the existence of
relevant documents, must be disclosed without a request from an op-
ponent. Of course, the lawyer will also probably tell the client: "I will
be making the determination of what is relevant. '320 Under disclo-
sure a client might be less likely to be candid as to what are perceived
lack of awareness of privilege scope, disclosure decisions based on need for legal assistance
rather than the existence of a privilege, majority of lawyers believed that they would get
about the same information from clients regardless of whether clients were told about con-
fidentiality and about 85% believed it would be enough for adequate representation, and
surveyed clients never told of confidentiality were about as likely to withhold information
as those told-only about 11% of both groups admitted not disclosing information to attor-
neys. Zacharias, supra note 314, at 383-86. See also Empirical Research Project, Corporate
Legal Ethics-An Empirical Study: The Model Rules, The Code of Professional Responsi-
bility, and Counsel's Continuing Struggle Between Theory and Practice, 8 J. CORP. L. 601,
622-23 (1983) (attorneys raised confidentiality issues more than twice as often in interview-
ing corporate employees (69.3%) than did the employees being interviewed (28.8%)).
318. See e.g., 24 WmGrrI & GRAHAM, supra note 301, § 5472, at 85.
319. See, e.g., Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy, supra note 299, at 172.
320. This arguably is the equivalent of the function performed by the lawyer in deter-
mining whether a particular fact is encompassed within a discovery request.
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as unfavorable facts because of the increased likelihood of their dis-
closure. As the empirical evidence shows, however, it seems unlikely
that clients, who generally seem less concerned with confidentiality
than the critics assume, will make this further, finer distinction in com-
municating with their lawyers. Moreover, an argument of decreased
candor ignores the primary motivation for individuals and corpora-
tions to go to lawyers-that they need reliable legal advice and recog-
nize that advice based on false assumptions may not be reliable. 321
Furthermore, it is slightly perverse to argue that a rule should be
rejected because it requires honest behavior from parties-merely the
disclosure of relevant facts, whether favorable or unfavorable. 322 The
disclosure obligation under Rule 26(a) is imposed on the client and is
intended to serve important public interests related to efficiently
resolving civil disputes accurately. Even employing the instrumental
or utilitarian justifications used to support the attorney-client privi-
lege, it is unpersuasive to argue that a rational cost-benefit analysis
that includes all of the costs, not only to the client but to the opposing
party and to the legal system itself, would support nondisclosure sim-
ply to obtain a very slight increase in client candor.
323
321. See Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy, supra note 299, at 175; Simon, Ethical Discre-
tion, supra note 196, at 1142-43 (arguing sufficient incentives exist to disclose adverse infor-
mation to lawyers without confidentiality); see also Zacharias, supra note 314, at 391-96. In
a survey of client/lay person responses to disclosure in hypotheticals in which disclosure
might work against client interests, clients overwhelmingly thought the lawyer should dis-
close confidential information in certain circumstances and the vast majority indicated that
disclosure would not make them less willing to consult an attorney. Interestingly, among
the hypotheticals were some that involved information that would be required to be dis-
closed under Rule 26(a), but which would be confidential under traditional ethical rules,
including the somewhat notorious example from Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d
704 (Minn. 1962), in which defendant's doctor discovered during an examination of the
plaintiff in a civil suit arising out of an accident that the plaintiff had a previously undiag-
nosed aneurism that was probably caused by the accident and would probably be fatal
unless disclosed. More than 91% of the clients surveyed indicated that the information
should be disclosed by the lawyer. See Zacharias supra note 314, at 395, 409.
322. Cf. 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 301, § 5472, at 83 ("the honest client has
nothing to fear from a disclosure of the facts, that only the client bent on chicanery would
withhold facts that might unmask his plot"). The typical utilitarian response to this point
has been that the inducement of disclosure, at least to the lawyer, is necessary so that the
lawyer can influence the client to ultimately not be dishonest. See id.; Thornburg, Sancti-
fying Secrecy, supra note 299, at 175-77. One problem with this response is that there is
little support for the argument that the lawyer is effective in influencing improper client
conduct because of the lawyer's dependence on satisfying the client and the client's eco-
nomic incentives. Id.; see also Zacharias, supra note 314, at 369-70, 389 (preventing client
misconduct rationale rarely comes into play).
323. Cf. 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 301, § 5472, at 84-86 (arguing that cost-
benefit analysis must include consideration of "the loss of public respect for and confi-
dence in the administration of justice" that "may well cost more than any trivial accounting
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Lawyers are in no position to argue that because of the existence
of the disclosure obligations, they will stop advising clients to be can-
did with them. Although the disclosure obligation is directly imposed
upon the party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a), the law-
yer becomes involved in disclosures in at least two ways: the determi-
nation of relevance to disputed facts pleaded with particularity clearly
calls for the kind of legal analysis for which the client employs the
lawyer; and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g), the lawyer
must certify that to the best of the lawyer's "knowledge, information,
and belief, formed after a reasonable inquiry," the disclosure being
made by the client "is complete and correct as of the time it is
made."324 The lawyer tempted to tell the client to keep the lawyer in
the dark may violate several legal and ethical duties. Such action
places the lawyer in direct violation of Rule 26(g)'s reasonable inquiry
requirement, thus potentially subjecting the lawyer and client to a
range of sanctions. 325 Moreover, such action by the lawyer would vio-
late the lawyer's duties of competence and diligence in representation
of the client generally, which must be viewed as entailing an obliga-
tion of rendering accurate, candid legal advice based on as complete
an investigation as is reasonably possible.3 26 Lawyers cannot close
their eyes and ears to unfavorable facts that might be obtained from
clients, because these unfavorable facts are necessary for lawyers to
provide accurate and intelligent legal advice on a panoply of issues,
including the likelihood of success on the merits, settlement advisabil-
ity, and litigation strategy. "Unless the client has sole access to the
bad facts, there is always a danger that the opponent will, on her own,
discover those bad facts and use them at trial. These bad facts can be
of evidence lost and gained as a consequence of the privilege"); Thornburg, Sanctifying
Secrecy, supra note 299, at 191-205 (citing adverse cost effects of privilege, including inap-
propriate risk shifting, "truthgarbling," and other societal costs such as increased litigation
costs and inaccurate outcomes).
324. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(g)(1).
325. Sanctions include the payment of an opponent's costs and attorneys fees and new
sanctions directly tailored to nondisclosure, such as preclusion of the use of evidence, pre-
clusion from being able to offer any evidence on an issue for which nondisclosure occurred,
and having the jury told about the nondisclosure. See FED. R. C-v. P. 26(g)(3), 37(a)(2),
37(c).
326. See generally MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.1 (1983) (Coin-
petene--"A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent repre-
sentation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for representation"); Rule 2.1 cint. ("A client is entitled to straightforward ad-
vice expressing the lawyer's honest assessment," even if it involves "unpleasant facts and
alternatives."). Cf. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy, supra note 299, at 178-81.
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minimized or manipulated effectively only to the extent that the [law-
yer] is aware of them. '327
Thus, the assertion that the disclosure rule is inconsistent with the
attorney-client privilege or will damage the attorney-client relation-
ship is not well grounded. The attorney-client privilege is formally
preserved in the new rules. Moreover, the rules seem to cause little, if
any, change in important aspects of the attorney-client relationship.
This is particularly true with regard to candor of communications and
the obligations of the attorney to the client relating to the new duty of
clients to reveal relevant facts without awaiting a discovery request.
For the ethical attorney and the honest client, there should be no ad-
verse effect.
(3) Work Product Protection
Much of the analysis of the disclosure rule and the work product
doctrine parallels the foregoing discussion of the attorney-client privi-
lege. The work product doctrine arguably was created to preserve the
essential adversarial nature of civil litigation in the face of the other-
wise cooperative, open nature of the discovery process.32 In addition
to maintaining the potential for spontaneity or surprise at trial, the
work product doctrine appears to rest on the premise that there is
something inherently and fundamentally valuable in preserving an ad-
versarial information gathering process.329 Nevertheless, it must be
327. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy, supra note 299, at 181. As noted previously, the
sanctions provisions of the new disclosure rules increase the potential downside of failing
to disclose relevant facts. Judge Ralph Winter poignantly noted, in response to the asser-
tion that disclosure will disrupt the attorney-client relationship, that such an argument "re-
flects the notion that the attorney-client relationship is enhanced by charging substantial
sums to a client for the fruitless defense of a request for discovery resulting in a direct
order that specified matters be disclosed. Indeed, the very argument-that formal and
costly but useless proceedings are necessary-is itself an admission that wasteful discovery
routinely occurs." Winter, supra note 18, at 271.
328. See Cooper, supra note 81, at 476-77; Elizabeth Thornburg, Rethinking Work
Product, 77 VA. L. REv. 1515, 1516 (1991) [hereinafter Thornburg, Rethinking Work Prod-
uct]. The discovery process itself, to the extent that it requires a specifically framed request
or question subject to the opponent's objections and interpretations, is procedurally adver-
sary in nature rather than a cooperative sharing system in which each side shares all. The
disclosure provision in Federal Rule 26(a) is only a limited exception to this general adver-
sary process. See Cooper, supra note 81, at 477-78. Yet, it may be the fact that disclosure is
largely not an adversarial process that most contributes to the resistance it has encoun-
tered, rather than the fact that in some way the rule requires disclosure of information that
is not otherwise required to be disclosed on request.
329. See Cooper, supra note 81, at 476-77; Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, supra
note 328, at 1525; Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring). It
has been argued that the maintenance of work product in the adversary system rests on the
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remembered that the work product doctrine is relatively narrow in
scope. While the attorney-client privilege absolutely protects from
disclosure communications falling within its boundaries, work product
protection under the Federal Rules is a qualified protection from an
opponent's discovery for the lawyer's processes of preparation for liti-
gation and the actual materials prepared by the lawyer and the law-
yer's agents.330 The primary utilitarian justification for work product
protection broadly stated is that "lawyers will better serve their clients
and the ends of justice when they can operate in a 'zone of privacy,"'
and more specifically, that work product protection is needed to en-
courage proper lawyer preparation of the client's case.3 31
As with the attorney-client privilege, Rule 26(a) on its face does
not directly affect, the work product protection because the rule specif-
ically preserves the protections available for trial preparation materi-
als that were already available under traditional discovery.332
Moreover, contrary to the suggestion of disclosure critics,333 the fact
erroneous assumption that secrecy and surprise served by the doctrine are essential to the
sound functioning of the adversary system and on an overemphasis 'on competition and
winning. D. Christopher Wells, The Attorney Work Product Doctrine and Carryover Im-
munity: An Assessment of Their Justifications, 47 U. Prrr. L. Rv. 675, 685, 701-02 (1986).
330. See e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Hickman, 329 U.S. 495; Alexander, supra note
313, at 214-15; Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, supra note 328, at 1522. Among the
types of information covered by "ordinary" work product are witness statements, intraof-
flee memoranda, investigative reports, data collections, surveys, and other tingible things
and documents prepared in anticipation of litigation. Such information may be obtained
by an opposing party only on a showing of "substantial need" and "undue hardship" in
obtaining the "substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." A second category
of work product materials, referred to as "opinion" work product, is entitled to a higher,
but as yet precisely undefined level of protection and includes a lawyer's "mental impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Alexander, supra
note 313, at 214-15 & n.66; Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, supra note 328, at 1522-
23.
331. Wells, supra note 329, at 681-885. See, eg., Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511 ("Ineffi-
ciency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice
and the preparation of cases for trial" if an opponent had ready access to trial preparation
materials); Alexander, supra note 313, at 214-15; Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product,
supra note 328, at 1524-30. For a critical evaluation of the various justifications for the
work product doctrine, including claims that its abrogation would deter attorneys from
writing down litigation materials, encourage sharp practices (e.g., evasion, dirty tricks, de-
lay), require an attorney to become a witness, invade proprietary attorney interests, and
harm lawyer morale, see, eg., Edward H. Cooper, Work Product of the Rulemakers, 53
Mn¢. L. Rnv. 1269, 1274-82 (1969); Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, supra note 328,
at 1524-83; Wells, supra note 329, at 681-703.
332. See, eg., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at 659;
Winter, supra note 18, at 270.
333. See eg., Hughes, supra note 171, at 6 n.22 (asserting mandatory disclosure may
violate the work product doctrine because requirements call upon attorney to interpret his
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that a lawyer in the process of making mandatory disclosures must
merely evaluate or interpret the opponent's claim neither violates the
work product doctrine nor creates a change in discovery practice.
Lawyers invariably must engage in substantial evaluation of opposing
parties' claims or defenses in the course of representation and must
engage in a probing factual investigation into the basis for those
claims. It is axiomatic that the work product doctrine, similar to the
attorney-client privilege, does not shield from disclosure the facts,
such as the names of persons with relevant information about the case
or the identification of relevant documents, that are gathered by the
lawyer or the client in the course of that preparation. 334 The disclo-
sure rule merely alters the necessity of generating traditional discov-
ery requests to elicit those very basic facts. While this may ultimately
be a profound change, it is not one that directly implicates the work
product protection.
Some critics maintain that the disclosure rule violates the work
product doctrine because, by requiring the party to identify relevant
documents or persons with relevant knowledge, it indirectly results in
revelation of an attorneys' mental impressions, opinions or legal theo-
ries.335 This argument seems to be based on an overly expansive view
of what is protected by the federal work product protection. Again,
the disclosure duty falls on the client in the first instance based on the
matters within the client's knowledge that are relevant to disputed
facts pleaded with particularity. While a client must also generally dis-
close information that would be available to the client through the
attorney, thus potentially implicating matters involving an attorney's
work product, the primary source of the factual information is the cli-
ent, and that information is of a very limited factual nature-knowl-
edge of persons and documents relevant to facts pleaded with
particularity. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the extent of disclo-
or her adversary's claim to comply with the mandatory disclosure requirements); supra
notes 294-286 and accompanying text.
334. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 331, at 1272, 1298, 1301 (discovery contemplates mu-
tual knowledge of relevant facts gathered by both parties; "party clearly cannot refuse to
answer interrogatories on the ground that the information sought is solely within the
knowledge of his attorney"); Mills, supra note 28, at 160-63; Schwarzer, In Defense, supra
note 166, at 659-60; see also Hickman, 329 U.S. at 504, 507. As Professor Cooper explains,
"Free fact discovery has been allowed because the extent of the losses resulting from un-
limited discovery.., remain a matter of conjecture, while the discovery system itself repre-
sents a considered judgment, based on long experience, that closing off such inquiry results
in unilateral ignorance-often mutual unilateral ignorance of different areas of fact-and
inadequate trial preparation." Cooper, supra note 331, at 1282.
335. See, e.g., Cure, supra note 296, at 75-76; Ferris, supra note 294, at 57.
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sure of the attorney's mental impressions or theories in this context
will be any greater than the indirect revelation that occurs under tradi-
tional litigation practices in response to discovery requests. For exam-
ple, such revelation occurs in discovery when an attorney provides
factual information that was gathered during that attorney's investiga-
tions, or when the attorney makes an objection based on the scope of
discovery, or when an attorney submits arguments in support of a mo-
tion for a protective order or responds to contention interrogato-
ries.336 On the other hand, the type of opinion work product that is
clearly intended to be within the scope of the protection is that which
would specifically reveal an attorney's mental impressions, such as an
intraoffice memorandum discussing a case or summarizing and evalu-
ating recollections from oral witness interviews.337
Critics of the disclosure rule also have raised the concern that
disclosure will be inconsistent with the primary purpose of the work
product doctrine, encouraging thorough attorney preparation of cases,
and therefore negatively affecting the attorney-client relationship. 338
Essentially, the assumption is that "[o]perating in the zone of privacy,
the lawyer will exercise greater efforts and freedom in pursuing the
client's interest without the danger of the adversary benefitting from
those efforts." 339 The analysis here is reminiscent of the objections to
336. See generally Cooper, supra note 331, at 1284-86, 1305-06 (finding that while
courts will not allow a single interrogatory request for all information one side has that
bears on a case, courts will allow a request for facts bearing on identified specific issues).
337. See FED. R. Cv. P. 26(b)(3). Rule 26(b)(3) makes clear that the mental impres-
sions that are entitled to protection are those that are contained in documents and tangible
things, such as witness statements that are prepared in anticipation of litigation, and pre-
sumably not the mere fact that a party or party's attorney may have knowledge of a poten-
tial witness or document relevant to some disputed fact in a pleading. See also Thornburg,
Rethinking Work Product, supra note 328, at 1521-23 (clarifying opinion work product to
include lawyer notes or memoranda reflecting witness statements, opinions on settlement
value of case, trial strategy, lists of trial witnesses to be called and expected testimony, lists
of trial exhibits to be offered at trial); but see Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d
1323 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying work product to preclude plaintiff from asking defendant's
in-house counsel to reveal documents that had been reviewed in responding to request for
documents relevant to the litigation).
338. See e.g., Hughes, supra note 171, at 7 (arguing disclosure "would reward the de-
linquent advocate rather than the well prepared").
339. Wells, supra note 329, at 683. A more complete statement of the assumptions
underlying this rationale are that (1) if lawyers have access to their opponents' case prepa-
ration they will not have-to incur the costs of case preparation and may also gain access to
information that they would not have otherwise been able to obtain on their own either
because of lack of resources or competence and (2) the lawyer preparing a case will recog-
nize this and have an incentive to undertake a less thorough case preparation and to not
develop information that may be used adversely by an opponent. The result is poorly
prepared counsel who have a badly served client and an adversarial system that cannot
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disclosure based on the attorney-client privilege, except that the focus
here is on predictions of the professional behavior of attorneys in
gathering information rather than on client candor. Probably even
more than in the area of attorney-client privilege, the justifications for
the work product protection have come under fire. Convincing argu-
ments have been offered on why the work product protection is un-
likely to contribute significantly to attorney preparation, and why it
simply cannot be justified, considering the cost to the judicial system
of lost information and the increased cost of resolving disputes.340
First, the very contours of the work product doctrine, as traditionally
applied, are not consistent with the thorough preparation rationale. A
substantial part of the incentive for more thorough preparation is the
notion of privacy of preparations, yet, as noted above, a large part of
the information obtained through an attorneys' investigations-both
favorable and unfavorable factual information-are outside the pro-
tection altogether.341 Thus, while the protection traditionally might
have precluded asking an opposing party to produce notes of its meet-
ings with potential witnesses, if the opposing party asks a party in the
course of a deposition or in interrogatories to name individuals who
have knowledge regarding specific facts or to identify documents in
the party's possession relating to those facts, the information would
have to be provided.
Moreover, adequate incentives, if not compelling demands, for
thorough preparation of cases come from numerous other sources,
pressures, and doctrines. As one commentator has stated: "[W]ork
product immunity cannot provide an incentive for the litigant to go
perform its functions because of unretrieved facts. Id. at 684-85; Cooper, supra note 331, at
1279-82; Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, supra note 328, at 1527.
340. See, e.g., Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, supra note 328, at 1582-83; Eliza-
beth G. Thornburg, Work Product Rejected- A Reply to Professor Allen, 78 VA. L. REv.
957, 957 (1992) [hereinafter Thornburg, Work Product Rejected]; Wells, supra note 329, at
684-703. But see Allen et al., supra note 316, at 383-85 (finding work product justified by
economic analysis); Ronald J. Allen, Work Product Revisited: A Comment on Rethinking
Work Product, 78 VA. L. REv. 949 (1992) (arguing work product increases attorney investi-
gation at the margin based on economic analysis).
341. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 331, at 1282, 1301-02; Thornburg, Work Product Re-
jected, supra note 340, at 959; Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, supra note 328, at
1528. In addition, there are other uncertainties at the time of pretrial investigations and
preparations that make it hard to predict in advance whether the protection will apply at a
later time, including the specific factual circumstances of the case, whether the tangible
product of a particular investigation was done "in anticipation of litigation," whether the
protection has been waived, and whether the opponent will demonstrate "substantial need
and undue hardship" so as to justify obtaining work product material. Thornburg, Rethink-
ing Work Product, supra note 328, at 1528-29; Thornburg, Work Product Rejected, supra
note 340, at 958-59.
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forward with a totally thorough investigation into both helpful and
harmful facts any more than the adversary system itself can encourage
such investigation. '342 Informal, but nevertheless powerful pressures,
for thorough preparation-arise from the lawyer's inherent motives to
win, or at least maximize the results of, civil litigation for the client;
these motives are fueled by a lawyer's financial considerations, con-
cepts of self-esteem, and reputation with peers or future clients. It can
be assumed that over the long term, lawyers who conduct their own
thorough preparation will be more successful than lawyers who rely
on their opponent's preparation or avoid preparation because of fear
that opponents will gain access to unfavorable facts through their
preparationY43 Thorough preparation is reinforced by the different
measures of success in a case: winning at trial; recognizing early on in
the case, before excessive litigation costs are incurred, that settlement
is appropriate; or being better prepared than one's opponent.344 Pres-
sures for thorough preparation can also be expected to come from
clients directly, particularly sophisticated or institutional clients, and
from the financial structures of law firms that may, as a result of
hourly billing practices, encourage pretrial discovery activities and
investigation.345
Thorough preparation is not only encouraged by the informal in-
centives surrounding civil litigation, but is virtually demanded by the
formal rules structures. For example, provisions of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct directly address the ethical obligation of attorneys to adequately
prepare cases.346 Adequate inquiry and investigation, including inves-
tigation of unfavorable facts, are required independently by the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 26(g) requires that all discovery
requests and responses to discovery requests be based on a "reason-
342. Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, supra note 328, at 1528.
343. Cooper, supra note 331, at 1280; Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, supra note
328, at 1527-28; Thornburg, Work Product Rejected, supra note 340, at 958-61; Wells, supra
note 329, at 686-89.
344. See Cooper, supra note 331, at 1280-81; Wells, supra note 329, at 686-87 & n.47.
345. Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, supra note 328, at 1529-30; Wells, supra
note 329, at 688.
346. Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, supra note 328, at 1530; Wells, supra note
329, at 688; Wolfson, supra note 32, at 60-61. See e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPoNsm.rry DR 6-101(A)(2) (1980) ("lawyer shall not.. . , [h]andle a legal matter
without preparation adequate in the circumstances"); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CoNDucr Rule 1.1 (1983) ("Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.").
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able inquiry" into the facts and circumstances of the case.3 47 Rule 11
of the Federal Rules requires an even broader duty of attorney in-
quiry and encourages thorough preparation. Rule 11 essentially pro-
vides that before an attorney presents or advocates a position to the
court, the attorney must have undertaken a reasonable inquiry into
the facts and evidence of the case.348
Given that work product does not protect basic factual informa-
tion in the possession of the party or the party's attorney and that
overwhelming incentives or pressures generally exist for thorough at-
torney preparation, there is no reason to expect that work product
practice and attorney preparation will change significantly under the
disclosure obligation merely to disclose the names of persons with rel-
evant information and to identify relevant documents.349 The only
question would seem to be whether less adequate preparation can be
expected to occur under the disclosure rule because the disclosure ob-
ligation is automatic, whereas in traditional discovery practice the
duty to reveal factual information depends on an opposing party ask-
ing the right question.350 The automatic nature of disclosure should
make little difference. It seems highly doubtful that lawyers are in a
position at the time they must begin case preparation to cut back on
the preparation in which they will engage based on the fact that a
disclosure obligation exists. As one commentator recently noted in
connection with her argument that the work product privilege should
be eliminated altogether, demand for trial preparation is relatively in-
elastic because the bulk of it is like the basic bread that people must
have to survive, regardless of the cost increases (i.e., adverse impacts)
that might occur.351 While the automatic nature of the duty to dis-
347. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g).
348. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. While the amended rule no longer applies to discovery, it
now applies to any other presentations to the court, including by signing, filing, submitting,
or later advocating, a "pleading, written motion, or other paper," and requires that an
attorney have specifically engaged in an "inquiry reasonable under the circumstances" into
whether the "factual contentions have evidentiary support" and the "denial of factual con-
tentions are warranted on the evidence." l
349. See, e.g., Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at 659; Wolfson, supra note 32, at
61-62; see also Janet Napolitano, Showing Your Cards: Litigating in a Mandatory Disclo-
sure Jurisdiction, LMG., Winter 1994, at 26, 28-29 (discussing Arizona disclosure rule,
under which attorneys must still attempt to get as much information as possible from cli-
ents in order to best represent them).
350. The argument would be that a lawyer who knows that the direct result of prepara-
tion will be disclosure of facts will be less thorough than a lawyer who knows that another
party must first propose a proper discovery request that may be resisted.
351. See Thornburg, Work Product Rejected, supra note 340, at 961. The cost to which
Thornburg was referring was that resulting from loss of work product immunity and the
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close does increase the likelihood that adverse facts obtained through
pretrial investigation will be disclosed to an opponent, the pressures
on a lawyer to investigate the case thoroughly from the beginning re-
main extremely powerful. The addition of new certification and inves-
tigation requirements and sanctions against both the client and the
attorney352 also may make any difference in the incentive to prepare
under disclosure, as compared to under the prior discovery system,
insignificant.
In summary, Rule 26(a)(1) is neither inconsistent with the formal
operation of the work product doctrine, nor inimical to its primary
purpose of encouraging attorney preparation. The protection is avail-
able to the same extent as it has been under traditional discovery. The
incentives that are responsible for lawyer preparation remain fully op-
erative even under disclosure. A substantial part of pretrial investiga-
tion would normally be expected to occur early in the case and prior
to the filing of pleading or other motions,353 and well before disclo-
sures would be required under Rule 26(a) and (f). Thorough investi-
gation would appear critical for the parties and counsel to meet their
reasonable inquiry duties, to avoid making frivolous claims and de-
fenses, and for lawyers to best represent their clients' interests by pro-
viding sound advice, particularly with regard to early settlement
discussions.
(4) Inconsistency with Ethical Rules
Conspicuously absent from most of the claims that Rule 26(a)
disclosure is inconsistent with lawyers' ethical duties is specific discus-
sion of exactly what those ethical duties entail and from what source
they are derived. Instead, critics simply broadly assert that having to
disclose information to an opponent, without a specific discovery re-
quest and based on determinations of relevance by the disclosing
party's attorney, violates duties of client loyalty and zealous represen-
tation.35 4 The disclosure opponents' ethical arguments inadvertently
resulting access by an opponent to information, but the analogy seems appropriately ap-
plied to trial preparation and disclosure.
352. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g), 37(c); supra notes 268-281 and accompanying text. The
fact that disclosure does not displace traditional discovery and that there is a supplemental
disclosure duty under Rule 26(e) would also seem to provide additional pressures to con-
tinue with thorough attorney preparation.
353. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (requiring reasonable inquiry before any presentations to
court including pleading and motions).
354. See supra notes 294-297 and accompanying text. But see Campbell & Rea, supra
note 124, at 242-45; Cure, supra note 296, at 81-86.
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draw attention to some of the fundamental problems already plaguing
the legal profession. Substantial ambiguity or internal conflict in the
formal ethical rules has arguably fed not only lawyer misunderstand-
ing of obligations, but also the development of an informal set of ethi-
cal norms that may be inconsistent with the formal rules. 355
The disciplinary codes and ethical rules that govern lawyer prac-
tice, as formulated in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
and the earlier ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility,356
attempt to regulate, or at least provide guidance in, two major areas of
lawyer duty and potential conflict: (1) the lawyer's duty to the client
as an advocate, which includes the duties of loyalty and confidential-
ity, and (2) the lawyer's duty as an officer of the court, which requires
commitment to the fair and efficient administration of justice and in-
cludes the duties of candor, honesty, and obeyance of law in dealing
with the court and with third parties.357 Relatively few of the provi-
sions of the ethical rules directly address, much less resolve, the litiga-
tion conduct issues implicated by the disclosure rule. Indeed, the
relevant ethical rules either expressly or impliedly defer to the law
outside the rules of ethics themselves-the rules of substantive law
and civil and criminal procedure-for definition of lawyers' legal du-
ties in litigation.358 For example, under the Model Code, zealous rep-
resentation of the client must remain "[w]ithin the [b]ounds of the
[law,'' 359 a lawyer must not "intentionally [flail to seek the lawful
355. See Schneyer, supra note 21, at 102 (finding even within the disciplinary codes are
"fragmentary and often incompatible conceptions of the lawyers' role vying for domi-
nance" such as the lawyer as partisan, as officer of the court, as counselor, as servant of the
public interest); Wilkins, supra note 308, at 480-81, 499-503 (arguing indeterminacy and
ambiguity in the ethical rules allow exploitation by lawyers committed to partisanship).
356. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983); MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980). For pragmatic reasons, the discussion focuses here on
the Model Rules and the Model Code provisions promulgated by the ABA House of Dele-
gates, even though the ethical rules of individual states may vary substantially from those
rules. As of late 1993, about 38 states and the District of Columbia had adopted at least
significant portions of the Model Rules, and the remaining states (with the exception of
California) have ethical rules based largely on the Model Code. See STEPHEN GILLERS &
Roy D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS X-Xi (1994).
For a fascinating and informative review of the process by which disciplinary canons and
codes, including the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, were developed, see
Schneyer, supra note 21, at 95.
357. See generally Enoch, supra note 306, at 210-13 (discussing the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct and lawyers' roles as advocates and officers of the court); Wilkins, supra
note 308, at 470-71; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Preamble (1983).
358. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1263
(1991); Wilkins, supra note 308, at 471-74.
359. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 & DR 7-102 (1980).
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objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted
by law,"360 claims and defenses advanced must be warranted by ex-
isting law, and a lawyer cannot "[c]onceal or knowingly fail to disclose
that which he is required by law to reveal." 361 Similarly, under the
Model Rules, claims and defenses must have a basis that is "not frivo-
lous" under the law,362 and lawyers must not "unlawfully obstruct an-
other party's access to evidence," "knowingly disobey an obligation
under the rules of a tribunal," or, "in pretrial procedure, make a frivo-
lous discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to
comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing
party."363
Rule 26(a) on disclosure is part of the law establishing the legal
boundary for attorney litigation conduct, just as other prior limiting
rules of procedure, such as Rule 11 and the discovery rules, generally
create obligations that restrain zealous representation. Thus, the
short answer to the arguments by the critics of disclosure regarding
the purported violation of ethical duties to the client is simply that
attorneys' zealotry has always been ethically subject to legal limita-
tions and obligations, including obligations to reveal to an opposing
party adverse information. 364 While true, this does not explain why so
many lawyers believe that disclosure of facts under a procedural law
violates an ethical duty or is somehow fundamentally different from
prior legal duties to disclose information during discovery. The an-
swer to these questions relates substantially to the tradition of zealous
advocacy and the critical role that the language of ethical rules has
played in lawyers' interpretations or perceptions of their roles and the
legal boundaries that constrain lawyers' advocacy.
360. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1) (1980).
361. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(2)-(3) (1980). See
also id. DR 7-109(A) ("lawyer shall not suppress any evidence that he or his client has a
legal obligation to reveal").
362. MODEL RutLs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 3.1 (1983).
363. MODEL Rur.s OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 3A(a), (c), (d) (1983).
364. See; eg., Alexander, supra note 186, at 656 & n.37 (arguing disclosure of informa-
tion under Rule 26(a) violates ethical duties to clients no more than do obligations under
discovery rules generally); Campbell & Rea, supra note 124, at 246 (discussing Arizona
civil procedure disclosure rule incorporated as legal duty under Arizona version of Model
Rule 3A(d)); Enoch, supra note 306, at 212-13 (finding rule limitations on zealotry such as
Rule 11 require "that a lawyer's duty to clients cannot override his or her obligation to the
justice system"); Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at 659 & n.17 (arguing claims of
violation of ethical duties are baseless and reflect a "blind eye to a lawyer's obligations to
the court"); Wolfson, supra note 32, at 61 (stating that ethical prohibition against damaging




Because the legal boundaries and duties are at times unclear, the
ethical rules (particularly provisions of the Model Code) have at-
tempted to provide guidance to lawyers in resolving potential conflicts
of duties involving the courts and clients. For example, the Model
Code specifically advises a lawyer that when "serving as an advocate,
a lawyer should resolve in favor of his client doubts as to the bounds
of the law."'365 Commentators contend that the tradition of zealous
advocacy in conjunction with this and other language of the Code that
restricts lawyers only to "good faith" or "nonfrivolous" positions, has
produced a model of lawyer conduct in which any "arguably legal"
position may be maintained by a lawyer with the lawyers interpreting
what is arguably legal from the perspective that maximally serves the
client's interests.366 The disciplinary codes, formulated largely by the
trial bar, "give primacy to the advocate's role and reducing dissonance
between the law and the immediate interests of the client by encour-
aging acquiescence to the client. ' 367 Some commentators saw the pro-
mulgation of the Model Rules as a conceptual advance, moving from
the Code's model of the lawyer as a partisan advocate to a model with
a clearer recognition of the lawyer's duties to the legal system in gen-
eral and considering the propriety of a lawyer's own values in repre-
sentation decisions.368 Nevertheless, commentators recognized that
365. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3 (1980). See also id EC
7-4 ("advocate may urge any permissible construction of the law favorable to his client,
without regard to his professional opinion on the likelihood that the construction will ulti-
mately prevail"); id. EC 7-9 (in exercising judgment on behalf of client, lawyer should
"always act in a manner consistent with the best interests of his client").
366. See, e.g., Maute, supra note 80, at 16-19; Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note
196, at 1085, 1087-88; Wilkins, supra note 308, at 471-73. Professor Simon characterizes this
as the "arguably legal maxim" or "libertarian approach"-under which loyalty to client is
the distinctive lawyer role with "no direct responsibility to third parties or the public other
than those the system imposes on citizens generally." Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra
note 196, at 1085, 1087.
367. Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in
LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRAcncEs: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROFESSION 230, 251 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992); see Maute, supra note 80, at 16-
20 (emphasis on zeal rather than legal boundaries); Wilkins, supra note 308, at 473 (resolv-
ing doubts in client's favor places partisanship at center of lawyer role). Critics of the
ethical rules also maintain that rules are written with sufficient ambiguity and generality
and underenforced to such an extent that only the most egregious violations will be
reached; tendencies toward self-interest and pursuit of client's desires regardless of ulti-
mate cost to society are tolerated, if not encouraged outright. See Nelson & Trubek, supra
note 184, at 183-85; Maute, supra note 80, at 18, 20-21.
368. See Maute, supra note 80, at 19-21; Schneyer, supra note 21, at 137-38; Wilkins,
supra note 309, at 480-81. But see Hazard, supra note 358, at 1262-63 (arguing the Model
Rules impose no independent professional restraint on litigation; the 1936 ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics evidenced more hostility toward litigation and more clearly empha-
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change would not occur "so long as the ethic of zealous advocacy is
the... accepted professional norm. '369 Post-1983 commentary on the
ethical rules and the negative response to Rule 26(a) disclosure seem
to indicate, however, that traditional zealous advocacy has retained its
primacy in the model of lawyer conduct accepted by lawyers even
under the Model Rules regime3 70
The fundamental point that many lawyers may have lost sight of
is that the formal ethical rules require compliance with the law.
Although the ethics rules' recognition of zealous advocacy on behalf
of the client might result in some deference to the client's interest as
the attorney interprets and argues the law, the legal boundaries are
ultimately going to be determined by the courts applying a very differ-
ent standard.371 Indeed, while lawyers have continued to tout the tra-
sized the profession's duty of deference to the courts). Professor Maute saw a shift away
from the primacy of zealous advocacy, particularly because of the elimination from the
operative portion of the Model Rules, the encouragement of zealous representation, and
substitution of more objective standards to govern litigation conduct, such as the Model
Rule 3.1 requirement of nonfrivolous basis for claims or defenses and the Rule 3.4(d) re-
quirement that lawyers make a reasonably diligent effort to comply with legally proper
discovery requests. Maute, supra note 80, at 19-20. The concept of zealous advocacy has
not been completely purged from the rules, but seems to have been diluted. The Preamble
to the Model Rules states that a "lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the
rules of the adversary system" and states that "a lawyer can be a zealous advocate" when
the other side is well represented, but also states that "[a] lawyer's conduct should conform
to the requirements of the law." MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Preamble
(1983) (emphasis added). The concept of zeal also appears in the comments to Rule 1.3 on
lawyer diligence, but is far more tempered than that in the Model Code. The Rule states:
"A lawyer should act ... with zeal in advocacy" but is "not bound to press for every
advantage that might be realized for the client." MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUcr Rule 1.3 cmt. (1983). Noticeably absent from either the rules or the commentary is
the equivalent of the Model Code's EC 7-3 principle of resolving doubts as to legality in
favor of the client. Id.
369. Maute, supra note 80, at 20. See also Eliot Freidson, Professionalism as Model
and Ideology, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAwYERS' PRACrICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 215, 227 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) (disciplinary
code reforms restricted to only those things acceptable to heterogeneous bar).
370. See Wilkins, supra note 308, at 471-73, 499-500; Simon, Ideology of Advocacy,
supra note 300, at 85, 88. See also Campbell & Rea, supra note 124, at 241-43 (discussing
discovery duties under Model Rules and rules of procedure before disclosure rule adopted
in Arizona-zealous representation outweighed any countervailing duty to the court to
present the truth); Cure, supra note 296, at 81 & n.102 (discussing traditional emphasis on
every tactical advantage for client over duties to court); Mayer, supra note 22, at 99-101
(arguing imposing discovery burdens ethical); Zlaket, supra note 4, at 6 (suggesting attor-
ney responses to new disclosure rules evidence misunderstanding of the "legitimate bound-
aries of advocacy" and that zealous advocacy leads to unjustified discovery delay, evasion,
obfuscation, or other such conduct in name of client representation).
371. See generally Gorham, supra note 281, at 771-72 (discussing different standard
applied by Washington Supreme Court to lawyers' claims that they were merely doing their
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dition of zealous advocacy, the judiciary has perceived an increase in
incivility in the practice of law in recent years spurred by an increase
in the confrontational "win at all costs" mentality.372 The courts have
looked disdainfully on attorneys' almost talismanic invocation of the
principle that "the duty to represent a client zealously is paramount
when it conflicts with any obligation to the administration of justice,"
and courts have rejected this notion as "indefensible as a matter of
law."'373 The point is quite simply that in the courts, zealous advocacy
adversarial duty in the discovery process); Wilkins, supra note 308, at 476-77 (discussing
the differences in the manner judges and lawyers apply law). See, e.g., Washington Physi-
cians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054, 1079 (Wash. 1993) (discovery
conduct "is to be measured against the spirit and purpose of the rules, not against the
standard of practice of the local bar").
372. See, e.g., Marvin E. Aspen, The Search for Renewed Civility in Litigation, 28 VAL.
U. L. REv. 513, 515-19 (1994); Brent E. Dickson & Julia Bunton Jackson, Renewing Law-
yer Civility, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 531 (1994); Keeton, supra note 52, at 13; Zlaket, supra note
4, at 6 & n.25. For example, because of a perception of increased unprofessional attorney
conduct, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit undertook a study of
civility and professionalism in the bar and eventually published a set of aspirational "Stan-
dards for Professional Conduct." FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMrTEE ON CIVILrrY OF THE
SEVENTH FEDERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, reprinted in 143 F.R.D. 441 (1992). Many of the
aspirational standards that address common forms of discovery abuse merely reflect the
duties legally imposed on counsel by the Federal Rules. Compare "Lawyers Duties to
other Counsel," numbers 19 through 27 (prohibiting discovery for purposes of harassment,
undue burden or increase in expenses; requiring good faith construction of discovery re-
quests to include relevant nonprivileged information; and requiring objections to discovery
to be based on good faith belief in merits and not for delay or nondisclosure of relevant
information) (Aspen, supra at 526-27) with FED. R. Cry. P. 26(b)(2) (scope and limits on
discovery) and 26(g) (discovery certification that all discovery requests, responses, and ob-
jections be consistent with the Federal Rules on discovery, not be imposed for an improper
purpose such as "to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation," and not be "unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive").
One question that arises is why this apparent redundancy exists with matters already
covered under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and other controlling disciplinary
rules. One disturbing possibility is that the civility code, purportedly an aspirational non-
binding set of rules intended to set standards above those of existing rules, is actually an
effort to water down the existing rules by suggesting that certain behaviors are not covered
by formal rules. Cf. Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism and Class Ideology: Civility
Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 657, 684 (1994) ("lawyer regulation may be
evolving backwards"). On the other hand, the possibility that the reiteration of discovery
duties may only be for emphasis is supported by the Preamble to the Seventh Circuit's
Standards, which states that "[niothing in these standards supersedes or detracts from ex-
isting disciplinary codes or alters existing standards of conduct .... Aspen, supra at 524
(emphasis added).
373. Aspen, supra note 372, at 519; see Winter supra note 18, at 271; Zlaket, supra note
4, at 6; see, e.g., Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co. 987 F.2d 1536, 1546 (11th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 181 (1993). Malautea is particularly relevant to the discussion of the
adversarial zealotry criticism of the disclosure rules. In that case, which involved a prod-
ucts liability suit against the manufacturer of a sport vehicle that rolled over and severely
injured the plaintiff, the court entered severe sanctions against the defendant and the attor-
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and its derivative doctrines of the attorney-client privilege and work
product protection are not given the broad scope or primacy that they
have been given by much of the profession.
The profession's natural gravitation toward an expansive defini-
tion of zealous client representation and application of the "arguably
legal" standard is particularly predictable and significant in the con-
text of discovery, which itself is intended as a limitation on partisan-
ship.3 74 Because it occurs largely outside the immediate controlling
influence of the court and because discovery requests typically involve
substantial indeterminacy, the scope of discovery is particularly sub-
ject to lawyer manipulation if partisanship is embraced as the primary
operating principle.375 This is epitomized by the traditionally ac-
cepted approach to discovery in which facts and documents need only
be made available to an opposing party in response to a "proper" re-
neys for discovery abuse. The sanctions included a default judgment against the defendant
for failure to comply with court discovery orders to turn over documents; costs and attor-
neys fees against the counsel for bad faith involvement in covering up discoverable materi-
als; and imposition of additional fines against the attorneys for other forms of discovery
abuse and resistance. Unfortunately, many of the particular examples of discovery abuse
involved were far from uncommon, such as disingenuously objecting to interrogatories as
ambiguous, construing interrogatory requests in an overly narrow manner, delaying pro-
duction of information and deposition transcripts to hinder plaintiffs counsel's prepara-
tion, and hiding damaging relevant information. Malautea, 987 F.2d at 1540.
In commenting on the frequency of discovery abuse in the courts today and the twist-
ing of discovery rules into powerful adversarial weapons for the benefit only of clients, the
Malautea court stated:
All attorneys, as "officers of the court," owe duties of complete candor and
primary loyalty to the court before which they practice. An attorney's duty to a
client can never outweigh his or her responsibility to see that our system of justice
functions smoothly. This concept is as old as common law jurisprudence itself....
Unfortunately, the American Bar Assbciation's current Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct underscore the duty to advocate zealously while neglecting the
corresponding duty to advocate within the bounds of the law. As a result... too
many attorneys, like defense counsel in this case, have allowed the objectives of
the client to override their ancient duties as officers of the court. In short they
have sold out to the client.
Id. at 1546-47. See also Fisons, 858 P.2d at 1084 (rejecting lawyer's claim that good lawyer-
ing required that lawyers for defendant not disclose documents and stating that "lawyer's
duty" to place his client's interest ahead of all others presupposes the lawyer will live with
the rules that govern the system); Williams v. General Motors Corp., 158 F.R.D. 510, 511-
12 (M.D. Ga. 1993) (imposing sanctions on attorneys for seeking sanctions against an op-
posing counsel who had to cancel a deposition because of his father's terminal illness and
commenting on the excess in zeal displayed); Keeton, supra note 52, at 13 (finding advo-
cacy has become excessively zealous compared to traditional model under the original Ca-
nons of Ethics).
374. See Wolfson, supra note 32, at 50; supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
375. See Frankel, Cure for Discovery Ills, supra note 124, at 261-63; Schwarzer, In De-
fense, supra note 166, at 658-59; Wilkins, supra note 308, at 477, 481, 505.
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quest-one that is unobjectionable, unambiguous, and inescapable.
Attorneys play this game, in the name of best serving the client inter-
est, by avoiding disclosure through finding an ambiguity or a basis for
objection. The common first instinct has been "[h]ow can I interpret
this interrogatory, or document request, to avoid giving up what I
know my opponent is after?" 376 As discussed above, however, courts
have had a very different view of these same practices, often charac-
terizing them not as legitimate discovery advocacy but instead as "ob-
struction, obfuscation, evasion, [or] destruction... under the guise of
sound legal maneuvering or client representation.
'377
Traditional lawyer discovery practice based on the primacy of
zealous advocacy is integrally related to a basic assumption about liti-
gant conduct that litigants and their attorneys will rationally act in
their own immediate self-interest. In the context of discovery, this
means that, as long as the cost or risk to the litigants from failing to
disclose information is less than the cost of disclosing the information,
the litigant will rationally "conceal, and lie about, unfavorable infor-
376. Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at 659; see, e.g., Campbell & Rea, supra
note 124, at 242-43; Enoch, supra note 306, at 225. Indeed, one of the great benefits of the
discovery game that depends so substantially on the ability of the opponent to ask the right
question is the possibility that either through ignorance or incompetence, the opponent
will fail to ask the right question. See Margaret A. Berger, Civil Litigation in the Twenty-
First Century: A Panel Discussion, 59 BROOK. L. Rnv. 1199, 1209 (1993) (quoting remarks
of Ralph K. Winter, former member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, regarding
the hysteria over disclosure); see also Cortese & Blaner, supra note 294, at 45; Napolitano,
supra note 349, at 26, 29. The pervasiveness of lawyers' acceptance of such practices was
recently demonstrated in Fisons, in which the court sanctioned the lawyers and defendant
for failing to disclose "smoking gun" documents in a products liability case despite the fact
that the documents were clearly encompassed by the plaintiff's discovery request. The
lawyers offered as part of their defense testimony by "expert" witness lawyers and academ-
ics to support the contention that "[d]iscovery is an adversarial process and good lawyering
required the responses made in this case." 858 P.2d at 1083. Moreover, one of the experts
asserted that "[t]endentious, narrow and literal positions with regard to discovery are...
both typical and expected in the civil discovery process." Gorham, supra note 281, at 771
n.42 (quoting Declaration of Professor Boerner). See also Bryan P. Hametiaux et al., Har-
nessing Adversariness in Discovery Responses: A Proposal for Measuring the Duty to Dis-
close After Physicians Insurance Exchange & Ass'n v. Fisons Corporation, 29 GONz. L.
Rnv. 499 (1994) (discussing Fisons case and civil discovery abuse).
377. Zlaket, supra note 4, at 6; see also supra note 373. The divergence between the
courts' views of lawyer tactics and that of lawyers, in addition to evidencing divergent
ethical visions for the profession, may also indicate lawyer cognitive dissonance-the ten-
dency for preconceived notions or beliefs to alter or obscure perceptions of contrary data.
See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 196, at 1139-40. Simon suggests that "a strong
presumption in favor of the client may blind the advocate to opposing considerations that
will be important to the judge ...." Id. at 1140.
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mation."378 The great benefit of expansive lawyer interpretation and
application of the principle of zealous representation, as well as the
work product and attorney-client doctrines, are that to a certain de-
gree they legitimize concealment and reduce the number of instances
in which actual lying is required. By doing so, they reduce the level of
internal conflict that lawyers must face in their professional lives as
they undertake conduct for the benefit of a client that should be unac-
ceptable on a personal level.3
79
The perceived dissonance of the disclosure rule and the accepted
traditional practice is greatly magnified, in the eyes of lawyers who
embrace the partisan ethic, by the fact that under Rule 26(a) disclo-
sure, lawyers supposedly must apply their analytical skills for the ben-
efit of the opposing party as they evaluate the relevance of documents
and information for purposes of disclosure. While disclosure oppo-
nents probably exaggerate the extent to which this differs from the
lawyer's duties to other parties and the courts under the predisclosure
federal civil litigation system,380 proponents of disclosure must do
378. Hay, supra note 42, at 483. Costs or risks can include, but are not limited to,
losing a civil case or incurring sanctions from the court for specific conduct. Other less
immediate factors that may influence litigants' cost-benefit analysis could include more
long-term costs, such as the precedential effect of a case and the effect of litigant behavior
on reputation in the legal community and future employment. See also Frankel, Cure for
Discovery Ills, supra note 124, at 261-63 (examining general incentives and pressures for
discovery abuse); Maute, supra note 80, at 49 (finding "opportunities and incentives to
cheat [in discovery] are enormous"); Wilkins, supra note 308, at 494 (arguing that lawyer
economics and the extent that lawyers will exploit indeterminacy are "inextricably
intertwined").
The litigants' self-interests in discovery do not, however, necessarily coincide with so-
ciety's interests, which may include minimizing social costs, the policies of substantive law
being enforced, and increasing the fairness and objective accuracy of settlements and trials.
Hay, supra note 42, at 483, 497-98; Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 42, at 436.
379. Cf. Simon, Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 300, at 126-28 (describing "proce-
dural fetishism," which is exemplified by focusing on procedure rather than substantive
values at stake and engaging in conduct that would not be acceptable based on one's own
values or those of the society).
380. For example, under Rule 11 lawyers have been required to undertake a reason-
able inquiry into the factual and legal support for their papers and pleadings and can be
sanctioned for making unwarranted arguments, claims, and defenses. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
The analytical duties imposed by this rule to reign in zealous advocates and deter frivolous
litigation serve primarily the interests of courts and opposing litigants. See FED. R. CIV. P.
11 advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983); Maute, supra note 80, at 28. In
the case of Rule 11, the standard that must be met is one of nonfrivolity, which leaves
much room for lawyers to maneuver on behalf of their clients. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11
advisory committee's note, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583, 586-87 (1993); LuBAN, supra note
300, at 51; Wilkins, supra note 308, at 505. Even so, much of the recent controversy over
Rule 11 may arise out of the clash between the rule's demands and the culture of adversary
zeal.
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more to demonstrate that the change is not significant than simply
stating that the "disclosure obligation is directly proportional to the
specificity of the allegations" in the pleading. 381 This relates only to
the amount of information that is potentially subject to disclosure.
However, it must be acknowledged that the rule represents a funda-
mental shift in who has primary responsibility for determining what
information is relevant and the basis upon which the determination is
made. In the discovery system, it is the requesting party who initially
must, through a discovery request, identify what facts and information
it believes are relevant. This occurs somewhat blindly at a level of
generality at first, and then with greater specificity, as more and more
information is obtained during the discovery process.38 2 Under Rule
26(a), it is the party in possession of the evidence that makes the ini-
tial determination of what is relevant and what will be disclosed. The
analysis of relevance will be based on the theories and facts alleged in
the opposing party's pleading and the discussions with the opposition
during the mandatory Rule 26(f) conference.383
Because the disclosure obligation is tied to an opposing party's
allegations of fact in the pleadings, the initial stage of traditional dis-
covery based on specific requests and the new rule 26(a)(1) appear to
be similar in the sense that the party seeking information can influ-
ence the extent of the disclosure in both cases by the specificity of
language they use. In most cases, the disclosure obligation and discov-
ery obligations would seem to result in roughly the same investigatory
and analytical effort by parties to exchange the same information. 384
Similarly, under the traditional discovery regime, analytical work undertaken by law-
yers to prepare their cases, including work interpreting the allegations of the pleading and
search for relevant materials, could inure to the benefit of their opponents through discov-
ery. However, in that context, there was the intermediate, necessarily "proper discovery
request" and ensuing game that would have to be played before the opponent would be
able to benefit.
381. Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at 660.
382. See Frankel, Cure for Discovery Ills, supra note 124, at 252-53. Frankel notes that
the traditional discovery process is one in which initial discovery takes the form of basic
interrogatories asking an opposing party to identify potential witnesses and documents that
exist and that are relevant to specific matters identified in the discovery request. Based on
the information obtained, document requests, depositions, and more interrogatories are
undertaken that yield additional relevant information that may expand the scope of the
requests made for additional information through more interrogatories, depositions, and
requests for production. Id. at 253 n.17.
383. See Frankel, Cure for Discovery Ills, supra note 124, at 253, 265; supra note 241-
246 and accompanying text.
384. However, substantial differences, could be expected in the amount of discovery
proceedings, disputes, and delays that occurred before the exchange of the information.
See Napolitano, supra note 349, at 29 (arguing that the same information comes out under
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The difference rests primarily in the level of specificity of language
that will trigger a disclosure of information and, more important, in
the fact that under Rule 26(a) the party disclosing information is in a
far better position to identify relevant information because of its supe-
rior knowledge and access to information that is potentially rele-
vant.38 5 The result should generally be the disclosure of more relevant
information than under traditional discovery, and it is this prospect
that seems to be at the heart of the concern by lawyers committed to
the tradition of zealous advocacy.
Thus, while Rule 26(a)(1) disclosure reaches a relatively modest
amount of the information involved in traditional discovery, it wreaks
havoc with the partisan conception of standard ethical operating pro-
cedure. By eliminating the requirement that there be a "proper" dis-
covery request 386 and sending the overt message that there is a legal
obligation of disclosure period, Rule 26(a) clearly signals the reversal
of two of the central systematic tenets of traditional zealous advocacy
in the context of discovery. When potential conflicts arise between a
lawyer's ethical duty as an officer of the court to disclose facts and a
lawyer's ethical duty to represent the client's interest, the duty to the
court and the administration of justice rather than client interest take
disclosure 98% of the time that would eventually come out under discovery anyway, after
more unnecessary delays and costs); Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at 660.
385. See Frankel, Cure for Discovery Ills, supra note 124, at 265. A simple illustration
of this would be as follows: A plaintiff brings a products liability case alleging that a manu-
facturing defect caused the plaintiff's injuries. The defendant manufacturer is aware that
the product was intentionally manufactured employing a design that was likely to cause the
type of injury suffered by the plaintiff but which was more cost effective. During tradi-
tional discovery, a plaintiff might seek the "identification of all persons with knowledge of
the manufacturing process applicable to this product." Applying the narrow reading, such
an interrogatory would be given under the zealous advocacy "arguably legal" ethics ap-
proach, and (after objecting that this interrogatory is unreasonably vague, broad, and bur-
densome, thereby delaying disclosure and potentially triggering additional discovery
proceedings) the defendant would disclose names of persons with knowledge of how the
product was actually manufactured, but not the names of person with knowledge about the
design defect. In the same circumstances under Rule 26(a) disclosure, the plaintiff might
allege in the complaint that plaintiff "was injured while using defendant's product and that
the injury was caused by that product." In this circumstance, a defendant with knowledge
of the design defect arguably has a duty to disclose the names of persons with knowledge
of the existence of the defect, although, predictably, some defendants would argue that the
facts are not alleged with particularity. Cf. Campbell & Rea, supra note 124, at 245.
386. As discussed in the section on practical criticisms of the disclosure rule, there is a
potential for at least some traditional application of the "arguably legal" partisan approach
focused now on the "pleaded with particularity" standard in Rule 26(a). See supra notes
192, 200-201, 232-234 and accompanying text. Even if this admittedly indeterminate stan-
dard becomes the new field for discovery games, the field for lawyer maneuvering should
be somewhat narrower.
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primacy. Furthermore, instead of an adversarial presumption that the
lawyer's first duty is one of nondisclosure, there is now a presumption
of disclosure of relevant information.3
87
Because the disclosure rule is explicit about the duty to disclose
certain basic relevant information and takes the disclosure of that in-
formation outside the traditional discovery dynamic, the rule also re-
stricts the opportunity for partisanship by reducing the legal
parameters within which indeterminacy of rules and language can be
interpreted by lawyers applying the "arguably legal" or "benefit of the
doubt to client interest" perspectives. 388 Finally, the rule also moves
further toward delineation of lawyers' duties based on "purposivism"
instead of maximizing client interests.389 The rule expressly instructs
lawyers that there is a unilateral duty to disclose both adverse and
favorable information and emphasizes the function of discovery in ef-
ficiently and fairly ensuring that all parties to a civil dispute have ac-
cess to relevant information to be used toward the just resolution of
the dispute. By ensuring access to relevant information, the rule fur-
ther erodes the traditional model of the lawyers' duty based on "zeal-
ous advocacy within the bounds of the law" and accentuates the vision
that federal rules and federal courts have been expressing with greater
volume and frequency in recent years: lawyers primary duty in federal
court civil litigation is "'to assist in carrying out [the] "essential pur-
poses" or "social functions" [of the law], or at the very least refrain
from acting so as to subvert and nullify the purposes of the rules.'
' 390
At least one explanation, then, for the claims of inconsistency of
Rule 26(a) with the adversarial system's ethical rules, work product
protection, and attorney-client privilege is that the formal legal and
ethical rules, at least as envisioned by the courts, are inconsistent with
387. See Campbell & Rea, supra note 124, at 242-47; Enoch, supra note 306, at 224;
Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at 659-60.
388. This is due in no small part to the fact that, despite the retention of standards such
as tying disclosure to the particularity of facts alleged, as soon as the lawyer analyzes the
facts of a case to determine if disclosure of something is in the client's immediate interest
and concludes that it is not, the lawyer may well have also made the determination that it is
relevant and therefore must be disclosed. See, e.g., the fact pattern discussed supra note
385.
389. "Purposivism" as used here is the notion that "lawyers should demonstrate
greater allegiance to the public purposes of legal rules." Wilkins, supra note 308, at 505;
see also Simon, Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 300, at 62.
390. Wilkins, supra note 308, at 506; see also Schwarzer, In Defense, supra note 166, at
660 n.21. Judge Schwarzer captured the essence of this point in his response to Justice
Scalia's contention that disclosure does not "fit comfortably" within our adversarial sys-
tem, when he stated that the "safeguards and incentives of the adversary process do not
work well in the discovery process." Id.
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the actual lawyer culture or the generally accepted operating rules of
lawyers in the civil litigation system. Under this view, it is a mistake
to assume that the official canons of the profession taught in the law
schools and reflected in the official rules governing lawyer conduct
actually reflect the ideology of the profession.3 91 Instead, the relation-
ship between actual practice and formal rules is far more complex.
Ideology reflected in official formal rules can influence lawyers to re-
sist economic and client pressures and behave consistently with the
rules. On the other hand, pressures, incentives, and influences gener-
ated in legal practice can directly influence the content or lawyers'
interpretation of ethics and procedural rules so that the understanding
and application of the rules reflects a quite different perspective on
ethics, one largely determined by individual self-interest. At times the
formal rule system and actual lawyer workplace rules may simply be
inconsistent with each other.392
This dynamic can be seen in the controversy over the disclosure
rule, which seems to have fallen very close to the fulcrum of the tradi-
tional tension between the lawyers' duty as client advocate and the
lawyers' duty as officer of the court. While the disclosure rule is not
inconsistent with the formal doctrines governing lawyer conduct, it is
inconsistent with the informal workplace practices and ideologies ac-
cepted by a large number of lawyers. The result is that, in the course
of reacting to the proposed rule on disclosure and in attempting to
influence the formal rules, lawyers and the organized bar have re-
vealed not only inconsistencies between the traditional adversarial
ideology and the disclosure rule, but also have revealed the inconsis-
tencies of that ideology with other existing formal rules governing civil
litigation practice. It will be interesting to watch the dynamic unfold
further as Rule 26(a) is applied. Perhaps the rule will positively influ-
391. See generally Nelson & Trubek, supra note 185, at 181-214 (discussing lawyers'
professional ideologies taken in context); see also Hazard, supra note 358, at 1250-51; Wil-
kins, supra note 308, at 488. This does not mean, necessarily, that there is a single, unified,
consistent ideology or agreement about appropriate lawyer behavior among individual
lawyers; varied and conflicting views abound and the profession must be viewed as ethi-
cally pluralistic. Idt; Hazard, supra note 358, at 1251; Nelson & Trubek, supra note 184, at
187; Schneyer, supra note 21, at 97. Indeed, even within the disciplinary codes are "frag-
mentary and often incompatible conceptions of the lawyers' role vying for dominance,"
such as the lawyer as partisan, as officer of the court, as counselor, as servant of the public
interest. Id. at 102; see also Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 196, at 1133 (stating
"there has never been a consensus about where to draw the line between" a lawyer's duties
to the court and as an advocate).
392. See Nelson & Trubek, supra note 184, at 188, 199, 206; supra text accompanying
notes 106-114.
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ence the ethical behavior of attorneys. On the other hand, the infor-
mal adversarial ethic may ultimately prevail over the ethical model
presented by the formal disclosure rule, through the use of the polit-
ical process to obtain a rule change,3 93 or the use of an eviscerating
and narrowing interpretation of Rule 26(a), or perhaps simply
through noncompliance, leaving the workplace discovery practices of
lawyers unchanged. 394
Conclusion
The seemingly intractable nature of discovery problems in the
federal courts is striking. The literature on federal court practice is
filled, particularly over the last three decades, with recurring concerns
about evasion of discovery and the use of discovery as a tactical
weapon despite the repeated efforts at procedural reform. The lim-
ited empirical evidence suggests that while discovery abuse is not as
pervasive as one would assume based on the volume of claims in the
literature, there is a constant, significant level of problem discovery
393. See supra notes 169-177 and accompanying text, discussing the intensive lobbying
efforts for repeal of the rule or for districts to opt out of Rule 26(a). See also Daniel Wise,
3 Bar Groups Seek Delay in Federal Discovery Changes, N.Y. L.J., June 9, 1994, at 1, 2
(defense bar organizations attempt to get Southern District of New York to delay imple-
mentation of Rule 26(a) in order to allow empirical data on efficacy of disclosure to be
gathered); Elaine Song, District's Judge Opposes Mandatory Disclosure Rule, CONN. L.
TRIB., Feb. 6, 1995, at 6 (discussing Connecticut district court's considering opting out of
disclosure rule and opposition by attorneys to rule).
394. At least one early example supporting a pessimistic view appeared recently in
Litigation (The Journal of the Section of Litigation of the American Bar Association), in
which an article on document production under the new Rule 26(a) sarcastically and pejo-
ratively referred to the "preenlightenment days" (Le., before the 1993 rule amendments)
and proceeded to list ways the bar can continue to "nonproduce" documents, including
"arguing that the document was not relevant to "disputed fact[s] 'alleged with particularity
in the pleadings."' R. Bruce Beckner, Advance Sheet, LrrG., Spring 1994, at 49. Other
ways of avoiding production included asserting (silently to yourself and later to the court if
caught) that the document was not within the scope of a document request, was not in the
file you reasonably searched, or was not "within your custody and control." Id. While the
writer does throw in the caveat that such behavior is "not necessarily" what an attorney
"should" do, the force of this caveat is diluted by the final conclusion that under the new
Rule 26 "it is more important that [sic] ever that [lawyers] work to keep document produc-
tion no worse than a zero-sum game for themselves and their clients." Id. at 51. In the
context of the article, apparently what this means is that an attorney should engage in a
cost-benefit analysis before deciding whether to "nonproduce" and should only consider
producing the "smoking gun" document when the risk or cost from nonproduction out-
weighs the likely cost of production. Noticeably absent is any exhortation of professional-
ism or compliance with the intent of the Civil Rules; instead, the reaction of at least one
representative indicator of the organized bar seems to be much of the same self-interest
that has fueled discovery abuse problems in the past.
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practices.3 95 More importantly, a closer look at the evidence suggests
that a large portion of discovery abuse can be attributed to the dy-
namics and pressures of the adversarial litigation tradition that have
been in constant tension with the utilitarian discovery goal of provid-
ing inexpensive mutual access to information for the purpose of just
resolution of civil disputes. The discovery rules have been unsuccess-
ful in checking partisan tendencies largely because the ambiguous or
indeterminate rules have lent themselves to, or been co-opted by, par-
tisan use and practices and because the courts historically have not
corrected adversarial excesses by strict enforcement of the rules.
The inconsistency between the adversarial tradition and the for-
mal goals of discovery is at the heart of the costly, counterproductive
practices labeled as discovery abuse and is both epitomized and con-
firmed by the controversy over the federal Rule 26(a) disclosure
amendment. Disclosure opposition has focused on the purportedly
impractical nature and operation of the disclosure rule, and critics
have tried to cast the disclosure rule as antithetical to well established
rules and doctrines of the civil litigation system. Upon thorough in-
quiry, however, the arguments that disclosure is so practically flawed
that it should be rejected out of hand are far from compellingly sup-
ported. In fact, the pragmatic attack on disclosure is really secondary
to the widely shared perception that disclosure is inconsistent with ad-
versarial traditions and discovery practices that have been embraced
without question by much of the profession for too many years. When
the disclosure rule is scrutinized in the context of the formal doctrines
that compose our federal civil litigation system, few, if any, significant
inconsistencies can be found with the formal rules. Instead, disclosure
of the basic information called for by Rule 26(a)(1) is consistent with
the procedural and ethical doctrines and rules that have been devel-
oped to achieve the goals of discovery and just civil dispute resolution.
In addition, the disclosure rule more clearly and unequivocally com-
municates those goals to the profession.
Reduced to its essence, what arguably so inflames the critics of
disclosure is that the rule says it is not permissible for lawyers and
clients who are aware of relevant evidence that is unfavorable to the
395. One explanation for the difference between the amount of discovery abuse identi-
fied empirically and that identified in the literature relates to who is defining or identifying
the abuse. Most empirical studies measure the perspectives of lawyers acculturated to ad-
versarial discovery practices that may be at odds with the language and intent of formal
discovery rules. The general literature, on the other hand, primarily created by academics,
uses consistency with language and intent of the formal discovery rules as the gauge of
abuse.
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client to rely on traditional adversarial gamesmanship to avoid the dis-
closure of that information. The lawyer in possession of evidence
tending to show that the claim should not have been brought or a
defense should not be made, can no longer rely on well-worn strate-
gies like waiting for the "proper request," delaying tactics, or hoping
that the other side fails to request the information. 396 Instead, the
underlying premise of disclosure is that the outcome of civil litigation
should relate more closely to the substantive merits than to the will-
ingness and ability of counsel to stretch partisan zealotry to its limits
at a potentially significant, unwarranted cost to the civil justice system.
It attempts to serve this end by reducing only slightly the field of ad-
versarial contest, but in this reduction it is revolutionary.
Because lawyers have had the adversarial tradition "drummed
into them" throughout their careers, some commentators are justifia-
bly skeptical about the prospects for success of any discovery or other
litigation reforms that are inconsistent with lawyers' perception of the
adversarial system-regardless of whether it will benefit society or the
lawyers in the long run.397 Admittedly the legal profession's reaction
to the disclosure rule provides much support for this skepticism.
However, the mere inconsistency of traditional practice and informal
ideology with the disclosure rule is not a reason for rejection of the
rule, both as a matter of principle and because the existence of the
rule can influence positively systematic client and lawyer behavior.
For many years commentators decrying the abuse of pretrial dis-
covery have asserted that improvement is unlikely absent a significant
change in the litigation culture and conceptions of professionalism.
398
As Judge Keeton, former Chair of the Standing Committee on the
396. The reaction to disclosure arguably exemplifies how completely the legal profes-
sion's ideology of advocacy has embraced what William Simon has labeled "[p]rocedural
fetishism," which is exemplified by focusing on procedure rather than substantive values at
stake: "The present system encourages the prosecution of claims which would not be pur-
sued by people who were forced to seriously confront their own and society's values."
Simon, Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 300, at 126-28.
397. See Berger, supra note 376, at 1208 (quoting remarks of attorney Kenneth R.
Feinberg). See also id. at 1209 ("[M]aybe we need to lobotomize lawyers away from their
adversarialism. But I think that with out strong judicial enforcement, a lot of these propos-
als are going to be doomed to failure." (quoting remarks of Professor Jeffrey W. Stempel)).
398. See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 52, at 13 (enforcement of precise rules alone is not
enough; also need professional culture); Mullenix, supra note 18, at 820, 827-28 (more than
rules changes are necessary; must treat cause and must develop aspirational professional-
ism); John W. Reed, Light-Hearted Thoughts About Discovery Reform, 3 REv. LrTG. 215,
221 (1983) (analogy to killing dinosaur of discovery abuse: nobody killed the dinosaurs-
the climate changed and the climate must change as to discovery); Walker, supra note 57,
at 811, 820 ("rules of procedure and principles of professionalism often mirror one an-
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Federal Rules of Practice, recently noted, this requires unitary cooper-
ation and efforts from all parts of the profession, including the courts,
legal practitioners, the government, and the academy, with the Rule 1
mandate for "just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every ac-
tion" serving as the guidepost.399 It includes "developing a profes-
sional culture that encourages skilled advocacy and discourages
Rambo tactics" and "a widely shared expectation about what is and
what is not permissible," training lawyers and judges in the effective
practice techniques and how to appropriately address deviations from
effective practice, and adopting new and improved rules for the
twenty-first century.4°° A critical aspect of a change in pretrial litiga-
tion culture is to overcome the traditional approach that focuses on
immediate or short-term clients' interests and assumes that zealous
representation of those interests is invariably at odds with society's
overall interest in discouraging strategic (i.e., frivolous) litigation and
partisan discovery practices. Given the current widespread public dis-
satisfaction with lawyers and the legal system,401 it is time for a fresh
look at what practices are in the client's best interest. While it is prob-
ably true that the public would agree in the abstract with notions of
"zealous representation," in the long term, clients' interests are most
rationally served by rules that serve the maximum social benefit
rather than individual immediate interests.4°2 For this change to oc-
cur, however, lawyers must overcome not only their clients' tenden-
cies toward counterproductive immediate self-interest, but their own
shortsighted competitive self-interests.
403
other," and even though "rules of procedure can express principles of professionalism," the
rules cannot embody them and "there are limits to what they can accomplish").
399. FED. R. CIrv. P. 1. See Keeton, supra note 52, at 16.
400. Keeton, supra note 52, at 16.
401. See generally Karen O'Connor, Civil Justice Reform and Prospects for Change, 59
BROOK. L. REv. 917 (1993) (examining the public's poor perception of the legal profession
and arguing for the necessity of an overhaul of the legal system). In particular, opinion
polls show that the public believes that the system is too slow, costly, and incomprehensible
and that lawyers are greedy and untrustworthy. Id. at 922-25. It would be interesting to
know what the public would think of lawyers' arguments regarding disclosure-particu-
larly why it is ever proper to hide relevant evidence. As noted previously, in one study of
lay opinions, regarding the obligations to disclose information, clients adopted a much
broader view of a disclosure obligation than have attorneys or the rules. See supra note
321.
402. See Gilson, supra note 124, at 874-75 (advocating Rawlesian approach to client
interest). See also Gordon & Simon, supra note 368, at 251-52 (finding corporations can be
unexpectedly responsive to regulatory reforms that may be socially responsible, even ap-
plying an "amoral" economic analysis).
403. See Garth, supra note 52, at 932-35 (discussing effect of client demands and citing
Posner for pessimistic view that only value is what sells); Gilson, supra note 124, at 884-86;
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As a mere rules change, the disclosure rule is unlikely to solve
pretrial discovery abuse.4°4 Indeed, the criticism is well taken that it
may result in short-term increased burdens on the courts as the novel
concept is applied to a profession steeped in a resilient partisan tradi-
tion.40 5 Nevertheless, the disclosure rule, by unequivocally stating a
fundamental obligation of automatic mutual access to basic informa-
tion, could well represent a significant, albeit faltering, step toward
meaningful litigation culture change. Given the obdurateness of dis-
covery abuse and the profession's unquestioning acceptance of the
partisan tradition, those interested in genuine reform must be willing
to fight extraordinarily hard for even such incremental
improvement.
40 6
Brazil, Front Lines, supra note 57, at 243-44; Brazil, Lawyers' Views, supra note 57, at 860-
61. However, in Brazil's study, lawyers indicated that even in large cases client pressure to
evade discovery requests was not common and was considered the source of fewest
problems. Id. 861-62.
404. See, e.g., Brazil, Improving Controls, supra note 57, at 946 (changes in rules will
result in only gradual changes in attorney behavior).
405. In light of modest gains likely to result from disclosure, the unintended side ef-
fects, such as additional dispute costs and satellite litigation costs, make the rule particu-
larly subject to further attack and potential retrenchment similar to that recently occurring
with regard to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See Frankel, Cure for Discovery Ills,
supra note 124, at 273.
406. See Marcus, Prospects, supra note 4, at 813 ("For the pragmatist, the question is
not so much whether changes achieve an ideal but whether they work an improvement.");
Marcus, Revival, supra note 223, at 494 (In "an adversarial system in which litigants and
lawyers try to use the procedures that exist to the advantage of their clients. .... as tinker-
ers, we will have to repeat the cycle of revision and relapse again and again.").
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